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The vagueness of
in

there being both

a

H.

Partee

vague sentence intuitively consists

a

deficiency in its meaning and

multiplicity of things which

a

a

speaker might mean by it.

One who knows the meaning is attuned both to the deficiency
and to constraints on the possible speaker’s meanings.

attempt to provide

a

1

theory of speaker’s meaning and of

meaning which does justice to these phenomena.
I

analyze

a

speaker’s meaning as an answer to

a

“What-

do-you-mean (WDYM) "-question, and analyze the latter using
van Fraassen’s theory of why-questions, according to which

why-questions are entities consisting of several contextdependent parameters.

I

argue that speaker’s meaning in the

sense relevant to vagueness is an answer to
with

a

a

WDYM— quest i on

distinctive parameter and which meets certain con-

straints.
0 — reason"

I

—

partially analyze the parameter
and identify the constraints.

I

- a

“conceptual

then elaborate

on the original vagueness phenomena, accounting for the

multiplicity of possible speaker’s meanings
v

in terms of

the

multiplicity of constrained answers, and identifying
positive and
As

a

comparative notion of content deficiency.

a

preliminary to developing the required theory

a
1

ar gue that

the truth of

a

vague sentence is

dependent on speaker’s meaning, and set up

framework which allows for this.

a

Montagovian

posit a speaker’s

I

meaning index coordinate and explore some consequences.
argue that the expression "in

a

i.e.

a

coordinate

extension gaps, and

that speaker’s meanings do not in general narrow gaps.

this way
I

I

1

sense" is an intensional

operator linked to this coordinate, and not to
which eliminates indeterminacy,

of

In

distinguish vagueness from indeterminacy.

he identification of the meaning of a vague sentence

with its Montagovian intension proves to be only partly

successful.

It

does not seem to account for positive or

comparative deficiency of content.
account for

a

But it does seem to

competent speaker’s knowledge of constraints

on possible speaker’s meanings for

a

sentence.

f
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

1

once saw

segment of 60 Minutes in which Mike

a

Wallace interviewed
Scientology.

As

I

prominent member of the Church of

a

recall, part of the interview went

something like this.
Scientologist:
freedom
Wallace:

Scientology is the only road to total

What does that mean?

Scientologist (combatively):
don’t understand?
Wallace:

Well,

I

Is there some word you

don’t have the concept.

The evident point of the scientologist’s barb is that "Sci-

entology is the only road to total freedom" is

a

perfectly

good sentence of English, and hence ought to be comprehensi-

ble to

a

competent speaker of English such as Wallace.

Wallace’s professed lack of under st and i ng
Intuitively, the barb doesn’t work.
answer,

it

seems to me,

is

So

dishonest.
The

But why not?

something like the following.

is

The sentence "Scientology is the only road to total

freedom" is, true enough,
English.

And,

a

true enough,

perfectly good sentence of
in virtue of

this it must have

some sort of communal and occasion-invariant meaning.

So

insofar as anyone who knows the meaning may be said to

"understand" the sentence, Wallace indeed must understand.
But the meaning of

a

sentence must be distinguished from

1

2

what the speaker means by the sentence.

The speaker’s

meaning has to do with how the speaker is conceptualizing,
or

"using" an expression, on

the meaning of

a

a

particular occasion.

Unlike

sentence, what the speaker means by

sentence is neither communal nor occ as on- nvar ant
1

i

1

a

So

.

one who knows the meaning will not in general know the

speaker’s meaning.

Wallace’s query.

So there is nothing unreasonable about

For though he "understands" in the sense

of knowing the meaning of the scientologist’s sentence, he

doesn’t "understand" in the sense of knowing what the

scientologist means.
It

might be objected that Wallace does not ask what the

scientologist means, but what "that", i.e. the sentence,
means.

But note, first,

that Wallace could just as easily

have asked "What do you mean by that?", and that this would
be an odd or

meaning.

impossible way of asking for the communal

More fundamentally, note that the scientologist is

surely right in supposing that the sentence has

a

communal

meaning, and that Wallace knows perfectly well what
I

it

is.

mag i ne if the conversation had begun:

Scientologist:
Wallace:

Scientology deliquesces.

What does that mean?

Here Wallace presumably would be asking for the communal
meaning, for he presumably would not know the meaning of one
of the scientologist’s words.

the actual situation.

This clearly contrasts with

Hence we must say either that Wallace

.

3

is

speaking loosely, and incorrectly, or that "the meaning"

sentence can mean either its communal meaning or what

a

the speaker means by it;

the choice depends on one’s atti-

tude toward ordinary usage.
this.

I

don’t want to take

a

stand on

Either alternative is consistent with the distinction

between communal meaning and speaker’s meaning, which
important thing.
that

But to avoid confusion,

will stipulate

"the meaning" of a sentence will henceforth mean its

communal meaning (though
nal

I

is the

mean ng "
i

I

will also continue to use "commu-

)

What makes the distinction between meaning and speak-

er’s meaning crucial

is the fact

that the sentence "Scien-

tology is the only road to total freedom" is vague.

Speci-

fically, the constituents "freedom" and "total freedom" are
vague.

We might say that the scientologist’s problem is

that he assumes that Wallace’s question can be reasonably

asked only if the meaning of the sentence isn’t known, where
in fact

it

can also be reasonably asked if the sentence is

found meaningful but vague.
But what

phenomenon.

is

vagueness?

Consider another example, the sentence "John is

conservative", which
tive".

take it to be a kind of dual

I

is

vague with respect to "conserva-

Intuitively, there is

something which makes
is being said about

a

kind of deficiency here,

difficult to understand just what

it

John.

multiplicity as well,

a

But there seems to be a kind of

multiplicity of possible things

u.

being said about John, e.g.:
John tends not to dress in bright colors
John doesnt like to see the traditions of the
fraternity changed

John’s opinions are cautious
John
and
to

opinions always accord with received views

5

forth.

We might say that these examples correspond

possible "senses" of "conservative".

Note that multi-

plicity stems from possible senses and possible senses of
senses.

only to

For
a

instance,

the last example corresponds, not

possible sense of "John is conservative”, but to

a

possible sense of the third example.
The tension can be resolved by saying that there is

somehow

a

deficiency in the communal meaning, and

a

multi-

plicity of possible speaker’s meanings.

Notice how this

distinguishes vagueness from ambiguity.

In the case of,

e.g.,

"John’s at the bank", we would posit several communal

meanings.

If we

wished to posit different possible speak-

er’s meanings as well, these would evidently have to coincide with the several meanings.

In contrast,

a

vague

sentence has one meaning, and not several but apparently
unlimited possible speaker’s meanings.
Whatever meaning is, the meaning of
as well.

a

vague sentence is

But the meaning of a vague sentence is also in two

ways distinctive, corr espond ng to the two facets of vaguei

ness;

I

will put the point in terms of the abilities of

a

~

5

semantically competent speaker
meaning of

First, one who knows the

.

vague sentence is attuned to some sort of

a

deficiency.

Second, he is attuned to constraints on poss i

ble speaker’s meanings.

Mu

1

1

i

p

1 i

c

i

tous though these are,

they are clearly subject to constraints; for example, one
not mean by

nose.

A

John is conser vat i ve " that John has

big

a

competent speaker is able to tell whether or not

given speaker’s meaning is okay.
entail that

a

Note that this does not

competent speaker explicitly knows all the

a

possible speaker’s meanings.

Nor should it,

since enumer-

ating possible speaker’s meanings, unlike enumerating the

several meanings of an ambiguous sentence,

involves imagina-

tion as much as it does semantic competence.

These observations are intuitive but programmatic; they
need

theory for support.

a

develop such

a

My goal

is to

theory.

will proceed as follows.

I

in this essay

First,

develop an account of speaker’s meaning.

I

will

try to

My strategy here

will be to draw on Bas van Fraassen’s theory of scientific

explanation to analyze questions like Wallace’s; speaker’s
meanings will emerge as answers to such questions.

Then

I

will proceed to reanalyze the phenomena concerning vague-

ness, specifically deficiency, multiplicity, and semantic

competence.
III.

I

will

These will be the subjects of Chapters

II

and

then take up the task of seriously analyzing

the meaning of a vague sentence by adopting a precise theory

.

6

of

meaning, namely that inherent in Montague semantics.

Chapter IV,

I

will propose

a

In

formal semantic theory which

attempts to capture the intuitive dependence of truth on
meaning.

5

In the final

chapter

I

will consider the

extent to which this theory supplies the desired account of
mean i ng

Vagueness is not confined to
gory.

For example,

if

a

single syntactic cate-

"freedom" is vague, evidently so is

"freely" and "free", considered both as

adjective.

Nonetheless,

in what follows

attention to certain adjectives.

verb and as an

a
I

will confine

More specifically,

I

will

confine attention to certain personal dispositional adjectives, e.g.

"conservative",

mostly for convenience.

"clever",

"reckless".

But it is also because

I

explanation of sorts of why these adjectives are,
be,

vague.

have an
tend to

or

because they purport to categorize

is simply

It

This is

people psychologically, and people are psychologically
complex.

Thoughtful application of one of these words

therefore requires tailoring to the case at hand;

allow

to

for the possible tailorings, constraints determined by the

communal meaning are loose.

Vagueness,
is

surely

a

in the sense

I

have tried to display here,

very pervasive phenomenon, however

,

and

I

don

mean to suggest otherwise by concentrating on certain

expressions.
is not

a

But

illuminating its full extent and

task for which

I

am presently prepared.

vai

iety

t

t

.

CHAPTER

2

THE PRAGMATICS OF SPEAKER’S MEANING

I

.

I

ntroduc

1

on

Any attempt to explicate the notion of speaker’s

meaning runs into an immediate difficulty, for there
v ar

i

ety in the sorts of things that can count as

meaning.

a

is

speaker

s

We can see this by following the lead of William

Alston and considering examples of the different sorts of
things that can be requested with "What— do - you— mean" ques —
4-

t

i

ons

1

Example

1.

says that it’s going to rain.

A1

Bo,

been thinking that it’s going to snow, says:
mean,

2.

A1

and Bo are rehearsing

rehearsed many times before; after
is

"What do you

it’s going to rain?"

Example

A1

who has

supposed to say:

a

a

scene that they’ve

certain line of Bo’s,

"Women are all alike."

gives his line but A1 says:
stops acting and demands:

This time Bo

"Females are very similar".
"What do you mean,

Bo

'Females are

ver y similar’?"

Example
sation.

3.

A1

and Bo have been engaged in

Suddenly A1 says:

"What do you mean,

Example

A.

A1

about politics.

Bo responds:

"Bleegh blugh."

'Bleegh blugh’?"

and Bo have been involved in
A1

serious conver-

a

a

discussion

then says that seventy-four' is

7

a

large

8

number.
mean,

After

stunned silence, Bo asks:

a

Seventy-four is

Example

Al,

5.

fading.

Bo,

a

"What do you

large number’?"

a

hospital aide, reports that the patient is

doctor who has been monitoring both the

a

patient’s heartbeat and his brainwaves, asks:

"What do you

mean, he’s 'fading’?"

Example
says:

response to

In

6.

"He’s old."

Bo,

policy for John, says:

Example 7.

a

question about John’s age, Al

an insurance agent working out

"What do you mean, he’s 'old’?"

says that John is good.

Al

a

Bo presses him:

"What do you mean, he’s 'good’?"

Example

8.

says that John is reckless.

Al

Bo presses him:

"What do you mean, he’s 'reckless’?"

Clearly, what Bo is requesting varies from case to case.
the first example, he is asking for epistemic reasons,
ion for a belief;

reasons,

i.e.

in the second,

reasons for deciding on

i.e.

for

course of action (in

a

this case, deviating from the script);

In

in the third,

for an

explanation of Al’s apparent nonsense; in the fourth, for an

explanation of Al’s apparent irrelevance; in the fifth, for
a

paraphrase

in

terms of the patient’s heartbeat or brainfor a specification in terms of years;

waves;

in the sixth,

in the

seventh and eighth, for

a

distinctions are not hard and fast.

But

if we

speaker’s meaning as what is given in response
do-you-mean" question,

it

is

These

specific "sense".

regard the
to

a

"What-

nonetheless clear that differ-

.

9

ent sorts of things can be speaker’s meanings.

One way to proceed, given my interests, would be to

simply take note of the variety and then immediately focus

attention on cases such as the last.
will do.

Instead,

I

will

But

that

isn’t what

I

try to shed light on such cases in

part by considering basic similarities they bear to other

sorts of cases.

In particular,

will try to account for

I

the cases I’m most concerned with in terms of

a

framework

which is suitable for the description of all types of

speaker’s meanings.

The motivation for this framework’s

application to the case I’m most concerned with will derive
in

large measure from its suitability for other types of

cases.

Of course

ences; but

I

will want to say something about differ-

will do this from within the general framework.

I

The unifying idea is this.

meaning,

it

is

in

When we specify

contexts where there

about, or some problem with,

a

is

a

speaker’s

something puzzling

speaker’s utterance.

Of

course, this is so in the examples, where actual questions

expressing puzzlement or dissatisfaction are being asked.
But

would want to say that even in contexts where no

I

question is actually being asked, there is an implicit
question to which the specification of speaker’s meaning may
be regarded as

"John is good.

a

response.
By that

I

For example, one might say:

mean

.
.

.

"

Here the speaker gives

his meaning in response to an implicit question, which he is
ant

i

c

i

pat i ng

.

He is specifying his meaning in order to

.

—

.

,

10

dispel any problem he thinks his listener might have
with

(presumably)

good".

succinctly:
answer to

a

a

My point of view can be summarized

specification of speaker’s meaning

guestion.

ably expect to learn

If
a

this is right*

is an

then we can reason-

lot about speaker’s meaning by

exploring the nature of the questions which specifications
of speaker’s meanings are supposed to answer.

then,

undertake

to

a

propose,

study of What— do does —you he she
)

(

i

will proceed as follows.

,

(

mean questions (henceforth, WDYM-quest ons
I

I

First,

I

)

)

will present

a

theory of why-questions recently developed by Bas van
Fraassen.
theory
gy.

’

Second,

I

will discuss in a general way the

application to the domain of commonsense psycholo-

s

Third,

I

will

try to show that the theory is ideally

suited for an analysis of WDYM-quest i ons by considering my

examples in some detail, especially the last.

Finally,

will discuss the Gricean notion of speaker’s meaning,

order to distinguish

I I

.

it

I

in

from mine.

Explanation and Commonsense Psychology

A.

Van Fraassen’s Theory

The underlying idea of van Fraassen’s theory of expla-

nation is that an explanation is an answer
an answer
is a

to a why-question.

theory of why-quest 1 ons

2

So,

-

in

particular

his theory of explanation

s

.

A why question is,

to begin with,

question, which can

a

be regarded as an abstract entity "expressed by" an
inter-

rogative

(a

string of symbols).

Answer

to

questions are of

different types, the most basic of which is the direct
answer,

an answer which gives neither more nor

i.e.

information than is required.

less

For example, consider the

following answers to the question expressed by "Can you get
to

Victoria both by ferry and by plane?"
(

a

)

(b)
<

c

)

Yes
You can get to Victoria both by ferry and by plane.

You can get to Victoria by ferry.

(d) You can get to Victoria both by ferry and by plane,
but the ferry ride is not to be missed.
(a)

and

(b)

are direct answers, whereas (c) gives less

information than is required, and

(d)

gives more.

Why-quest ions are distinguishable from other kinds of

questions by the parameters which constitute the question
expressed by

a

why- i nter rogat i ve in

a

given context.

There

are three such parameters.

First,

there is the topic P of the question.

For

example, the topic of the question expressed by "Why is this

conductor warped?" is the proposition that
tor

is warped

Second,

a

certain conduc-

.

there is the contrast-class

propositions distinct from
did Adam eat the apple?"

P.

3

Consider

.

,

This is

a

set of

for example,

"Why

This can be construed in various

IE

way s

:

(

1

)

Why was

it

Adam who ate the apple?

(P)

Why was it the apple that Adam ate?

(3)

Why did Adam eat the apple?

These construa s are distinguishable by their contrast 1

classes

.

Thus*

(

1

)

asks why

was Adam, rather than

it

somebody else, who ate the apple.

(P)

might ask why Adam

ate the apple rather than some other fruit in the garden.
(3)

Eve.

might ask why Adam ate the apple rather than toss
The contr ast - c 1 asses are, respectively,

ate the apple),

it

to

{Somebody else

{Adam ate some other fruit in the garden),

and {Adam tossed the apple to Eve).

The third constituent of a why-question is the
r espec t - i n-wh i ch a reason is requested, which determines what shall count as a possible explanatory
factor, the relation of explanatory relevance
In the
[conductor] example, the request might be for events
'leading up to’ the warping.
That allows as relevant
an account of human error, of switches being closed or
moisture condensing on those sw i tches
On the other
hand, the events leading up to the warping might be
well known, in which case the request is likely to be
for the standing conditions that made it possible for
those events to lead to this warping: the presence of a
magnetic field of a certain strength, say. Finally, it
might already be known, or considered immaterial
exactly how the warping is produced, and the question
(possibly based on a misunderstanding) may be about
exactly what function this warping fulfills in the
operation of the power station.
.

.

The interests of

a

questioner in

place further constraints on

a

.

.

particular context may

a

relevance relation.

questioner might be interested in

a

A

particular sort of, say,

event "leading up to" something, or particular sort of

’

,

13

standing condition.

Van Fraassen quotes N. R. Hanson:

There are as many causes of x as there are explanations
of x.
Consider how the cause of death might have been
set out by a physician as a 'multiple hemorrhage’,
by
the barrister as 'negligence on the part of the driver
by a carriage builder as ’a defect in the brakeblock construction’
by a civic planner as 'the presence of tall shrubbery at that turning.
’

,

,

He remarks:
as

'

"

the cause

In other

words,

the salient feature picked out

in that complex process,

is

salient to

a

given person because of his orientation, his interests, and

various other pecul i ar i

t

i

es in the way he approaches or

comes to know the problem

contextual factors." 6

-

Thus,

the

relevance relation of the question to which the specification of

a

cause is an answer may be highly constrained by

interests peculiar to the context.
So a why-question can be regarded as a three-tuple

<P,X,R>, with P the topic,

relevance relation.

X

the contrast-class, and R the

The asking of

a

why-question

is a

pragmatic matter in that these factors, most notably
X,

R and

are context-dependent.
A direct

answer to

a

why-question

is

expressed by an

expression of the form:
P

in

contrast to (the members of)

X

because A

Such an answer claims that P is true, that the members of
are false,

that A is true,

and finally that A is a reason

for P in the contextually-determined relevant sense
is,

the "because" signifies that A bears R to <P,X>.

examp e
1

-

7

that
For

X
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suppose you ask why I got up at seven o-clock this
morning, and I say 'because I was woken up by the
clatter the milkman made.’
In that case I have interpreted your question as asking for a sort of reason
that at least includes events- 1 ead i ng-up-to my getting
out of bed, and my word 'because’ indicates that the
milkman’s clatter was that sort of reason. .Contrast
this with the case in which I construe your request as
being specifically for a motive.
In that case I would
have answered 'No reason, really.
I
could easily have
stayed in bed, for I don’t particularly want to do
anything today.
But the milkman’s clatter had woken me
up, and I just got up from force of habit I suppose.’
In this case,
do not say 'because’ for the milkman’s
clatter does not belong to the relevant range of
events, as I understand your question.
.

I

A

"direct answer" can be defined:
B is a direct answer to question Q = <P,X,R> iff there
is some proposition A such that A bears R to <P,X> and
B is the proposition which is true iff <P; and the
members of X are false; and A) is true.

Thus, answering
at

least

a

why— question is also

a

pragmatic matter,

insofar as whether or not something is

a

direct

answer depends on the same contextual features that determine the question.
Call A the "core" of answer B.

Henceforth

I

will use

the term "answer" to mean either an answer or an answer-

core; which one will be clear from context.

Some further definitions will prove useful.

A why-

question presupposes just that
true,

(a)

its topic

(b)

the members of the contrast class are false, and

is

(c) at least one of the propositions that bear its
relevance relation to its topic is true.

These presuppositions are true if and only if there is some

:
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true direct answer.

presupposition

is a

A

non-direct answer which denies

a

correct ive answer.

Van Fraassen describes

a

further contextual feature as

foil o ws
the context in which the question is posed, there is
certain body K of accepted background theory and
factual information.
This is a factor in the context,
since it depends on who the questioner and audience
are.
It is this background which determines whether or
not the question arises: hence a question gay
arise... in one context and not in another.
In

a

He then offers the following definition:

question Q arises in context with background K iff K
implies presuppositions (a) and
and does not imply
the denial of any presupposition.
Further

,

something can now be said about what constitutes

good answer

a

Van Fraassen offers three criteria by which an

.

answer "Because A" might be judged, of which we need consider only two.

"The first concerns the evaluation of A

itself, as acceptable or as likely to be true.

The second

concerns the extent to which A favors the topic as against
the ... members of the contrast class."

symbolized: Pr(A/K),

i.e.

taken for granted (henceforth

"likelihood criterion").

regarded as

a

The first may be

the probability of A given K; for

the evaluation of A takes place in
is

1 l

I

a

context where K is what

will refer to this as the

The second, however, cannot be

comparison of Pr(P/K8*A) with Pr

(

P

/K?*A

Pr(P^/K&cA), etc., where the P^’s are the elements of
P

is

the topic.

One reason is that,

tion arises in K at all,

if

)

,

X,

and

the relevant ques-

then K entails P and the negation

)

.
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of each

P.

so any A would be maximally good by the
proposed

;

criterion.

mation K Q
(

We need to consider a body of theory and infor-

differing from

)

just

K

which entail presuppositions

presuppositions that

P and

in

and

(a)

lacking those elements
(b)

that not P

,

of Q,

i.e.

12

for each P

1

the
We

i

might then try to measure the extent to which A favors P
over the elements of
Pr P^ /K Q
(

(

either.

)

2*A

by comparing Pr P/K Q &A

for each P

,

<

<

)

)

with

However, this won’t quite do

.

The problem is that, even if P is favored over the

elements of
A;

)

X

X

A may be

on this comparison,

this may not be owing to

irrelevant. Consider:

Why didn’t Fred get pregnant?

Because he’s on the pill.
Here
Pr (Fred doesn’t get pregnant/K(Q)8*(Fred

is on the

pill)),

where K(Q)
duction,

is

is a

corpus including facts about human repro-

considerably higher than

Pr (Fred gets pr egnant /« Q & Fr ed
(

)

is on the pill)).

(

Yet we wouldn’t want to say that this is

a

good answer in

virtue of favoring the topic over the elements of the

contrast-class; for the topic would be equally favored even
if we

weren’t assuming the truth of the answer.
Pr (Fred doesn’t get pr egnant /K Q
(

That

is,

)

compares just as favorably with Pr (Fred gets pr egnant /K

<

This suggests that we can measure favoring by seeing how

Q

))
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much A

shifts the probability function toward P"

-

how

i.e.

much better P compares with its rivals when A is
assumed
than when A is not assumed.

This will be a function of how

much the least favorable comparison of P with some P
1

becomes more favorable, and of how much the number of P

’s
i

with which P compares least favorably decreases.
is only one P^,

When there

as will often be the case in examples

henceforth, we may think of A’s goodness on the favoring

criterion simply as how much better Pr P/K Q
(

with Pr P /K Q
<

<

)

8*A

(

)

8<A

)

compares

than Pr<P/K<Q>> compares with Pr P /(Q))

)

<

1

i

This completes my summary of van Fraassen’s theory of

why-questions and their answers.

It

should be noted that

the theory is supported by an extensive critical discussion;
for this the reader

B.

is referred

to van Fraassen’s book.

Commonsense Psychology

Though van Fraassen is primarily concerned to account
for explanations in science, he intends his theory as a

general one.

In this

section

I

want to discuss the theory’s

application to everyday explanations of actions and beliefs.

1

.

Relevance Relations
In his discussion of the milkman example,

van Fraassen

notes two ways one might explain an action: by citing an
event which "leads up to" it, and by citing

a

"motive".

This list shouldn’t be taken to be (and I’m sure van Fraas-
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sen doesn’t take it to be) exhaustive, or even very
clear as
far as it goes;

explain in

for

it's

a

commonplace that an action can be

great variety of apparently distinct ways.

a

If

van Fraassen’s general approach is sound, we should expect

a

corresponding variety in "senses" of the question "Why did
he do that

7

not new.

J.

As it happens,

.

Q.

this way of viewing matters is

Urmson once remarked as follows:

Let us consider some questions which may be asked about
an action... we may start with this list, which makes no

claim whatever to completeness:
1. What was the point of his doing that?
2. What was his reason for doing that?
3. What led him to do that?
A. What prompted him to do that?
5. What made him do that?
6. What possessed him to do that?
7. How did he come to do that?
8. How did it come about that he did that?
This list is certainly very i ncomp 1 ete ... These questions are not perfectly precise, and admit, according
to context, of being answered in more than one way; but
there are fairly typical types of answer for some of
them, and the answers appropriate to some of them would
be quite i nappr opr i ate as answers to others.
[for
example] let us suppose that Jones, in playing chess,
moves his Queen into a position where it can be taken
by his opponent without return.
Someone might ask:
"What made him do that?"
If the answer is that he
panicked under pressure of time, then the question was
appropriate, and no one will think of going on to ask
what the point of the move was, or what led Jones to
make it. But if the answer is given "Don’t you see, it
was the only way of escaping mate in two moves", it
would be i nappropr i ate to say, "Oh, so that is what
made him do it"; rather one must say "Oh, so that was
In
his reason!", or "So that was the point of it".
saying this one recognizes that the original question
was, in fact, i nappr opr i ate to the situation and might
have been met with the retort " No t h i ng gade him do it,
for he had a very good reason for it".
.

These remarks echo van Fraassen’s.
action,

Concerning

a

.

given

there are different relevance relations one might be

)
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interested in, and whether or not
answer

given answer is

a

("appropriate") depends on what

it

is.

direct

a

(The retort

corrective answer, denying the presupposition that

is a

there s something that made him do it.
It

s

not clear that each of Urmson’s sample questions

corresponds to

a

distinct relevance relation.

account for the possibility of

given question being

a

"answered in more than one way" (e.g. question
ty

or by

,

And to

"Vani-

3 by

Blind fury", or by "His father’s urging"), one

might want to allow that even some of these "disambiguated"

why— quest i ons are yet ambiguous with respect to relevance

relation (e.g. that question 5 might be asking for

a

dispo-

sitional trait, or an occurrent mental state, or an outside
influence).

Making out

tions in this domain
are related

which
it

I

-

-

would be

a

full

typology of relevance rela-

identifying them, and saying how they
a

considerable theoretical task, one

can’t undertake here.

Most fundamentally,

intuitively,
(e.g.

making

knocking over
kind.

in

questions 3-6)

-

2)

are "causes"

(as,

whether "reasoned" actions

fire to get warm) and "caused" actions (e.g.

a

a

cup upon hearing

But however this may be,

agent’s reason for" is

and

think,

would involve addressing the very complex issue of

whether "reasons" (as in question

or

I

a

a

sudden noise) are of

a

the relation of "being an

very important relevance relation,

kind of relevance relation, especially for my purposes,
I

need to review some basic facts.

.
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Commonly we give explanations which can be put in
the
following form:
x

did

<B)
D
(

That

x
x

)

Y because
believed that if he did
des i red Z

this schema can accommodate

explanations
the

believed

is

shown by

a

Y,

Z

great many everyday

number of considerations.

a

number of different kinds of attitude,

a

differing in degree.

Second, actual explanations consist-

ing simply of an explanans of the form

(e.g.

(B)

or of the form

Because he wants to get warm") can be regarded as

leaving implicit an explanans of the other form
tice it
a

s

First,

and "desired" can be construed generally

enough to subsume

(D)

would result, and

unnecessary to mention both.

in prac-

;

Third, Z need not be

state of affairs distinct from and subsequent to

may be something attained

the performance of

ijn

Y,

but

(e.g.

Y

"He

killed her because he wanted revenge", "He raised his arm

because he wanted to signal

a

left turn");

action can be explained by redescribing

sometimes an

it.

Fourth, expla-

nations which do not explicitly mention either
desire (e.g.

"To get warm")

-

a

belief or

a

explanations supplying the

"intention" with which something is done (not to be confused
with the intention to do something), or the "purpose",
"goal", or "motive"

in doing something - can be subsumed by

the schema via the generalization:
for doing Y was Z (or,
Y,

Z would result,

and

to Z)
x

,

then

desired Z.

typically,
x

15

if

x’s reason

believed that

if he did

.
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I

will say that an explanation which can be
schematized

in the above way supplies a

cal reason",

i.e.

p-reason for"

a

is an

vance relation.

It

"p-reason"

-

short for "practi-

reason for doing something.

"Being

a

important and pervasive kind of releis

to be distinguished from another

important kind of relevance relation, that of "being an
e

rea50n for

reason",

where "e— reason" is short for "epistemic

,

reason for believing something.

i.e.

When one asks

why somebody believes something, what one generally wants is
that somebody’s epistemic reasons ("justification",

dence",

"warrant"); there isn’t the variety in relevance

relations that we find in the case of actions.

e-reason to be, not
simply
x
x

x
x

is a

"evi-

a

a

belief together with

belief, or set of beliefs.

believes
believes
believes
believes

So

I

a

I

take an

desire, but

take it that

that p because
that q^, and
that q^, and ...
that q
^n

schema which can accommodate explanations which give an

e-reason 16
So p-reasons and e-reasons are important kinds of

relevance relations in commonsense psychology.

I

say

"kinds" because both can be further constrained by the

interests of

2.

a

questioner in

a

context, as we will see.

Contrast-Classes
Suppose Q

=

<P,X,R> arises in

a

context with background

e
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K.

Then there are people in the context who share
certain

beliefs from which

it

follows that

P,

that the elements of

X

are false, and from which it doesn’t follow that
there’s no

true proposition bearing R to <P,X>. 17
that there’s nobody who asks, or

"arising" is not

a

is

will say).

I

c

1

consider the contrast-class:
"interested" in X?

cance is

X

In

with
that,

a

I

Just what that

in R.

ar i f i cat 1 on

.

But here

I

want to

in what sense need somebody be

That is, of what psychological signifi-

when <P,X,R> arises for somebody?

then

q,

q

is

like R,

X

if

<P,X,R>

disposed to utter an interrogative
The reason is

can’t in general be read off from an inter-

rogative, even one with

that

for

question’s arising "for"

certain "focus", or stress placement.

example,

Q;

this section

The answer to this question is not simply:

arises for

may be

We already know one requirement:

that the somebody be "interested"

involves may need further

a

it

disposed to ask,

psychological notion.

want to consider what constitutes

somebody (as

Still,

a

certain focus.

"Why did Adam eat the app

1

? "

.

Consider, for
The focus tells us

the contr ast-c 1 ass consists of elements which vary

according to what Adam eats, but no more;
bet weeen

,

e g
.

it

doesn’t decide

.

{Adam eats

a

pear},

{Adam eats

a

pear, Adam eats the snake),

{Adam eats some other fruit in the garden),
and so forth.

For this further determination we must appeal

®

.
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aspects of the questioner’s psychological state
other
than the interrogative he’s disposed to utter.
to

For further

illustration of th4s point, consider the

case where it is asked why somebody believes
something.

Epistemic justification is highly sensitive to variations
in
contrast-c lass, as Dretske has pointed out
these terms

<

though not in

)

...let us assume that Clyde... robs the grocery store.
Tracy, suspecting that Clyde robbed the store, undertakes an investigation.
Damaging evidence comes to
light and Clyde is arrested.
Suppose Tracy is asked to
recite his evidence for thinking that Clyde robbed the
r Y store.
9 °
It is natural to think of Tracy being
asked this within a setting in which the identity of
the thief is in question.
That is, Tracy is being
asked what evidence he has for thinking that
Clyde robbed the grocery store.
In response to such a query Tracy, naturally enough,
cites such facts as that Clyde was seen loitering
around the store at 3:00 A.M., Clyde’s fingerprints
were found on the cash register, and so on.
What is
important to notice is that none of these facts constitute evidence for supposing that
Clyde robbed the grocery store.
If we want evidence for [the latter] the best I can
think to offer is the fact that all the money was gone
from the cash register when the owner returned in the
morning.
That, surely, is evidence that Clyde robbed
the place; he did not just sleep overni^gt in the store
with his arms around the cash register.

Dretske is pointing out that "Why does Tracy believe that
Clyde robbed the grocery store?" can express different
questions, demanding different answers, depending on stress

placement in the

"

that " -c 1 ause

This is so, but doesn’t

.

quite get to the heart of the matter, for even
l

nterr ogat i ve doesn’t determine

a

focussed

a

contr ast -c 1 ass

.

Just as

<Tracy believes that Clyde robbed the grocery store,

,

k

Tracy believes that Clyde slept in the grocery
store
with his arms around the cash register,
e-reason>

demands

a

different answer than

<-Tracy believes that Clyde robbed the
grocery store,
Tracy believes that somebody else robbed the
grocery
store, e-reason>,

so

too does the latter demand a different answer
than
<.Tracy believes that Clyde robbed the grocery
store,
Tracy believes that Alex robbed the grocery store,
e-reason)

though the same focussed
last two questions.

i

nterrogat ve may express these
i

(When the contrast-class has

element, as will often be the case henceforth,
the set-brackets.)
the time might be

For example,
a

(good)

but not to the former.

I

a

single

will omit

that Alex was in Hawaii at

answer to the latter question,

The under determ i nat i on of contrast-

class by focus should, anyway, have been clear from Dretske’s suspiciously arbitrary choice of {Clyde slept in the
store with his arms around the cash register} for the

contrast class of the question expressed by "Why does Tracy

believe that Clyde robbed the grocery store?".

He certainly

didn’t get this just from the focus.
The under determ i nat i on of

X

by an interrogative is

dramatic in cases where there is no focus, and not even
hint as to what

X

is.

a

For example, suppose q sees Sue walk

along the street, stop suddenly, and then walk back the
other way.

Presumably q’s

"Why did Sue wa 1

i

nter rogat i ve would not be, say,

back the other way?", as if the contrast-
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class were something like (Sue skips back the
other way}.
Rather, it would presumably be “Why did Sue
walk

back the

other way?", without focus, expressing

contrast-class {Sue continues
tion}.

What

to walk

question with the

a

the same direc-

in

presumably wants is an explanation of why Sue

q

turned around rather than continued.

This example suggests one sort of way that
q

might be interested in

X.

contains

X

prised

and <P,X,R> arises for him.

,

conveniently described
set of beliefs K

is sur-

q

A general

case can be

we assume that we may speak of the

if

of an agent

(at

^

probability" function Pr

al

questioner

single event which

a

expects to happen; when P happens instead,

q

a

a

time), and of a "person-

of an agent

(at a time),

Pr

q

being the agent’s degree of belief in proposition
time);

the function is relativized to K

Pr

-

(p)

Pr

(p/K
q

q

for any p.

),

q

p

(at

a

in the sense that

Given these assumptions, we

can describe the case as follows.
al

(p)
q

At

time t^,

has person-

q

probabilities as follows:
Pr

(

P/X

)

= Pr

q

Pr

(

X/P

)

=

0

q
(

X

)

=

(

P

)

=

1

,

or

i

s

c

1

ose to

0

,

or

i

s

c

1

ose to 0

1

q

Pr
(I

adopt the expedient of using "X" to refer to the element

of X,

when

X

has just one member.)

and P incompatible, has

a

Thus, at

q

1

q

deems

very high degree of belief in

and a very low degree of belief in P.

assumed that Pr (P) =

t

- Pr

(X),
q

since

(Note it is not
it

isn’t assumed

X

X,

,
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that P and

time

t

that P is added to q’s "corpus"

belief in
of Pr ^

X /

(

for q.
P and

At some later

comes to fully believe P <i.e. the proposition

q

,

x

are collectively exhaustive.)

X

X

P

)

)

is

"conditional ized"

at

t

Q

i.e.

,

0.
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At

Then his degree of

.

i.e.

changes to the value

this point <P,X,R> arises

Note that this general account doesn’t require that
occur at

X

a

time later than t^ (by "occur",

course don’t mean "actually occur");

q

needn’t "expect

the sense of anticipating its future occurrence.

example, at

t

might be sure
Q q

of

I

X

in

For

that Eve ate the apple, and

then at t^ ask why it was Adam rather than Eve, having just

been told by someone he trusts that
call

it

was Adam.

I

will

question which arises for someone in the way de-

a

scribed here an "urgent" question.
Now consider another example.

Bob is at the pet store

shopping for

a

on display.

His companion Joe asks him why he chose the one

he did,
all

kitten, and chooses one from among the three

not because he is surprised at the choice

to Joe

the kittens seemed the same - but simply because he is

curious how Bob chose from among the three.
a

-

general case

follows.

a

We can describe

At time t^, q has personal

probabilities as follows:
(P/P.) = Pr

Pr
q

(P./P

Pr
q

Pr

i

(P)

at

)

=

=

Pr

for each P

in

X

l

for

(P.),
q

t

0,

= 0,

1

i

=

j

J

q

Thus,

(P./P)
q

1

q

for each P.

l

deems P and the

l

PVs

pairwise incompatible,

,
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and has an equal degree of belief in P
and each P

(Note

.

1

again

it

is not

assumed that P and the elements of the

contrast-class are collectively exhaustive.)
time

t

r

Pr

becomes

(P)

l

(P.)

at

t

q

R>

then arises for q.

P^s

and the

since at

and for each P., Pr

1,

^

the value of Pr

t

Q

Q

,

i.e.

the pr obab

i

it

1 i

t

i

<P.)
q

is not

time later than

a

may).

I

will call

t

Q

.

Note also that

es of the (incompatible) members

in mind

X

needn’t

as in the previous case (though it

,

question which arises for somebody in

a

the way just described
be kept

assumes

i

required that P

of the contr ast-c 1 ass aren’t required to be high,

have just one member

later

a

<P,X,R>, for some

0.

Again note

occur at

At

a

"non-urgent" question.

It

should

that whether a question is urgent or non-ur-

gent has to do with its psychological etiology, and not just

with its intrinsic features (i.e.

its topic,

contrast— c 1 ass

and relevance relation).
It

should be noted that for

incompatible with

a

a

topic to be deemed

member of the contrast-class,

it

is

sufficient but not necessary that they be deemed logically
incompatible.
A1

If,

for example,

believes that the water

the topic is
is cold

and the contr ast-c 1 ass member is
A1

believes that the water is not cold,

then my apprehension of incompatibility stems from my

assumption that you don’t have inconsistent beliefs.
I

emphasize that

I

haven’t tried to provide logically

s

1
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necessary or sufficient conditions for
arising for somebody.

why-quest i on

a

It’s clear, for example,

’

that one

could have personal probabilities as in the second
sort of
case without ending up being disposed to ask
anything; e.g.
Joe may simply not be very curious about Bob’s decision.

have

I

much harder time imagining someone having personal

a

probabilities as described in the first sort of case without
ending up being disposed to ask
term "urgent" seems apt).

is why

the

Still there is no logical connec-

tion between having the pr obab
to feel

question (which

a

puzzled, but at most

a

i

1

t

i

es described and coming

psychological one.

Note also

that my terms "urgent" and "non-urgent" may be misleading,

inasmuch as they suggest exhaustion of the possibilities.
But

I

take myself to have described the two basic cases:

antecedent expectation of the contr ast— c 1 ass over the topic,
and antecedent
A final

indifference.

note on contrast-classes.

I

assume that in

some cases the contr ast-c 1 ass consists simply of the negation of the topic.

For example,

if

I

ask

"UJhy

is Joe

standing on his head in the road?" because, naturally
enough,

I

find Joe’s action inherently bizarre, then the

contr ast-c 1 ass appears to be simply (Joe doesn’t stand on
his head in the middle of the road);

capture the force of "inherently".

collectively exhaustive.

in fact

I

take that to

In this case P and

Also, van Fraassen’s favoring

criterion for the goodness of an answer

A

reduces to

a

X

are

^
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simple comparison of Pr(P/K(Q)) with Pr P/K
Q
(

finally,

<

)

&.A

)

Note,

.

that inherently bizarre actions give rise
to urgent

questions; the occurrence of the topic is cause
for surprise.
It may seem problematic in this case
to regard the

questioner as having "expected" the contrast-class,
but the
problem is resolved is we suppose that one’s beliefs
needn’t
be accompanied by conscious feeling.

3

•

Evaluation of Answers
this section

In

I

want to show that van Fraassen’s

likelihood and favoring criteria are ones which we in fact

commonly use to assess the goodness of explanations in

commonsense psychology.
K

At

least,

this is so if the corpus

and the probability function Pr are appr opr

stood;
K

I

i

a te

1

y

under-

discuss these in turn.

must be understood to include general

"real-world" or

"commonsense" knowledge, knowledge about the world had by
any normal adult.

Such knowledge includes, for example, the

knowledge that most birds fly, that nobody likes to have

a

headache, that clean water is good to drink, that people
need friends, and that most people are rational and have

commonsense knowledge.

Of course, K may also include

contextual information which, though no part of commonsense,
is

nonetheless well-established, e.g. that John has just

sneezed, or that Nary doesn’t like strawberries (but for

simplicity

I

will

leave such information out of account in
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the examples to follow).

Note that there is nothing special

about the questioner’s corpus K

;

q

depending on how acute

q

may or may not coincide with the corpus K
relevant to

is K
q

the "objective" evaluation of answers to
q’s question.

The probability function Pr should reflect the
reasoning of normal

adults, as far as this is possible.

example, Pr The sun will rise tomorrow)

(=Pr(The sun will

(

rise tomorrow/K)) should be close to

For

Of course this is

1.

quite vague, as was the specification of

K,

but no more

characterization is necessary for the purposes
have in mind.
is not

1

Note again that the questioner’s perspective

privileged; Pr(p)

is not

necessarily equal to Pr

(p)
Q

(even if it so happens that K equals K

)

We need not even

.

q

construe Pr
I

(

p

)

"subjectively",

i.e.

as a degree of belief.

haven’t the need or the time to argue for

a

particular

interpretation of probability statements.
Now let’s consider some explanations of why somebody
did something in which what is wanted is

a

p— reason.

Consider the questions
01:

<Joe stands on his head in the middle of the road,
Joe doesn’t do this, p-reason>, and

Q2

<Sue goes to the store, Sue stays home, p-reason>.

:

Now consider the possible (abbreviated) answers:
A1

:

To win a bet.

A2

:

So he can see oncoming traffic upside down.

A3:

To get some exercise.

)

)

)

,
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A4:

To get a million dollars.

Intuitively, A1 and A3 are pretty good answers

to Q1

and Q2

respectively, while A3 and AA are pretty bad
answers to Q1
and 03,

respectively.

These intuitions assume only common-

sense knowledge and that Joe and Sue are normal,
i.e. reason

normally and have commonsense knowledge, and no special

information such as that Joe is
very rich uncle at the store.

a

lunatic or the Sue has

In accounting for

a

them it is

thus appropriate for this to be reflected in K.

Consider first the likelihood criterion.
that a p-reason has a belief component and

a

Recalling
desire compo-

nent, we have that the probability of an answer A supplying
a

p-reason is
Pr B&D/K
<

Pr(B/K)

=

= Pr

(

D&B /K

= Pr

(

D/K

where

B

ively.

)

x

Pr D/ B&K

x

Pr B/D&.K

(

<

)

,

and D are the belief and desire components, respect-

Thus the likelihood of A is directly proportional

bothto Pr(B/K) and to Pr(D/K),

a

fact to which

appealing in assessing likelihood. 3

I

will be

1

Turning to the examples, A1 may be cast in the explicit
form of

a

direct answer to Ql, as follows:

Joe stands on his head in the middle of the road rather
than not doing so because (Dl) he wants to win a bet,
and (Bl) he believes he can do this if he stands on his
head in the middle of the road.

x

.

)

,
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(The ‘Tather than" clause is not really
necessary when the

contrast-class

trivial,

is

negation of the topic.)
sense knowledge;

it’s

i.e.

B1

is

consists simply of the
likely enough given common-

crazy thing, to do,

a

it

wouldn’t be

unusual

to

is also

likely given commonsense knowledge; winning

bet on somebody doing something crazy, etc.
a

Dl

bet

usually means material gain, people generally want material
gain, etc.

Hence A1 fares pretty well on the likelihood

criterion.

Similar remarks apply to A3.

presumably don
likely enough

t

—

do so well.

The be 1 i ef — c omponent of A2 is

likely that Joe believes he will see

is

it

However, A2 and AA

oncoming traffic upside down if he stands on his head in the

middle of the street

- but

on the other hand, has

a

the desire component is not.

AA

likely desire-component but an

unlikely be 1 1 ef -component
the intuitive quality of Al-AA is accounted for by

So

how good they are on the likelihood criteiron.
the favoring criterion?

It

What about

turns out that explanations

supplying p-reasons are almost always good on the favoring
criterion.

The basic idea is that, given that somebody

wants Z and thinks he can get

Z by

doing Y, the probability

that he will do Y will almost always go up.
Pr

(

does Y/K Q
<

)

)

will usually compare less favorably with
Pr P. /K Q
(

than

(

)

More precisely:

,

,

,

.

)
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Pr(x does Y/K(Q)8*(x desires Z
does Y Z will result))

and believes that

if he

,

does with
Pr <P. /K<Q)g»<
Y

Z w

,

for any P^

i 1

x

r esu

desires

Z,

and believes that

It)),

(keeping in mind that any P

is
^

P,

with x’s doing Y). 22

i.e.

if he

does

incompatible with

This is so regardless of how

the p-reason does on the likelihood criterion.

Consider AA

for example, which isn’t good on the likelihood criterion.

Since K(Q) doesn

t

contain any special relevant information

about Sue
Pr (Sue goes to the store/K(Q))

will be comparable to
Pr Sue stays home/K(Q)
(

)

However
Pr Sue goes to the store/K Q

Sue wants to get a
million dollars, and believes she can by going to the
store
(

(

)

&<

(

compares very favorably with
Pr Sue stays home/K Q & Sue wants to get a million
dollars, and believes she can by going to the store)).
(

So AA

is good

(

)

(

on the favoring criterion.

Note that the evaluation of an answer by either criterion depends crucially on the assumption that Joe and Sue
are normal.

Given that K contains these assumptions, the

likelihood of answers amounts to the likelihood of

person having the beliefs and desires in question.

a

normal
And

given that K(Q) contains these assumptions, the extent

to

,

.
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which an answer favors an action over
another action (or
actions) depends on how much more likely it
is that a normal
person would perform the action once the information
that
the person believes the action will get him
something he

wants is added to K(Q).
Let s now turn our attention to e-reasons.

Consider

Q3:

<Tracy believes that Clyde robbed the store,
Tracy believes that Alex robbed the store,
e-reason>

Q4

<Bob believes that the plumber did it,
^ Bob
believes that the gar dner did it, Bob believes
that the maid did it}, e— reason}

and
:

Consider the possible (abbreviated) answers
A5

:

A6

:

AT

:

A8

:

Because he thinks the fingerprints on the cash
register are Clyde’s.

Because he thinks he was told so by

a

unicorn.

Becuase he thinks only the plumber could have known
where the gun was hidden.
Because he thinks the sky is blue.

Intuitively, A5 and A7 are pretty good answers to Q3 and Q4

respectively, while A6 and A8 are pretty bad answers to Q3
and A4 respectively.

Note again that these intuitions

assume only commonsense knowledge and that Tracy and Bob are
normal, so that

information in

it

K

will be appropriate to include only such

and K(Q).

The likelihood of an answer amounts to the likelihood
of

a

normal person having the belief in question.

likely, A5 and A7 not unlikely, and A6 unlikely.

So,

A8 is

.

.
)

(

.
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Now consider the favoring criterion,
beginning with A5
(I

will dispense with the formality of
putting it in the

explicit form for
Pr

a

direct answer).

Consider

Tracy believes that Clyde robbed the store/K(Q)

and
Pr (Tracy believes that Alex robbed the
store/K(Q)

These are comparable.

Now consider

Tracy believes that Clyde robbed the
store/K(Q)&,Tracy believes that the fingerprints.

Pr

)

(

.

.etc,

)

and
Pr Tracy believes that Alex robbed the
(

store/K(Q)8«(Tracy believes that the
fingerprints. .etc.
.

)

)

.

Presumably now the first is higher; hence A5
answer on the favoring criterion.

It

is a good

can be seen that

unlike answers which give p— reasons, answers which give

e-reasons do not automat ca
i

on.

1 1

y

satisfy the favoring criteri-

Favoring has to do with how the addition of

a

certain

belief would effect the believer’s reasoning; again, an

assumption in K(Q) that the believer is normal has great
ef f ec

t

.

It

can be easily be shown that A6 and A7 are also good

on the favoring criterion; A8

,

however,

is not.

So we have

that both A5 and A7 are reasonably likely, and favor the

topic over the contrast-class; A6 favors, but isn’t likely;
A8 is likely, but doesn’t favor.
t

i

ons

This account for intui-
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To summarize.

We’ve seen that with the right assump-

tions about the background corpus and
the probability

function, van Fraassen’s likelihood criterion
can account
for

intuitively good answers to questions requesting

a

p-reason (in which the topic is an action), while
both the
likelihood and favoring criterion can account for
intuitively good

answers to questions requesting an e-reason (in

which the topic is

a

belief).

In the case of a p-reason,

the favoring criterion is almost always satisfied.

case of an e-reason,
the

(

it

corresponds to the extent

In the
to which

content— c 1 ause of) the answer -be 1 i ef confirms the

(content-clause of) the topic-belief.

In both cases the

result depends on K(Q)’s containing the assumption that the
agent in question is normal.

Other criteria to be used in the evaluation of an

answer might well be introduced:
will useful.

let me mention one which

Presently nothing rules out

the topic as a bad answer

;

a

app r o x i ma t

i

reiteration of

in fact such an answer will

maximally good on the favoring criterion.
introduce

a

And so we might

non-circularity requirement, which as
on

be

a

first

might be rendered as a simple requirement of

non-identity between topic and answer.

III.

Speaker’s Meanings as Explanations

In the previous chapter

I

introduced van Fraassen’s

.
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analysis of why-questions, and then showed
how

it

applies to

why-questions asked in the context of commonsense
psycholoIn the present section

gy.

applies to WDYM-questionS)

WDYM-interrogatives.

will show how the analysis

I

i.e.

questions expressed by

The picture that will emerge is that

of a WDYM-quest ion as a species of
why-question asked

context of commonsense psychology.
speaker

’

s

answer to

in the

specification of

A

meaning will accordingly be understood as an
a

WDYM-quest i on

ing for what

take to be

I

This will be my way of account-

.

a

pr e theor e t i c a

1

fact, namely,

that specifications of speaker’s meaning are explanations.

A.

Why do

I

The Topic of

a

WDYM— Quest i on

say that WDYM-questions are asked in the

context of commonsense psychology?

Because the topic of

a

WDYM-quest i on is always an action or belief, described in
everyday fashion, and the relevance relation

p-reason or e-reason of some sort.
fully,

I

is

always

a

To state this more

need to make some assumptions about the perception

of speech
I

assume that when one apprehends the utterance of

declarative sentence, one normally enters in
be 1 i ef-f ormat i on that has at

formal properties has been uttered.
a

process of

least the following stages.

First, there is the belief that

belief with

a

a

a

string with certain

I

will represent this

"direct-discourse" locution, e.g.

.
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A1

says "It is going to rain".

The quotes here indicate that the enclosed
expression is

being mentioned, not used; no semantic
properties are

attributed to Al’s utterance.
case to case.

This is going to vary from

In the case where the

utterance as well-formed,

I

will suppose that the belief

that A1 says "It is going to rain"

utterance belongs to

listener recognizes the

is the belief

that the

sentence- type determined by

a

structural description.

In the case where the

not recognize the utterance as well-formed,

a

certain

listner does

the belief may

simply be that the utterance instantiates an unstructured
string of lexical
A1

items, as e.g.

in

says "It going is rain",

or an unstructured string of phones,
A1
I

e.g.

says "Itzo ranh"

am not here making any claims about the semantics of

direct discourse reports, only announcing how

I

will be

construing them.

I

could always

Not much is at stake, since

devise alternative means for specifying the beliefs I’m
interested in.
Second,
a

there is the belief that the uttered string has

certain meaning.

I

will represent this belief with an

indirect discourse locution, e.g.
A1

says that it is going to rain.

This stage must be preceded (or accompanied) by
tion of the string as well-formed.

In typical

a

recogni-

cases

-
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"

homophon l c interpretation'

sion has

a

1

-

one supposes that the expres-

certain communal meaning, and that the
utterer

using it with that meaning.

In such cases the

is

indirect

discourse report can be gotten from the direct
simply by
removing the quotation marks (provided the
quoted expression
contains no indexical expressions such as "I" or
"you").

More will be said about homophonic interpretation
in due
course.
i.e.

Note that both sayings and sayings-that are acts,

things that people do.
will

I

suppose that if the uttered string is

formed sentence of

a

community-wide and

t

natural
i

language, then there are

me- i nvar i ant "semantic rules"

of which the sentence has the meaning
5 P ea ^

i

n t e r c h ang eab

1

y

well-

a

does.

it

in

And

I

virtue
will

of a person’s "semantic competence",

knowledge of semantic rules", and "knowledge of meaning".
Third,

there is the belief, stemming from the assump-

tion that the utterer is sincere and has not misspoken, that
the utterer believes what he is saying, e.g.
A1

believes that

it

is going

This stage must be preceded by

a

ance’s well-formedness, and by an

necessarily homophonic).

that

to rain.

recognition of an utteri

nterpretat i on (not

Of course this is not an attribu-

tion of an act to the utterer, but of a belief.

Note that the two principles which
use

,

I

take listeners to

i.e.
if

x

utters "p", and

x

shares our language, "p"

’
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contains no indexicals,

.

then

..,

x

says that p,

and
If
•

•

x
•

says that p, and x is sincere, hasn’t
misspoken,
then x believes that p,

jointly entail what has been called the
"disquotational

principle", which has the form:
DP: If x utters "p"
and (1) x shares our language, "p"
contains no indexicals,..., and (2) x is sincere,
hasn’t misspoken, ..., then x believes that
p.
,

Thus DP may be thought of as having an "interpretation"

component and

a

"belief" component;

accordingly, as I’ve indicated.

(I

its caveats divide

leave the caveats

open-ended to allow for the possibility that I’ve left out
few

.

a

)

I

don

t

claim that the stages of speech perception

d&scribed are exhaustive. 24

But

1

’

ve

I’ve said enough to enable

me to clarify the remarks made at the outset.

The reason

I

say that WDYM-quest l ons are questions asked in the context
of commonsense psychology is that the topic of

tion is always an act or belief attribution.

might create the impression that

a

I

WDYM-ques-

Now,

this

WDYM-quest i on is simply

why-question with an appropriate topic.
sense this must be so, because

a

In an

a

important

am claiming that the same

analysis applies to both; the question expressed by

a

WDYM- i nter rogat i ve must in every case be expressible also by
a

why- i nter rogat i ve of some sort.

However, there is

difference having to do with psychological etiology:

a
a

1

.

4

question expressed by

WDYM-interrogative arises for

a

someone during the process of speech
perception, whereas an
identical question expressed by a

why-mterrogative need

no t

.

lo

illustrate, consider the first of the examples

presented at the outset of this chpater
Ql:
A1

.

Bo's question is:

<A1 believes that it is going to rain,
believes that it is going to snow, e-reason>.

This is an urgent question; Bo is surprised
because he

himself believes

it

s

going to snow, and supposed that A1

believes this too, and not that it’s going to rain.

At

the

time of the utterance Bo comes to believe three things
in
the process of perceiving the utterance, namely:
A1

says "It is going to rain",

A1

says that

A1

believes that

going to rain,

is

it

and

In virtue of

it

the latter

,

is going

to rain.

Bo’s previous expectations are

upset, and the question arises for him; he wants Al’s

evidence for thinking it’s going to rain, as opposed

to

snow

n
Bo’s

i

the present analysis of the question expressed by

nterrogat i ve

expressed by

a

,

the same question might have been

why- i nterrogat i ve

it’s going to rain?",

And

I

if Bo’s

,

i.e.

"Why do you think

interests are kept constant.

would maintain that this is always the case:

whenever

We h3VG a que5tlon expressed by a
WDYM- i nter r ogat i ve

same question can be expressed by

a

the

,

why- i nter r ogat i ve

.

Yet

there is still something distinctive about
WDYM- i nter r ogatives, as can be seem be reflecting upon
the possible
answer from Al:

"I

didn’t say that

it

was going to rain."

This is not

a

defined;

doesn’t deny any presupposition of the question

it

corrective answer, as that notion has been

expressed, e.g. that Al believes that
Yet

it

P ear5

is going

still seems to be corrective in some way.
e.g.,

’

it

that Bo could not reasonably respond:

perhaps not, but answer my question:
going to rain 7

".

It

ap"Yes,

What do you mean,

it’s

That is, Bo couldn’t acknowledge the

answer without giving up his question.
other hand,

to rain.

Suppose, on the

that Bo had uttered a why— i nter r ogat i ve express-

ing the very same question.

Then not only would the answer

not be corrective in the strict sense, but it would not

corrective in any sense.

Bo could reasonably respond:

perhaps not, but answer my question:

"Yes,

it’s going to rain?"

Why do you think

(perhaps with an answer on "think").

Bo can reasonably acknowledge the answer without giving up

his question

expects

ram

-

especially

if

Bo came to believe that Al

not from having being told by Al, but from some

other source.
I

choose to account for this difference by distin-

guishing, following Stalnaker, between pragmatic and semantic presuppositions.

The semantic presuppositions of an

<3

interrogative on an occasion may be taken

to be what we have

been calling simply the '•presuppositions"
of the guestion
expressed by the interrogative on that
occasion.
Hence the
semantic presuppositions of Bo’s
WDYM-interrogative are
identical to those of

why- i nter r oga t i ve uttered in similar

a

circumstances, since the questions expressed
are the same.
Whereas semantic presupposition is a relation
between
linguistic entities,

a

pragmatic presupposition is

a

propo-

sitional attitude on the part of an utterer; very
roughly,
it

belief without which one can’t "felicitously" utter

is a

the interrogative.

The pragmatic presuppositions on the

part of the utterer of

a

WDYM-interrogative on

a

given

occasion include the semantic presuppositions of the question,

in

that the utterer believes these semantic presup-

positions.

So,

for example, Bo believes that the topic of

his question is true,
to

rain.

i.e.

But in addition,

that A1 believes that it is going
the pragmatic presuppositions of

an utterer of a WDYM- i nter r ogat i ve on an occasion include

those of his beliefs formed prior,

perception, to that belief which
topic.

So,

is

in the

process of speech

represented by the

for example, Bo presupposes not only that A1

believes that it’s going to rain, but also that
(said)

A1

says

"It’s going to rain" and that A1 says (said) that

it’s going to rain.

But Bo does not presuppose these things

in the case where he utters a corresponding why-interro-

gative (though he may, of course, believe them); in the case

/

cf why-interrogatives the
pragmatic presuppos i

the semantic pr suppos

t

,

i

ons

,

t

i

one are Just

construed as beliefs.

the apparently corrective nature
of

"1

didn't say

Hence
it

was

going to rain" as an answer to the
question expresed by the
WDYM- interrogative hut not as an answer
to the question
expressed by the why- i nter r ogat i ve
In the case of the
.

UIDYM -

interrogative but not the why- a nterr ogat i ve

,

the answer

denies a pragmatic presupposition. 25
f

°

Sum up

expressed by

a

•

1

claim that WDYM-quest ions

WDYM- nter r oga t i ve
i

topic which represents

a

,

,

i.e.

questions

are why-questions with

a

belief formed at some stage of the

questioner’s perception of an utterance.

The user of a

WDYM-interrogat ive has pragmatic presuppositions corresponding to beliefs formed at prior stages

(in addition to those

cor respond i ng to presuppositions of the question expressed).

B.

WDYM-interrogat ives

We’ve seen that the relevance relation and contrastof a why— question can’t be read off from an interro-

gative.
what

I

The topic, however, more or less can be.

But

if

have been saying about WDYM-quest i ons is right, then

WDYM-interrogat ives are opaque not only with respect

to

relevance relation and contrast-class, but also with respect
to

topic.

In this section

I

will say something about the

relations between topics and forms of interrogative.
The following

is a

list of the various surface forms

))

)

that a WDYM-interrogat i ve might
take:
1

(

)

What do you mean?

(2)

What do you mean by that?

(3)

What do you mean, p?
<e.g. What do you mean,

(5)

What do you mean?

7

What do you mean by "p"?
(e.g. What do you mean by "Bleegh blugh"?,
or: What do you mean by "Seventy-four is
a larqe
number " ?

(7)

"P"?

8

)

What do you mean by that?

What do you mean,
."w"...?
(e.g. What do you mean, John is "old"?)
.

(9)

... "w"

10

.

)

(11)

I

p

(6)

(

.

.

.

?

.."w"...?

What do you mean?
What do you mean by that?

What do you mean, "w"?
(e.g. What do you mean,

(13)

What do you mean by "w"?
(e.g. What do you mean by "old"?)

19

)

7

"w"?

What do you mean?

What do you mean by that?

(<4),

and

(8)

as primitive forms,

elliptical for any of these,

I

"old"?)

"w"

take (3),

for

.

(12)

(

(

ram?)

What do you mean, "p"?
(e.g. What do you mean, "Bleegh blugh"?,
or: What do you mean, "Seventy-four
is a larqe
number " ?

(

(

it’s going to

9

take

)

,

a

and

(9)

(5),

(6),

and

(1)

(7)

and

a

Thus,

WDYM-interrogat i ve to consist of

"what do you mean" followed by

a

as

as elliptical

through (19) as elliptical for (8).

basic form of

(2)

sentential clause, where

this clause may be unquoted, quoted, or partially quoted-

9

.

.

v

.

h6

Consider now the following forms for
answers:
(

mean that

I

>

.

.

.

<10)

By that

(11)

By "p"

I

mean that

By "w"

I

mean

IB)

(

I

mean that

.

...
.

.

.

Evidently (10)-(1B) correspond to the
non-basic forms (B),
and

(5),

(8).

(9)

is all-purpose;

appropriate for answers to
basic

i

in

particular

it

is

nter r ogat i ves in any of the

f or ms

My tentative conclusions concerning the
topics of

questions expressible by the three basic interrogative-forms
are these: an interrogative of the form (3)
expresses

question with

a

may express

question with either

as topic,

a

a

be 1 i ev i ng- that as topic, one of the form (9)
a

saying or

a

saying-that

and one of the form (6) may express a question

with either

a

saying-that or be

1 i

WDYM- interrogative thus serves as

e

i

a

ng- tha t as topic.

partial

The

indicator of the

stage of speech perception at which the question arises for
the questioner.
to which

(This need not be identical with the stage

the questioner has progressed; more on this later.)

An apparent difficulty immediately arises.
and

contain quotation marks; yet

(6)

I

Forms

(9)

say that they may

express questions with topics in which no quotation marks
appear

(

say l ngs- that or bel ievings-that

)

.

How can this be 7

That is, how can it be that the WDYM- i nter rogat i ve is quoted
or partially quoted when the question expressed by the

A7

interrogative may arise for the questioner
at the interpretation stage or later?
If the question arises for
the
questioner after the utterance has been
interpreted,
wouldn’t that be reflected in his
WDYM-interrogative by an
absence of quotation marks?

This would be

a

genuine diffi-

culty if quotation marks always functioned
so as to enable
mere mention of an expression, i.e. always
merely trans-

formed an expression into

name of that expression.

a

they don’t always function this way.

According to the

T

i

mes

,

But

Consider:

Andropov "had

a

headache".

Here the quoted expression is mentioned, since the
intent is
to
1

.

1

.

attribute
mes

But

•

tokening of) the expression itself to the

(a
it

is also

being used; otherwise the sentence

would not be grammatical and hence would not make sense
either, as intuitively it does.

The quotes in a WDYM-in-

terrogative are sometimes like this.

expression

is

because

is found

with

it

certain

a

Sometimes the quoted

partly mentioned, attributed to the utterer

i

quotes appear in

problematic in some way, and partly used

nter pretat i on
a

.

Hence from the fact that

WDYM-interrogative

it

doesn’t follow that

the question expressed arises for the questioner at

pre- i nterpretat on stage,
i

tion is given by

a

i.e.

that the topic of the ques-

say i ng— 1 ocut i on

(in which the quotes are

purely mention-quotes). The converse, however,
the topic of the question is a saying,

appear

.

a

is true:

if

then quotes must

In that case the quotes are purely mention-quotes.

)
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C.

Examples

support and illustrate the general
remarks made so
far, I turn now to a const
derat i on of the examples
presented
at the beg i nni ng of this
chapter.
My aim is not a complete
account of UDYM-quest i ons the
various issues
ro

will not be

;

equally explored, some not at all,
and until the last
example no issue will be explored at
very great length.
For
example, I will throughout be considering
only questions
which arise in response to the utterance
of a sentence

m

the indicative mood.

My excuse,

to repeat,

aiming for an analysis of vagueness.

I

is that

I’m

need say just enough

about WDYM-questlons generally to make the
general framework
clear and plausible, in preparation for its
application to a

particular sort of case.

(More about the general framework

may be found in the appendix.

*

•

Expla ining Saying: Examples 2 and
In example 2,

Q2
A1

:

3

Bo’s guestion is:

<A1 says "Females are very similar",
says "Women are all alike", p-reason>

This is an urgent guestion,
Bo had expected A1

to say

in the sense earlier defined.

"Women are all alike", and not

"Females are very similar"; Al’s utterance thus comes as
surprise, and the guestion arises for him.
I

recently noted that

terrogative,

it

if

guotes appear in

a

WDYM-in-

doesn’t follow that the topic of the ex-

a

1

y

<f9

pressed question is

saying, for the quotes may not
be

a

purely ment on-quo tes
i

.

I

did not say it didn't folio,
that

the stage of speech perception
to which the questioner
has

progressed is represented by

a

saying-locution.

be a distinct claim, for the stage
at which

a

That would

question

arises for the questioner, represented
by the topic of the
question, is not always identical to the
stage to which the
questioner has progressed.
This is demonstrated by the
present example, for whereas the topic is
no doubt

interpreted Al’s utterance.

saying, Bo has

a

Owing to the atypical

play-acting context, Bo expected the utterance of
string, so that the utterance of even an

1

similar string is cause for surprise; Bo’s
no part of the psycho 1 og i ca

1

a

specific

nter pr et i ve

1

nter pr et a

1

on is

etiology of Bo’s question.

(We

1

can thus see that the above-mentioned distinct claim
is
true.

That

is,

if

quotes appear in

a

WDYM-i nterrogat ve

doesn’t follow that the questioner is at
1

1

l

a

it

pre-interpreta-

°n stage of speech perception; even if the quotes are

Purely ment i on— quo tes

,

the questioner may have interpreted

the utterance.)
I

Q2
to

A direct

.

a

answer has the usual form of a direct answer

why-question:
P

In

turn now to the consideration of possible answers to

in contrast to (the members of) X because
is a proposition bearing R to <P,X>

this case we have:

...

,

where

,
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m

are VerY slmilar "
contrast to
Women are aU aUke because ...
where
...
is a proposition giving a
Females are very similar” ratherp-reason for A’s savino
than ”Women are all

(savino)
(saying)

..

,

So,

for example,
A1

the answer:

wanted to try something new

(expressed, e.g., by

a

response of

"I

wanted to try some-

thing new" from Al) can be understood
as

a

direct answer

m

abbreviated form, filling in the above
blank with:
Al wanted to try something new,
and believed that he
could do this by saying "Females are very
similar".

Since what is wanted is

a

p-reason, direct answers will

almost always be good on van Fraassen’s second
criterion
(but see note 22).

But the likelihood criterion accounts

for the intuitive worth of many possible
answers.

The above

answer is intuitively good, and this is traceable to

likely-enough desire component and likely be

1 i

given commonsense knowledge and the fact that
given the line correctly in the past.
the

(

ab b r e v i a t ed
Al

)

ef -component
Al

has always

On the other hand,

answer

wanted to say

a

line with four "e"’s in it.

has an unlikely desire component, while
Al

wanted to eat spaghetti

has an unlikely belief component.

Let’s turn now to example
Q3:

3.

Bo’s question is:

<A1 says "Bleegh blugh",
Al doesn’t say "Bleegh blugh",

communicative p-reason>.

a

,
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ThjB is an urgent question; Bo
had been expecting the
negation of the topic, so that
Al's utterance comes as a
surprise, and prompts the question.
Note that here the
topic represents only a phonological
stage of speech perception; this is also the stage to which
the questioner has
progressed.
The prior expectation of the
contrast-class may
seem problematic, as in the case of an
inherently bizarre
action (indeed, the topic might be
classed as an inherently
bizarre action), but recall that one's
personal probabilities needn’t be accompanied by conscious
feeling.
As in example 2, what Bo wants is

unlike example

2,

a

p-reason.

But

Bo wants a p-reason of a particular
sort,

one having the form:

wanted to communicate that p
believed that if he said "Bleegh blugh", he would
communicate that p
A1
A1

That

is,

even though A1 has uttered gibberish, Bo supposes

that A 1 wanted to communicate something by it, and wants
to

know what it is;
P~ reason

i

n

thus the spec i f i cat i on of "communicative"

Bo’s question.

It

is an open

question just how

this relevance relation is to be further analyzed,

in

light

of the various analyses of communicative "intentions".

Suffice

it

to say here that Bo wants a p-reason of a certain

sort.
Let s now consider answers.

Note first that answers

providing non-communicative p-reasons are not direct.
examp 1 e

For
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wanted to clear his throat

A1

(henceforth

I

will not be putting answers in
fully explicit

form) would not be

a

direct answer.

(It may,

however, be

"satisfactory" in that Bo would no longer
seek an answer to
his question.
This is because it would be reasonable
to
infer from it the corrective answer
that no communicative

p-reason exists.)

Since

a

p-reason is wanted, the second

criterion is again useless.

However, the likelihood cri-

terion assumes new significance.
contain,

K must be supposed

to

in addition to commonsense knowledge and
the assump-

tion that A 1

is normal,

information concerning what has been

said in previous discourse, and elements determining
what

would be relevant or appropriate to now say.
A1

For example,

wanted to communicate that his dog has fleas

would not be too likely an answer
tion had been about basketball.

if

the previous conversa-

Given its irrelevance

isn’t too likely (though of course quite possible)

would want to communicate this.

it

that A1

The likelihood of the

belief component will depend on elements of

K

determining

what gibberish might reasonably be expected to communicate.
For example,

nent,

for

the above answer has an unlikely belief compo-

it’s unlikely given commonsense knowledge that an

utterance of "Bleegh blugh" would communicate anything about
the dog.

On the other hand,

the answer

A1 wanted to communicate that what Bo just said was
nonsense
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has

a

all

these

somewhat more likely be 1 i ef
-component

evaluates

.

the assumption that A1

Note that in
is normal

is

crucial,

licensing the inference from what
could reasonably
be expected to communicate what
to what A1 would likely
believe about this.
In

this example Bo doesn’t interpret
because the

utterance

is

gibberish.

Another reason

a

listener may be

unable to interpret is if the utterance
is in
the listener doesn

a

understand; he supposes that the

t

uttered string has meaning (he doesn’t
consider
ish),

but he doesn’t know what it is.

a

saying as topic.

'

gibber-

a

WDYM-ques-

He would not ask what the

speaker meant, but what the sentence meant
do you mean,

it

In such a case,

however, the listener’s question would not
be
tion with

language

Je ne sais quoi ’?"

,

-

e.g.

not

"What

but rather "What does

'

Je

ne sais quoi’ mean?".

2

.

Explaining Say inq-That
I

:

Example

A

said earlier that what Bo wanted in example

explanation of Al’s apparent irrelevance.
brought Gricean implicatures to mind.

^

was an

That might have

In the case where

there is apparent violation of the conversational maxim

requiring relevant contributions, an imp 1 icature serves

precisely as an explanation of the apparent violation.
makes

it

This

natural to suppose that such implicatures may be

subsumed by the current framework,

i.e.

rendered as answers

.

;
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to

(tacit) WDYM-quest ion

a

.

In this

section

I

will try to

substant ate this point of view,
treating example
process
i

a

in

the

Here are two of Grice’s original
examples of relevance
mp icatures
i.e. implicatures generated by
an apparent
violation of the maxim of relevance:
1

1

,

Bo:
Al:

I
am out of petrol.
There is a garage around the corner.
(Implicature: The garage sells petrol,
and may be
n n pn
7

i

Sm

th doesn’t seem to have a
girlfriend these days.
He ; s been spending a lot of time
in New York
lately.
Impl icature: Smith may have a girlfriend
in New York.)

a'?!
Al

(

The general point of view

I

am espousing here is expressed

by Marcelo Dascal:

...an implicature is a hypothesis about the
speaker’s
intentions that explains away the apparent
irrelevance
of his utterance, by explaining how the
utterance is in
fact relevant.
So, the task of the hearer is similar
to the task of a scientist who looks
for a theory that
explains given data, under certain broad theoretical
assumptions (comparable to the [maxim of
relevance]
.

So relevance

tion,

.

.

implicatures are explanations.

Now, by defini-

an implicature of any sort must be "calculable" by the

hearer;

the hearer must

in some way be able to determine the

implicature for himself, without help from the utterer.
Thus, on the present view relevance implicatures are expla-

nations which the hearer can work out for himself.
is no

So

there

need for the hearer to request an explanation with

WDYM— quest i on

.

a

But that does not entail that the explana—

1
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tiDn may nDt be re9srded

answer to an implicit WDYn-

quest ion, representing his
initial puzzlement; it is
just
that he answers the question
himself.
I
„
npw support
this point of View by showing
how all the facts of relevance
implicatures can be accounted for by
the present theory.
begin by saying what I take the
facts to be.

m

1

Fact

That for which an explanation
is wanted is Al’s

1:

say i ng that p, not Al’s saying "p",

the apprehension of

apparent irrelevance would not be
possible without interpretation.
The quotes in Al’s interrogative
are of the

hybrid sort.
Fact 2; Bo finds Al’s saying that

puzzling because he

p

believes, first, that A1 is not "opting out'
relevance,

i.e.

that A1

is

bution, and second, that

previous discourse.

p

apparent irrelevance.
s

a

of the maxim of

relevant contri-

is not relevant with respect

As Dascal remarks,

judgment about p’s actua

irrelevant is A1

somehow making

1

the latter

to

is a

irrelevance, not merely p’s

What is perhaps only apparently

say i nq that p.

So we have here a distinc-

tion between "semantic" relevance and "pragmatic" relevance,
i.e.
^i

<

between

5Course

>

p

being relevant with respect to previous

and A1

’s

saying that

respect to previous discourse.

p

being relevant with

The first entails the

second, but the second doesn’t entail the first.

irrelevant, then Al’s saying that
vant; but Al’s saying that

p

p

is

If p

is

apparently irrele-

might actually be relevant if
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an exp anat ion of
1

certain sort is avaUable. 28

a

Fact 3: What is -anted
is an explanation that
meets
certain constraints.
These are as follows.
e

nat

1

iiying thst
content q.

n mUSt

Th

o

PBCif V A1 s intention in
specifying a certain
'

^
involves

This is meant to be neutral
between diferent ways of specifying the desired intention,
e.g. between »A1 intended
for
Bo to believe that q“ and

"A1

intended for Bo to believe

that A1 believes that q".
C2:

q must be relevant with respect to
previous
discourse.

C3:

There must be some -'connection'

"Connection" simply labels
first example.

a

1

between

problem here.

p

and q.

Consider Grice’s

The implicature could hardly be that
Bo

should travel by bicycle instead of car,
even though this
would be relevant, because there is no
connection between
this and there being a garage around the
corner.
If we

reflect on the actual

implicature, we might conclude that

a

"connection" consists in identity of certain
propositional

constituents (in this case, the garage).
second example.
lot of

Here there is more to it: Al’s spending

time in New York

friend there.

But consider the

is

evidence for his having

Obviously there is

a

quite vague; but

constraint exists.

it

is

girl-

problem here, that of

specifying the nature of the different connections.
is

a

a

So C3

nonetheless clear that some such

.
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there is an explanation meeting
all these constraints, then Al-s saying that
p is, though apparently
If

irrelevant

i

actually relevant.

The facts can be accounted for
as follows.

Fact

1

question be

15
a

accommodated by having the topic of
saying-that.

WDYM-

a

Note that we have here further

illustration of how the stage of speech
perception at which
a question arises for the
questioner may be distinct from
the stage to which the questioner has
progressed

example,

in

the first example Bo presumably assumes
that A1

believes that there is

a

garage around the corner.

doesn’t seek an explanation for the belief
Al’s evidence for thinking there is
corner

-

For

.

-

But he

he doesn’t want

garage around the

a

but for Al’s saying that there is

a

garage around

the cor ner

Fact 2 may be recast as

a

description of how the

quest ion
<A1 says that
p-reason>

arises for Bo.

p,

A1

doesn

At a time

is

say that p, communicative

just prior

expects A 1 not to say that
a55um ing that A1

t

p;

says that
In

p

to

the utterance,

Bo

this is a reflection of Bo’s

observing the maxim of relevance, and of

his attunement to p’s irrelevance.

utterance Bo come

to

At

the time of the

believe that A1 says "p", and that

(assuming the

i

A1

nterpretat i on to be homophonic).

virtue of the latter, the original pr obab i

1 i

t

i

es are

.
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reversed, and the question arises
urgently for Bo.
Like the
prev 1 ous example, it may help to
cons.der here that one
needn’t be conscious of one's
personal probabilities - in
particular, that Bo needn’t be aware
of his expectation that
A1

will not say that p.

The constraints mentioned under
fact 3 are entailed by

various conditions on good answers to
the above question.
Any direct answer will supply a
communicative p-reason.
Recall that when I introduced p-reasons,
I
meant to subsume
"intentions".
(But see note 15.)
Note that it really is a
c o mmunicative

p-reason that is wanted. There would be no

implicature if A1 said that
say, hear himself talk;
So much for Cl.

p

only because he wanted to,

such an answer would not be direct.

C2 is captured by the criterion of de-

sire-component likelihood, and C3 by belief-component
likelihood, where K is again taken to include information
about previous discourse and what is (semantically) relevant
with respect to this discourse, and,

in addition,

the

assump t i on that A1 is observing the maxim of relevance.

For

example, the answer
A1

intended to communicate that Smith likes New York

is unlikely.

vant and hence

communicate.

Given K, that Smith likes New York is irreleit

is

unlikely that this is what

A1

wanted to

Now consider the answer

intended to communicate that Smith’s previous
girlfriend was short and cur 1 y-ha i r ed

A1
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Thxs has an unlikely be 1 i ef -component

,

given commonsense

knowledge; though the communicative
content is relevant,
is unlikely that A1 thought he
could communicate this by

saying that Smith has been spending
York.

lot of time

a

Likelihood of the belief component is

a

in New

criterion of

adequacy on any proposed theory of
"connections" between
and q,

in that

it

any proposed connection must be such
that

p
a

normal person conversing with another normal
person could

reasonably expect to communicate

q

by saying that p.

Note

finally that the answer
intended to communicate that Smith might have
girlfriend in New York
A1

is good
c

*

on all counts;

it

is direct,

and has both

a

a

likely

es ire component and likely belief component.
I

conclude that relevance implicatures may be construed

as answers to

a

WDYM— quest i on

questioner in

a

certain way, and whose parameters are set in

a

certain way.

,

one which arises for the

They are not just any answers; they are

direct answers which are very good on the likelihood criterion.

This,

in part

at

least,

is what

people to come up with them, making

it

enables normal

unnecessary to

actually ask the question which has arisen for them.
all

For

that relevance implicatures are still answers.
Now, what about example 9?

Here Bo regards Al’s

utterance as an implicature gone wrong (though strictly
speaking this is

a

contradiction in terms).

Bo s quest ion,
’
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and the way it arises for him,
follows the pattern of

questions to which relevance implicatures
are answers;

it

is

just

that in this case there is no
answer which is very good
on the likelihood criterion.
So in this case Bo needs help,
and the question is asked.
As he has to ask, there is no

very good answer available, but he
can still hope for a relatively good one.
So, for example, the answer

wanted to communicate that Reagan is too
old to be
Pres i dent

A1

has

likely desire component, given that the
conversation

a

has been about politics and that A1
of

relevance, but

no t-so- 1

a

i

is

observing the maxim

ke 1 y though not-total ly-un-

likely belief component.

Such an answer is about as good as

could reasonably be hoped

'for.

With respect to how the various issues in this area

might be resolved,

I

have done nothing.

I’ve said very

little about the nature of semantic relevance (in terms of

which pragmatic relevance may be accounted for), about the

nature of connections, about how people manage to "abduce"

explanations which meet the constraints.
only that

it

is

My point has been

appropriate to approach these problems from

within the theory of WDYM-ques t i ons and answers.

(This is

not to say that the problems might be more easily resolved

when so approached.
I

tures.

As to that,

I’m not sure.)

have been confining discussion to relevance implicaIt

might be wondered whether my conclusions transfer

61

to other
at

kinds of

i

mp

1 i

cature

.

I

think that they transfer

least to those kinds which resemble
relevance implica-

tes

with respect to the nature of the
"violation" of a
conversational maxim.
Relevance implicates are characterized by the semantic irrelevance of what
is said and of the

apparent pragmatic irrelevance of the speaker’s
saying what
he did.
More broadly, they involve actual violation
"at the
level of what

is said"

(in Grice’s terminology)

violation "at the level of what is meant".

and apparent

But it would

seem that whenever there is such violation, whether
or not

relevance is involved, an utterance
and puzzlement, however tacit.

is

cause for surprise

But where there is puzzle-

ment stemming from an utterance, there is

a

WDVMquestion

representing the puzzlement, whether or not the listener
capable of resolving

it

for himself.

Hence

I

is

expect that

many kinds of implicature, at least, are amenable to the

present approach

,

differing only in the maxims which must be

accounted for in the psychological etiology of the question
and in the constraints on answers.

(Again though,

would amount in the short run at least to

resolution of the various problems).

a

are speculative, and

3

.

Explaining Be
In

1 i

I

a

this

transfer and not

But these remarks

won’t pursue them further. 29

ev i nq-That

:

Examples 5-7

examples 5-7, Bo’s questions are, respective ly:

Q5:<A1 believes that the patient is fading,

A1

be 1 i eves that the patient is
not fading,
y
e-r eason >
’

(

)

Q6

:

A1

07

:

A1

,

<A 1
believes that John is old,
believes that John is not old,

<e-reason)>,

< A 1 believes that John
is good,
believes that John is not good, e-reason)>.

These examples are alike in certain
respects, and different
in others.
I
will first discuss the ways in which
they are
a

1

ike.
lo

i

ng- that

begin with, the topic in each case is

a

believ-

accordingly, the relevance relation is in
each

;

case an e-reason. Thus in each case Bo
presupposes
and saying-that

(in addition to a be 1 i ev i ng- tha t

)

;

saying

a

he has

progressed to, and the question arises for him at,
what

1

have identified as the final stage of normal speech
perception (of
over,

a

declarative sentence), as in example

in each case the

1.

More-

puzzlement represented by the WDYM-

question is in two ways distinguishable from earlier examples

*

First,

the questions are non-urgent.

the case of Q5 Bo had no

For example,

in

inclination prior to Al’s utterance

to

think either that A1 believed that the patient was fading

or

that the patient was not fading; so the utterance does

not come as a surprise.

Nonetheless when he comes to

believe that A1 believes that the patient is fading, via the
normal stages of speech perception, he is puzzled.

This

brings us to the second distinctive aspect of the puzzlement, which is that it is occasioned by, not an entire
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sentence, but only by some particular
word; this is manifested by a partially quoted WDYMnter rogat i ve where the
quotes are of the hybrid sort mentioned
earlier.
i

,

The fact that Bo is puzzled by

particular word is

a

captured by the contrast-class, together
with its utilization in the favoring criterion.
Let’s see
how this works.

Note first that, as we are now dealing with
e-reasons and
not p-reasons,

the favoring criterion will no longer
automa-

tically be met by any direct answer.

Recall that, when

applied to an answer supplying an e-reason, favoring
has to
do with how the addition of a belief would
effect a believ-

er’s reasoning.

So,

for example,

consider as an answer to Q5
A1

believes that the patient’s heartbeat has weakened

(which has the fully explicit form

believes that the patient is fading rather than that
the patient is not fading because A1 believes that the
patient’s heartbeat has weakened).
A1

(Let’s suppose that this supplies an "(e-reason)"

-

this

will be explained shortly - so that the answer is direct.)

This answer does well on the favoring criterion; when the

information that A1 believes that the patient’s heartbeat
has weakened is added to the relevant background K Q
(

)

,

Al’s

believing that the patient is fading becomes more likely,
and his believing that the patient is not fading becomes
less likely.

beliefs in

a

For

it

is part

of K(Q)

reasonable way, and

it

that A1 forms his
is

reasonable to believe

.

£>H

that the patient i. facing
on the basis of the e-reason
that
the patient s heartbeat has
weakened, and not reasonable to

believe that the patient is not
fading on this basis.
that the pragmatic presuppositions
concerning

Note

what A1 has

"said" must be excluded from K<Q)
here,

in accordance with

the general policy of excluding
items which imply the topic.
Note also how the choice of contrast-class
here makes it so

that an answer good on the favoring
criterion must provide

evidence pertinent to Bo’s puzzlement with
"fading" in
particular.
Similarly for Q6 and Q7 the interest

in a

;

particular word is reflected in the contrast-class,
and the
way it

interacts with the topic in the application of
the

favoring criterion.
want to emphasize that in these examples Bo is
not

I

seeking an "interpretation" in the sense in which
that term.
t

i

He has full

I

am using

knowledge of the communal and

me- i nvar i ant semantic rules, whatever that may consist
in,

allowing him to form the relevant saying-that belief.
15

That

the examples are most naturally accounted for in this

,

way.

think this point is clear enough intuitively, but

I

may perhaps be made more obvious by considering

a

which A

before.

1

utters

a

word that Bo has never heard

case in

Suppose, e.g., that Bo forms the belief that A1 says "John
is

perspicacious"; assuming Bo’s problem

is only with

"perspicacious", we might alternatively suppose that Bo
forms the belief that A1 says that John is "perspicacious"

it

.
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In this case Bo does seek
an

sense

in this respect

;

earlier

53)

(p.

interpretation in the relevant

the case is just

like one considered

in which Al’s entire sentence

language that Bo doesn’t know.
tion would not be

a

is

But here again,

WDYM-quest i on

in a

Bo’s ques-

The more natural

.

interro-

gative would be -What does 'perspicacious’
mean?" (mention
quotes), not "What do you mean,
'perspicacious’?" (hybrid
quotes).

In general,

when what is wanted is an interpre-

tation in the relevant sense, we do not have

a

WDYM-ques-

tion; we do not have a request for the
p-reasons or e-rea-

sons of the utterer.
in which an

1

In contrast,

Q5-Q7 are all questions

nterpretat on is presupposed, and hence not
1

sought after.

Of course this is not to say that what

sought is not an "interpretation" in any sense.
three examples,

it

I

1

n t er pr et a

In all

might properly be said that what Bo is

after is an "interpretation";
isn’t an

is

t

i

I

would insist only that

it

on in my sense.

turn now to differences among the examples. The

parentheses surrounding the relevance relation in Q5 indicate that Bo is interested not just in any e— reason, but in
one constrained by his further interests on this occasion
in

particular

,

he wants evidence having to do with the

weakening of either the patient’s heartbeat or his brainwaves.
A1
1

s

So,

for example,

the answer

believes that the patient has been coughing

no t dir ec t

a

lot

-

There is a certain respect in
which this example
resembles a case of lexical ambiguity.
Suppose, e.g., that
A1 says that he is going
to look at the "table",
and Bo,
having no clue as to whether A1
means a chart or a kitchen
table, asks a question.
Again, Bo must be supposed
to be

semantically competent, i.e. to know
whatever semantic rules
for "table" are at work here 30
otherwise no puzzlement
would arise.
And the question would (or could see below,
!

be a WDYM-quest ion (as

I

have already intimated by putting

the puzzle in terms of what "A means"),
expressed, e.g., by
"What do you mean, 'table'?", or perhaps
simply "'Table'?".

(Certainly this latter would not be short for:
"What does
'table' meant".)
Thus my claim that questions in which an

interpretation is sought are not WDYM-quest ions needs
further

c

1

ar 1 f i ca t ion

;

for

in a way B does in this case want

an interpretation in the relevant sense.

claim as follows:

I

should put the

questions in which what is sought is

sought for lack of semantic competence are not WDYM-

questions.
ample.

So put,

But,

kind is it?

(though

I

the present case is not

given that we have
I

a

a

counterex-

WDYM-question here, what

am not sure exactly how to analyze this case

do think that the topic

going to look at the "table"

relevance relation is that of
But one thing is clear:

—

is

that A1 says that he is

mention-quotes
a

-

and the

communicative p-reason).

this case differs from previous

cases in that Bo’s problem here is not that he has no

.
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exp 1 ana t ion, but that

he

mi9ht make thiS
’table-

as in

has .ore than one.
by ask i ng

'kUchen table'?";

Note that Bo

you mean

,

chart or

this would not express

a

WDYM-quest ion, any .ore than "Does the
sun rise because the
earth reyolyes or because the sun
revolves?" expresses a
why-question.

Example 5 is similar in this respect.

supposes (perhaps incorrectly) that

fll

Bo

means either that the

heartbeat has weakened or that the
brainwaves have weakened,
and just wants to know which one.
Hence, he might
have

asked instead "Do you mean his heartbeat
is weaker or that
his brainwaves are?", which would have
expressed a different
question.
The difference, however, is that in the
case of
lexical ambiguity

it

is

merely in virtue of his semantic

competence that Bo has the competing explanations; not
so
example 5.
In

example

6,

particular sort,

a

Bo’s interest is again in an e-reason of
in this case

John s age in years.

in Al’s

belief concerning

That is, Bo supposes that A1 bases his

belief that John is old on

a

belief concerning what John’s

age is in years, and this is what Bo wants.
ple,

in

So,

for exam-

the answer
A1

believes that John has

a

lot of gray hair

would provide an e-reason, but not be direct.

But unlike

the previous case, Bo does not here have competing explanat

i

ons
In example 7,

Bo

isn’t

interested in any particular

68
kl nd of

e-reason.

However,

a

certain problem concerntng the

favor ng craterion should be
noted.
i

in app lying

We have been

ass„»„ 9

,

the favoring criterion to
answers supplying

e-reasons, that K<Q) contains the
supposition that A1
reasons normally, so that favoring
has to do with how a
normal reasoner would modify his
beliefs in response to a
certain new belief.
In light of the present example,
normal
reasoning must be construed so as to
include normal evaluative judgments.
But note that the answer
A1

believes that John is

a

fervent patriot

will not make the topic either much
more or much less likely

relative

the contrast-class members when added
to K(Q),

to

for not enough is known about John’s
values.

doesn’t

It

help much to assume that he is normal, for
it is hard to say

whether

a

normal person would consider patriotism good.

When the topic is

a

normative belief, goodness on the

favoring criterion will generally require that K Q
(

1

A

)

contain

nf ormat ion about the believer’s idiosyncrasies.

.

Examp 1 e

‘

B

Bo’s question here is:
Q8:<A1 believes that John is reckless,
A 1 believes that John is not reckless, conceptual
e-reason>
In several

respects this example

The topic is

a

be 1 i ev i ng — tha t

;

is

just

like examples 5-7.

accordingly, the relevance

relation is an e-reason, though one of

a

special sort that
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Will require explication.

The question is non-urgent.

Finally, Bo-s puzzlement is
again occasioned by some particular word; just as before,
this is captured by the contrast-class and its role in the favoring
criterion. What is
distinctive about this example is the
nature of the relevance relation, and some consequent
features of the evaluation of answers.
But before getting to that, I
want to
discuss a matter which, while relevant
to previous examples,
I
have chosen to put off until now.

a.

The Fallibility of Homophonic

I

discussing examples 5-7,

I

In

nterpretat on
1

dismissed the possibility

that Bo’s puzzlement was owing to some
failing in his

knowledge of communal and

t

i

me- i nvar i ant semantic rules.

I

dismiss this possibility in example 8 also (obviously,
since
the topic of Q8 is a be 1 i ev i ng- that

)

.

But

I

would like to

consider another possibility, one which might be raised
on
the heels of an objection to the notion of community-wide

semantic rules.

Simply put, the problem of radical

i

nterpr etat i on is

the problem of developing a theory for interpreting the

utterances of people whose language
It

is

completely unknown.

has been studied by Quine and by Davidson;

attempt here even an exposition of either

al^j[

i

will not

’s views.

am concerned with is the view, held by both,

important sense

I

nt er pr e t a t i on is radical

What

that in an

interprets —

I
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tion.

Davidson remarks:
The problem of interpretation
is
foreign: it surfaces for speakers domestic as well1 asS
of fh=
P akers nf
the same lanquaqe
n
h
the question, how can it be
detained
bat the language
that
„
is the same?
Speakers of the same
U 9e Can 90 on tbe assumption
that for them the
same
sam2 e
expressions are to be interpreted in uisf
way, but this does not indicate
what justifies the
assumption.
All under stand i ng o
the speech of another
involves radical interpretation.
,

i

j.

.*•

The view can,

I

think, be put in the following
way.

In

everyday life, we assume that others
speak the same language
we do

(English, say);

homophomcally.

that is, we ordinarily interpret

But this assumption is

a

hypothesis

,

one

whose merits are to be judged by the
same criteria by which

radical-interpretation hypotheses are judged.

Just what

these critera are is

it

deep guestion.

a

Suffice

to

say

that one consequence of the present view
is that homophonic

interpretation is fallible, as (arguably) all
hypotheses
are;

when we interpret homophomcally, we might be wrong.

Davidson again:
Let someone say

"There s a hippopotamus in the
refrigerator" am I necessarily right in reporting him
as having said that there is a hippopotamus in the
refrigerator
Perhaps; but under questioning he goes
on,
It s roundish, has a wrinkled skin, does not mind
being touched.
It has a pleasant taste, at least the
juice, and it costs a dime.
I
squeeze two or three for
breakfast." After some finite amount of such talk we
slip over the line where it is plausible or even
poss i b 1 e to say correctly that he said there was a
hippopotamus in the ref r ger ator for it becomes clear
he means something else by at least some of my words
than I do.
The simplest hypothesis so far is that my
word "hippopotamus" no longer translates his word
"hippopotamus"; my word "orange" might do better
.

,

.

’

:

:

i

,

The possibility of error is not merely academic, for differ-
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ences in meaning mere subtle
than this one are not unusual.
For example, it you say
Mary>s
„
,.

dousl y uni ikel y that

1

in

u

love

i>n

,

t

pan correctly report you as
haying

said that Mary is infatuated.
Let us suppose that homophonic
interpretation is
fallible.
Then ,e must conclude that the
notion of communi-

ty-wide semantic rules, knowledge of
which constitutes
semantic competence, is an idealization.
The semantic rules
utilized by one speaker are not in
general exactly the same
as those utilized by another.
And so we must modify the
notion of semantic competence, e.g. by
saying that semantic
competence consists in knowledge of the
rules used by most
speakers.

(I

don’t mean to suggest that there may not
be

better ways to proceed.)

Now let’s return to question of

the correct topic for QB (and also Q5-Q7

>

.

It

is still

clear on the present picture that Bo’s puzzlement
does not
stem from some lack of “semantic competence"; even
on the

present picture,
in which A1

rules.

It

utters
is

is clear

it
a

that this case differs from one

word for which Bo knows no semantic

just that,

in

pointing out the difference by

saying that in this case Bo is semantically competent, and
so presupposes a homophonic

interpretation, we must assume

the new notion of semantic competence.

objection now comes to mind.
*

n

semantic competence,

wants to know is how A1

But another possible

Granted that Bo is not lacking

in the new sense,

perhaps what Bo

interprets "reckless", according to

)
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Al-s semant

competent

rules.

Bo can still be assumed
semantically

in the new sense;

,

but he refrains from homophone

interpretation (so that the quotes
in his WDYM-c 1 ause are
purely mention-quotes), for fear
that his semantic rules are
not Al-s.

If

homophomo interpretation

this might be a reasonable thing
to do.

is fallible,

then

We can summarize

this possibility by saying that
perhaps what Bo wants is the
meaning of "reckless" in Al’s "idiolect".

have no wish to deny that there are
questions of this
sort, or that it can be reasonable
to ask such questions
precisely because homophonic interpretation
is in general
fallible.
1
would even add that such questions
appear to be
I

WDYM-questions.

In fact

I

think that B could request what

"reckless" means in A’s idiolect using the very
same inter-

rogative,
such

a

i.e.

case,

"What do you mean, he’s

'reckless’?".

the quotes would be purely mention-quotes, and

che question expressed would have as topic,

ing— that, but a (partial) saying-that,
A1

In

not

a

believ-

i.e.

says that John is "reckless",

where the mention-quotes in the specification of topic would
reflect Bo’s refraining from (complete) homophonic interpretation.

And the relevance relation would be

(communicative, presumably), not an e— reason.
case of ambiguity,

a

p-reason

(As in the

I’m not sure about the contrast-class.

But this is not the most natural construal of what is going

on in example 8.

(Even if it is,

the point would remain

.
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that there is a distinct sort
of case analyzable, in part,
by 08).
In example 8, Bo finds
"reckless" vague.
This is
not to say that he suspects
that Al’s semantic rules are

different from his.

It

is only

to

say something about the

nature of the semantic rules, or the
"output" of such rules,
WhiCh Bo
perfectly .ell suppose he shares with
Al.
To
P

it

another .ay,

is only

it

to say something about

the

nature of the "concept" which Bo might
perfectly .ell
suppose he shares with Al.
It would appear that Bo’s
attunement to the vagueness depends upon his
having homophonically interpreted, i.e. that he presupposes,
rightly or
wrongly, a homophonic nterpretat i on
i

Consider

a

further point.

Suppose that homophonic

interpretation is fallible, and that semantic rules are
not
community-wide.

Still, nothing follows concerning the

rules’ relative time-invar lance.

suppose that the rules known by

That is, we may still
a

given speaker are rela-

tively time-invariant, and in particular that those known by
a

speaker who is semantically competent,

are so.

in the new sense,

What "reckless" means in Al’s idiolect is not the

sort of thing that changes from occasion to occasion;

alternative proposal is correct, then what Bo wants

relatively stable thing,
with him, as

it

were.

a

if

the

is a

concept that Al carries around

But on the construal

I

am urging,

what Bo wants is simply what A means by "reckless" on this

occasion.

For example, a direct answer might be

7^t

A1

believes that John runs red lights.

this provided whet "recklessmeans in Al’s idiolect, we
should expect that pretty much
whenever A1 uses "reckless"
If

he means "runs red lights".
be pretty strange.

That’s possible, but

At any rate,

distinct construal.

it’s clear that

it

would

there is

a

The answer provides just what A1
means

on this occasion; next time is
a different story.

It would
be fruitless to try to deny the
distinction by supposing
that one’s semantic rules change
easily from occasion to

occasion.

That would that be a very suspect
notion of

semantic rules.
There is actually
of the distinction

ing- that

I

a

very straightforward demonstration

want.

In Q8

So a response by A1

.

John is reckless

1
'

expresses

a

,

the topic

is a

believ-

of "I don’t really think that

corrective answer; Bo couldn’t

reasonably acknowledge this answer, and then repeat
his
request for

n

a

"way" or

the other hand,

if Bo

had asked

in Al’s

a

idiolect.

"sense" in which John is reckless.

this same answer would not be corrective

question requesting what "reckless" means
This is actually a reflection of the

difference in time-variability, for the time-variability of
what Bo is requesting with QB is explicated by the fact that
he wants an e-reason for
this will

in general

a

particular belief of Al’s, and

differ from e-reasons for different

beliefs of Al’s concerning who or what is or are reckless
when, beliefs he may express on other occasions.

1

.
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To summar i ze

the topic is

In

.

example

8

and also in examples 5-7,

,

believing-that, so that Bo presupposes
an
interpretation.
More Pprecisely
ciseiy, Bo
Rn nroe
presupposes a sayingthat
attribution whose content-clause is
homophoni
a

ca
y interpreted; and the content -c 1 ause
of the believing-that attribute which is the topic is interpreted likewise.
Example
8 1S thUS distinguishable from
a case in which Bo seeks
the
meaning of a word in Al’s idiolect.
It is also distinguishable from a case in which A1 utters
a word whose meaning Bo
doesn’t know, and from a case of lexical
ambiguity.
1

b.

Conceptual
I

E — Reasons

mentioned recently that intuitively what Bo

is

seeking in example B is something which varies
from occasion
to occasion.

This is

a

relevance relation of QB
e-reason

.

That is,

reflection of the nature of the
,

which

I

have labelled "conceptual

this relation is such that typically

beliefs stand in the relation only for
time.

My goal

in this section

is

to

a

short period of

further characterize

conceptual e-reasons, by determining how they differ from
other kinds of e— reason.

Intuitively what Bo wants is

5ense
that

reckless

°^

if a

belief,
be 1 i ef

1

belief is

a

"specific" or "precise"

which A1 has in mind.
a

Thus we might say

conceptual e-reason for

a

topic

then it is more specific or precise than the topic
But note that the same condition intuitively holds

.

.
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of examples 5-7,

ip »h,ch the relevance
relations are

e-reasons, but not conceptual
e-reasons.

The condition

i

s

thus not sufficient to
characterize the relevance relat ion
of QB
.

say that

To

a

belief is more -precise-' than
another

is

evidently to say something about
the relation between the
respective contents of the beliefs.
Just what this relation
is is a difficult question,
one which
will
not be in a

I

position to address until chapter

presently that since being

a

Suffice

5.

it

to say

conceptual e-reason for

a

topic

belief entails being more precise than
the topic belief, the
relation "is a conceptual e-reason for"
is asymmetric.
turn now to another essential char ac ter
i st

I

conceptual e-reasons.

i

c

of

Imagine the following dialogue taking

place after Q8 is put to Al.
A1
Well,
mean that John spends money without ever
checking his account.
:

I

Bo:
agree that John spends money without ever
checking his account, but I don’t agree that he’s
r ec k ess
1

1

Al:
is

But look, when I say that he’s reckless, all I mean
that he spends money without ever checking his

account
If Al

s

initial response expresses

hence provides
5

objection

a

a

direct answer, and

conceptual e-reason, then Al’s reply to

is a natural

one.

I

attempt on Al’s part to clarify the

take the reply to be an
"I

mean" of his initial

response, to indicate that he was providing

a

conceptual

,
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e-reason.
less"

And as

a

consequence of this, he

in a certain way on this
occasion.

is

using "reck-

And given this

usage, he takes John’s recklessness
as necessarily equivalent to his spending behavior,
so that there can be no
accepting one while denying the
other, as Bo does.
(Given
that Bo asked DB which requests
a conceptual e-reason, it
would be unusual for Bo not to
construe Al’s response as
,

providing

conceptual e-reason, but put this aside.

a

The

objection to Al’s response might just as
well be made by
someone other than Bo.)
Thus, consider the following:
SI:

John spends money without ever checking his
account
.

SS

S3:
if
If SI

John is reckless.

:

John spends money without ever checking his
account
and only if John is reckless.

(presumed uttered by Al) expresses

answer to QB

,

true direct

then Al believes that Si, Al believes that SB,

and the first belief is

second.

a

a

The present moral

conceptual e— reason for the
is

that,

as a consequence of this

relation holding on this occasion, Al considers S3 to be

necessarily true on this occasion.

The relation’s holding

may be thought of as constituting A’s "usage" of "reckless".
The present feature of conceptual e-reasons serves to

distinguish example 8 from examples 5—7.
5.

Consider example

Suppose Al believes that the patient’s brainwaves are

weakening.

While this fact provides

a

direct answer to Q5

,
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most likely wouldn't do so
if the relevance relation
of
were a conceptual e-reason.
We can imagine, for example,
Bo (the doctor) convincing A1
that weakened brainwaves was
actually a hopeful sign, owing, say,
to some intricate
it

5

correlation between brainwaves and
metabolism.
Presumably
A1 would not respond to any
such attempt to convince him
with the complaint:
"You don't understand; when
I

'fading', all
A1

say he’s

mean is that his brainwaves are
weakening."

I

would not be using "fading" in such

a

way that he would

consider the patient's fading to be
necessarily equivalent
to his brainwaves weakening.
Of course, we
may still say

that when A1 says that the patient is
"fading", he means

that his brainwaves have weakened;

means

doesn’t indicate that

supplied, as

it

conceptual e-reason

a

a

is

being

The proposition that, e.g.,

6.

believes that John is sixty-two is

were

just that here the

8.

Similarly for example

but most

is

did in the imaginary dialogue considered in

connection with example

A1

it

a

direct answer to Q6

likely wouldn’t be if the relevance relation of Q6

conceptual e-reason.

For presumably A1

isn’t using

in such a way that he would consider oldness to be

old'

necessarily equivalent to being sixty-two.
Finally consider example
that John is

a

fervent patriot.

conceptual e— reason for A1
for

it

is easy

7.

to

’s

Suppose that A1 believes
This is presumably not

a

believing that John is good,

imagine Al’s being convinced that patri-

79
ot

i

sm

or anything for that
matter

,

good.

This is not

ice Bo

to say

that we may not

in example 7 as wanting
a

John is good,

example

8.

'way" or

just as

But

it

I

(except goodness),

j
.

no

s

loosely

"way" or "sense"

in which

have characterized the situation
in

must now be pointed out that
wanting

"sense" does not always amount to
wanting

a

a

con-

ceptual e-reason. 33

Since dispositional adjectives are
very frequently
normative in part, the above considerations
entail that,
strictly speaking, a sense of a dispositional
adjective
cannot be analyzed as a conceptual e-reason.
For example,

presumably could possibly be convinced that
John spends
money without ever checking his account but
A1

isn’t reckless,

simply by being somehow convinced that there’s
nothing bad
about John’s spending money without ever checking
his

account.

So my analysis of example 8 really applies
only to

dispositional adjectives with no normative component.
Rather than change my example, however,

I

will simply ignore

the normative component of "reckless".

Summing up, the relevance relation "being

e-reascm for" has three char ac ter i st
general

it

utterance.

i

c

features.

holds only for the duration of
Second,

it

is asymmetric

a

a

conceptual
First,

in

context of

because one relatum is

more specific or precise than the other.
holds,

a

Finally, when

it

believer may be said to be "using" an expression,

where this implies that he takes

a

sentence containing the
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express ion to be necessarily
equivalent to a certain other
sentence
This last feature is what
tost clearly distinguishes conceptual e-reasons from
other kinds of e-reason,
and
will elaborate on it in the
next chapter.
.

1

c.

Answers and Semantic Competence
have two goals in this section.

I

First

want to draw
out some consequences of intuitive
properties of certain

answers for the nature of communal
meaning.

I

And second

I

want to identify the constraints on
answers which correspond
to

constraints on intuitively proper senses of
"reckless".
ve argued that the attribution to
A1 of the belief

I

that 8E is partly made on the pragmatic
presupposition that

when A

1

cally.
A1
is

his is

utters SE

,

his words can be interpreted homophoni-

Now consider the possible answer to Q8

has no conceptual e-reason for believing that
John
reckless.
a

corrective answer, since

position of Q8 that A1 has such
However,

it

a

is a semantic

it

presup-

conceptual e-reason.

does not correct the topic, and hence does not

correct the presupposition of
Al’s sentence.

In sum,

a

a

homophonic interpretation of

homophonic interpretation is

consistent with the non-existence of

a

conceptual e-reason.

Now consider the answer
A1 believes that John spends money without ever checking his account.

This intuitively provides, or at least could provide,

a

.
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non-corrective answer to Q8

,

in the broad sense of not

denying any pragmatic
presupposition land hence not denying
any semantic presupposition
either).
Hence it does not deny
the presupposed homophonic
interpretation.
Thus,
a

of

"John is reckless",

"usage"

in the sense of a conceptual
e-reason

consistent with this sentence’s haying
its normal meaning.
This Vindicates a claim implicit
from the very beginning, Hhen I distinguished meaning
from speaker’s meaning in
Chapter 1
is

I

noted in Chapter

respect to

a

1

that semantic competence with

sentence which is vague with respect

to

some

constituent entails being attuned to constraints
on possible
speaker s meanings.
Now that I have identified speaker’s
meanings with answers to WDYM-quest ons I take
7

i

these con-

,

straints to be certain constraints on answers to
the relevant question.

I

take the relevant constraints on possible

speaker’s meanings for "John is reckless", for example,
to
be certain constraints on answers to Q8

cular

-

three in parti-

.

A

is not
A

trivial constraint is non-circularity.

Recklessness

intuitively among the specific senses of "reckless".
second constraint is possible directness.

Most

significantly, this requires an answer to possibly be
conceptual e-reason.

a

This means an answer must be more

precise than the topic belief, and also be such that

it

possibly gives rise to the sort of perceived necessity

—
as

mentioned in the previous
h cviuus section
section.
latter

that the answer be of the form

is

believes that John

A1

hh^ is required for the
What

where P expresses

P,

(perhaps conjunctive) dispositional

a

property. This rules out, for example,
the answer that A1
believes that everybody says that John
is reckless, though
this is an e-reason, and allows the
answer that A1 believes
that John spends money without ever
checking his account.

I

am not, however, prepared to say what
is required in

general,
i

n vo

1

ved

i.e.

when

a

dispositional adjective need not be

.

he sense in which an answer must be
"possibly" direct

I

is not

alethic but psychological.

logically possible for

a

I

suppose that

psychologically possible for

is

a

isn’t

intuitively

John P

,

where P

dispositional property.

A third constraint

ion.

it

"John is reckless" and "Everybody says that John

because the latter is not of the form
a

But

speaker on an occasion to

reckless" to be necessarily equivalent,

expresses

is

speaker on an occasion to hold any

two sentences to be necessarily equivalent.

hold, e.g.,

it

is

goodness on the favoring critei

Consider how the answer expressed by SI does on the

favoring criterion.

In accordance with

the way we have

previously applied this criterion, we allow as an element of
K(Q)

does

the assumption that A1

is a normal

reasoner

.

Then

)

.

?

)

)
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Pr(Al believes that John 15 r
that John spends money withouteckless/K<Q)&,< A1 believes
checking his account
compare more favorably with

„

.

)

Pr(Al believes that John is
not
believes that John spends money reckless/K(Q)&(Al
without checking his
account
)

than
Pr(Al believes that John is rec
k 1 ess/K Q
(

)

does with
Pr(Al believes that John is not

Evidently so.
has

a

ion,

In contrast,

r ec k

1

ess/K Q ))
(

the answer expressed by -John

big nose" doesn’t do as well on the
favoring criteras the reader may verify.

Note that "reckless" has its normal communal
meaning

throughout; this follows from "John is reckless"
having been
interpreted homophon i c a 1 y
The goodness of an answer
1

on

.

the favoring criterion thus depends upon the
communal

mean i ng
How good

criterion is

a
a

possibly direct answer is on the favoring

measure of how likely

it

is that A1

would

infer that John is reckless given that A1 believes that John

has

a

certain dispositional property.

But note that the

assessmen t proceeds without assumptions about whether the
answer is direct (or possibly direct), and hence about

whether the inference is non-demonstrative or "analytic".
(I

will have more to say about each possibility in Chapters

.

.

8-f

3 and

A

,

respectively.)

Note that the contrast-class and
relevance relation of
QB are such that every possibly
direct, favoring answer is a
belief attribution whose content-clause
is some predication
of John, one which is more
precise than the original
"is

reckless".

All possibly direct,

favoring answers may thus

be individuated by their more precise
predications.

Summing up, the constrained speaker’s
meanings corresponding to the "proper usages" of "John is
reckless" are

non-circular, possibly direct, favoring answers

Semantically competent speakers are attuned
straints,

i.e.

to

to Q8

these con-

they are able to judge possible answers

according to these criteria.

Judging non-circularity and

possible directness corresponds to judging the presence
of
"usage";

judging favoring corresponds to judging the "pro-

priety" of

a

usage.

Note that in virtue of the favoring

constraint, semantic competence thus entails commonsense

knowledge and commonsense reasoning ability.

D.

Summary

This completes my treatment of the examples presented
at the beginning of this chapter,

genera 1

1

and of WDYM-quest i ons

y

To sum up:

a

UIDYM—quest i on has been regarded as

triple of parameters fixed by the interests of
(or potential

questioner)

in a particular

a

a

questioner

context.

Aside

a
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from the question itself,
other aspects of a quest.oner’s
psychologies! state include the
urgency or non-urgency of
the question and the questioner’s
presuppositions (which
outstr ip the presuppositions of
the question).
Together
these factors represent a state
of puzzlement prompted in
some way by the apprehension of an
utterance.
A specificaion of speaker s meaning is simply
an answer to a WDYMquestion, and which may be evaluated
in various contextdependent ways, i.e. in ways which depend
upon various of
the context-dependent features of
the question.

This notion of speaker’s meaning is not
turn now to distinguishing it from

I

1

a

a

familiar one

notion which

is.

Gricean Speaker’s Meanino

V

Theorists are,

I

think, well aware that there is

a

distinction between the Gricean notion of speaker’s meaning
and the more everyday notion that has been my concern
but

I

want to try to say in my own way just what this distinction
i

s

.

Consider the following basic Gricean analysis:
meant that p in uttering S if and only if U uttered
ntend i ng
(Gl) to produce in an audience A the belief that
p
G2
that A recognize U’s intention Gl, and
G3
that A s believing that p be achieved partly in
virtue of A’s recognition of U’s intention Gl ^
U
i

(

)

(

)

’

.

In and of

itself this analysis makes no claims about the

S

.

,

nature of meaning,
meaning.

i

n the sense

in which expressions have

In early papers Grice did,

however, make

it clear
that he thought meaning could in
some way be understood in
terms of his notion of speaker’s
meaning.
Grice never

himself provided

very extensive account of just how
this

a

worked, but others have.
here.

Suffice

to say

it

I

will not review these efforts

that for any account of meaning of

the sort envisioned by Grice to be
non-circular, no notion
of "the meaning of S" can enter

into the analysis of speak-

er s mean i ng
’

For me,

"speaker’s meaning" is simply

answers that may be given to

specification of
isolation;

a

a

broad label for

a

WDYM-quest i on

.

Thus, a a

speaker’s meaning cannot be understood

its significance can be seen only in relation to

some WDYM-quest ion.

parameters of

a

We have seen that the ways in which the

WDYM-quest i on may vary;

answers varies accordingly.

the significance of

We can see this by reviewing

the fully explicit basic form for a direct answer to a

WDYM-quest 1 on (or to

a

why-question) <P,X,R>:

P in contrast to (the members of) X because A,
where A is a proposition bearing R to <P,X>.

Thus,

a

in

speaker’s meaning may specify p— reasons and e— rea-

sons of various sorts, and may presuppose topics and con-

trast-classes of three basic sorts: sayings, say i ngs- tha t
and bel ievings-that

.

From this perspective we might try

viewing the Gricean notion as

a

special case.

We might,

.
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that

view Gr icean speaker’s meaning
as an explanation of
a say ng
i... an act of uttering a
string, where the string
is v i ewed
by the seeker of the explanation,
is,

l

,

,

ed,

as

^interpret-

and ln which what is provided
is a communicative p-rea-

son

There is something right and something
wrong about this
wou 1 d-be subsumption.
What’s right is that Gricean speaker’s meanings may be regarded as
explanations, providing
communicative p-reasons for people uttering
strings regarded
as uninterpreted.
It is, moreover
merely because the
,

strings are regarded as un i nter preted that
there
for explanatlon in the first place.

That is,

theoretical stance that we don’t know what
sions to have meaning, then

it

becomes

a

it

demand

is a

if we take
is for

the

expres-

striking fact, one

which calls for explanation, that people go around
making

utterances.

The Gricean explanation, provided by the

Gricean notion of speaker’s meaning,
ly,

is,

roughly and broad-

that people do such things because they have certain

communicative intentions: utterances are made because people
have certain

c

ommun 1 ca t i ve ends, and believe that these can

be achieved by making utterances.

That an expression has

meaning is then in some way analyzed in terms of its role in

facilitating the achievement of these communicative ends. 35
So

let

s

suppose that Gricean speaker’s meanings do

provide explanations of some sort, and also that
cative

p

a

communi-

reason may be analyzed along the lines of the
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Gricean intentions G1-G3

Mhat

s

no problem,
.

,

the analysis of communicative
p-reasons open).

Gncean speaker’s meanings may
WDVM questions,

whose topic is

i.e.
a

as

Still,

(direct) answers to WDYM-quest
ions

saying and whose relevance
relation is

WDYM-quest ion is

a

I’ve left

not be regarded as answers to

communicative p-reason; the subsumption
fails.
topic of

for

a

a

When the

saying, then it is no part of

the etiology of the puzzlement
that the questioner has

interpreted the utterance.

This might be because, though

the questioner has interpreted,
is the verbatim report

this case it isn’t

a

the context

in any case,

that

it

that matters (example E - though in

communicative p-reason that’s request-

ed), or that the questioner can’t interpret
But

is such

(example 3).

these properties of the etiology of WDYM-

quest i ons with saying-topics are to be distinguished
from
the distinctive property of the etiology of the
puzzlement

which Gricean speaker’s meaning is supposed to resolve.
say,

example

3,

In,

the WDYM-question arises for Bo not because

he is for theoretical purposes supposing that he doesn’t

know what meaning is, but simply because he doesn’t think
that the utterance has any meaning.

Whereas the Gricean

notion of speaker’s meaning is highly theoretical, my notion
of speaker’s meaning

is that of an answer

to

a

question

which might arise in everyday life (whether or not the topic
is a say i ng

)

.

Grice may once have thought of himself as attempting

a
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conceptual analyse of an everyday,
antecedently
no t i on of speaker’s meaning. 36

cism:

if so

there is no antecedently

,

then

,

g 1V en

have

a

crit ._

gwen notion

of speaker’s
meaning .hich can serve the
theoretical purposes he had in
mind.
For
take the antecedently given
notion
I

f

to be that

an answer to

a

WDVM-quest i on

.

(Whether or not he may

have successfully analyzed,

in part,

notion is another question;

I

an antecedently given

am leaving

it

open whether

communicative p-reasons might be analyzed
along Gricean
lines, and hence whether answers to
WDVM-quest i

ons with a

communicative p-reason as relevance relation
might be partly
analyzed along Gricean lines.)
But I don’t
think that

Gricean theorists nowadays regard their notion
of speaker’s
meaning as an everyday notion, or even the
question as being
very important.
in terms of

The concern is to somehow analyze meaning

communicative intentions, and

it

immaterial

is

whether or not their notion of speaker’s meaning

dently given;

it

is

antece-

might just as well be stipulated, or done

away with altogether in favor of the conjunction of intentions G1-G3 (or some modification thereof). 37

In any case,

my main point here is simply that the Gricean notion of

speaker

s

How,

meaning is not
then, do

I

it

special case of my notion.

account for the apparent fact that

Gr 1 cean speaker s meaning

that

a

is

provides an answer to

explanatory?
a

Simply by saying

broad why— quest i on

,

i

.e.

<People make utterances, People don’t make utterances,
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communicative p— reason>,
where this arises for the theorist
whQ does not
to
meaning for granted.
As always, the parameters of
the
why-quest ion are context-dependent; e.g.
the interest might
alternatively be in an physiological account
of speech
production.
So, even though it is not a
special case of my
notion of speaker’s meaning, the Gricean
notion of speaker’s
meaning is nonetheless subsumable by the
theory of why-questions.
This will be the case with all explanations,
if van

Fraassen’s theory of explanation

is

correct.

.

—

.
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37.

See Schiffer

(1983), especially pp

.

120-9.

CHAPTER

3

VAGUENESS AND SPEAKER’S MEANING

1

I

Introduct ion

•

noted in Chapter

that

1

reckless" seems to have at once

plicity of meaning,

a

conflict

sentence such as "John is

a

deficiency and

a
I

And

I

multi-

resolved by positing

deficiency of communal meaning and
ble speaker’s meanings.

a

a

a

multiplicity of possi-

noted that one who knows the

meaning is attuned not only to the deficiency
but also to
constraints on the possible speaker’s meanings.
The point
of studying WDYM-quest ions was to explicate
the notion of

speaker

s

meaning, and thus elaborate on and support these

obser vat ions

.

In this chapter

I

want to consider where we

are with respect to this goal.
In chapter

1,

I

used the term "vague" to describe

a

certain phenomenon, but care should be taken, for one lesson
of the previous chapter

is

very fine distinctions.
said not to "understand "
is a

WDYM-quest i on

,

that everyday terms do not make

In all
.

of the examples Bo may be

would say that whenever there

I

there is some sort of lack of "under-

standing" of an utterance.

There being a WDYM-quest i on is

not a necessary condition for

however; for there is also

a

a

lack of understanding,

lack of under stand i ng

communal meaning isn’t known.

if

the

As I’ve noted previously,

95

in

96

examples 3-8 Bo may be said to want
an "interpretation";
addition to these there is the sense
having to do with
communal meaning.

In

examples 5-8 Bo may be said to find

word "vague", and to want

vague, or more "precise".
as no surprise,

is

m
a

"sense", or something less

a

My conclusion, which should come

that the theory of WDYM-quest i ons

which

,

allows the articulation of distinctions among the
examples,

capable of finer distinctions than are those provided
by
these everyday terms.
What I have called "vagueness",
is

and

the problem

I

am interested in,

strated by example 8,
tual e-reason.

is

the phenomenon illu-

in which what

is wanted

is a concep-

will continue with this usage, as well as

I

with the correspond i ng usage of "precise", but
that

is

it
I

I

must warn

partly stipulative.

will begin here by elaborating on last chapter’s

discussion of conceptual e-reasons, specifically on the kind
of necessary inference they involve.

I

will

then be in a

better position to reassess the phenomena discussed in

Chapter

1;

the deficiency of meaning,

the multiplicity of

speaker’s meaning, and semantic competence will be discussed
in turn.

I I

In

.

Occasional Analyticity

the previous chapter

I

noted that

a

conceptual

e-reason gives rise to kind of perceived necessity.

My

.
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remarks were confined to an example,
however, and
now like to assay a generalization
of sorts.
It

I

would

convenient to state the generalization
in terms
of the notion of "acceptance".
Unlike belief, acceptance is
a relation between a sincere
subject and a sentence
is

with

certain meaning.

a

The difference between acceptance
and

belief can be seen most clearly in the
case of

containing an indexical term, e.g.
case what is accepted,

i.e.

"I

am late".

"I

a

sentence
In such a

am late" with its attendant

context-independent meaning (or, at least, contex t- i
ndependent so far as "I" is concerned),
from what is believed,
lar person

is

late,

a

i.e.

e,_

ne d with

clearly distinct

the proposition that a particu-

proposition which is determined by

context (in particular, the speaker).
c

is

indexicals, but

it

*

I

will no t be

will be convenient to

speak of sentences and meanings rather than propositions.
The general result can now be stated as follows.

Suppose
tion,

a

speaker accepts SI under

and also accepts S2 under

a

a

homophonic interpreta-

homophonic

i

nter pr etat i on

And suppose that on an occasion the belief "corresponding"
to

the first acceptance is a conceptual e— reason for the

belief cor respond 1 ng to the second.

considers

r Sl

if and only

if S2

sarily true on this occasion.
two

n
,

Then the speaker

call

it

S3,

to be neces-

We may think of S2 as having

"interpretations", one being the homophonic interpre-

tation,

the other being a particular "usage" on this occa-

.

.

.

98
s

i

on
If

a

sentence contains no indexicals, the
belief -'corre-

sponding" to an accepted sentence under

a

homophonic inter-

pretation is straightforwardly specified via
For example,

if

a

d

i

squo tat i on

speaker accepts "John is reckless", then

he correspondingly believes that John
is reckless.

are more complicated if indexicals are
present, but

Matters
I

will

not consider these complications here.^

Under the given circumstances, S3 appears to have
the

status of an "analytic" truth of some sort, relative
to Al.
This is not analyticity in the traditional sense.
thing,

traditional analytic truth is not relativized to

speakers.

However,

necessar
the speaker
is

For one

i 1

.

y

in the next chapter

I

will argue that S3

true in fact, and not merely in the view of

From my point of view the crucial difference

that Al does not hold S3 to be necessarily true in virtue

of an identity between the meanings of certain of its

constituent expressions.

After all, Al takes SI and S2 to

have their usual, distinct, meanings.

Al

holds S3 to be

necessarily true on this occasion in virtue, not only of the
meanings of SI and S2

,

but also of what

h_e

means by S2 on

this occasion, where the relevant sense of "meaning some-

thing by"

a

sentence is that of

a

conceptual e-reason.

I

will call the type of analyticity involved here "occasional
ana 1 y t ic i ty "

Crucial to this account is my claim that "John is

99

reckless
usage.

has both its normal meaning
and
ny

a

particular

Justification for this, to repeat,

is

basically

that a homophonic

interpretation is presupposed in the
asking of a question requesting a
concepual e-reason.
Yet
this still may seem a peculiar claim.
In particular, it may
seem that the perceived necessity
of S2 depends only on the

particular usage given by SI; what role
is there for the
communal meaning to play?
I
want now to address this
concern, by considering how occasional
analyticity differs
from stipulation.

Suppose

a

lecturer gets tired of saying -carnivorous

mammal" all the time and introduces the term
"carmam" to
stand for this.
Then for the duration of the lecture
he
will regard "carmam" as having exactly the
meaning of "carni-

vorous mammal".

Consequently he will regard

a

sentence of

the form
T

is a

carmam if and only if

as necessarily true.

ceived necessity.

I

T

is a

carnivorous mamma

1

Thus stipulation gives rise to pertake the crucial feature of this sort

case To be that the abbreviating expression is arbitrary,
in that

its own meaning,

if

the duration of the context.

it

has one,

is

disregarded for

Since it assumes exactly the

meaning of the abbreviated expression, there can be no

question of propriety or impropriety in the abbreviatory
relation, outside of heuristic value.
Cal

1

the relation that holds between accepted sentences

100
si

and S2 in virtue of the belief
corresponding to SI being

conceptual e reason for the belief
corresponding to S8 the
relation
The c-relation clearly differs
from a stipu.

lated abbreviatory relation in not
being arbitrary, as can
be seen from the fact that there can
be propriety or impro-

priety in

a

c-relation.

S2 to c-re late, but

Intuitively

improper for, say,

face" and S2 to c-relate.

assumes the meaning of SI.

So

is proper for SI

it

"John has

and

clean

a

cannot be that S2 simply

it

For what could

be other than

it

this meaning, as well as that of SI and "John has

a

clean

face", which accounts for that the fact that the c-relation
is proper

in the one case but not

the other?

On my account,

this intuitive dependence of propriety on meaning is ac-

counted for by the fact that how well an answer does on the

favoring criterion depends on the meaning of the original

utterance (as well as on other factors
Inasmuch as stipulation is

a

-

see pp

.

82-3).

fully explicit act on the

part of the speaker, the speaker must be fully aware of the

abbreviatory relation.

This points out another difference

between stipulation and the c-relation.
a

Earlier

dialogue which might follow Al’s uttering

to Q8.

SI

I

imagined

as a response

But an answer is not fundamentally something which

which some respondent is able to give;

it

is

logically

possible for there to be some direct, and true, answer

to Q8

which no one is aware of, and in particular, which A1 is not

aware of.

And this is more than a merely logical possibi-

101

lity.

It

is not

uncommon for people to say something

without quite knowing what they mean,

discover it; at least, so
talk.

it

would appear from everyday

Suppose for example that

but by somebody else.
to say.

Yes,

perhaps later to

SI

is

supplied, not by Al,

Then it would not be unusual for Al

thank you;

that’s just what

I

meant."

This

would suggest that, prior to the response
being actually
given, SI did supply Al’s meaning, but Al
was not fully

aware of this, at least in the sense that he
was not able to
articulate it.
(Or, if this is not convincing enough,
imagine

a

complex.)

case in which the speaker’s meaning is more

Obviously no such phenomenon is present in the

case of stipulation.
A speaker’s being unaware of a conceptual

e-reason

should be distinguished from there being no conceptual
e>_reason

all.

In the

latter case but not the former

there is no true and direct answer to
a

conceptual e— reason.

question requesting

a

Phis will be the case if the speaker

simply has nothing more precise in mind; this is

a

common

phenomenon, one which is generally to the relative detriment
of

the speaker’s understanding of the world.

noted that in such cases there might in fact be

precise belief, but one which is not
for the topic belief.

both SI and S2

,

a

should be

It
a

more

conceptual e-reason

For example, a speaker might accept

but still SI may not express

e-reason for the belief expressed by S2

;

a

conceptual

the belief corre-

.

.
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spending to SI may not constitute
„hat the speaker meant by
S2

thus stress that the point about
awareness is not

I

simply that

may be difficult to articulate

it

belief, but that

it

more precise

may be difficult to articulate

precise belief which is
belief.

a

a

more

a

conceptual e-reason for the topic

Both claims are true, and both follow from
the

wider claim that any belief may be difficult to
articulate.
But

it

is

the claim concerning conceptual e-reasons
which

I

take to account for the phenomenon of groping tor
one’s

mean i ng
I

ing,

hough

a

speaker need not be fully aware of his mean-

he may be.

A good way

to

see this is by noting the

existence of locutions for making one’s meaning fully
explicit.
sense of

I

am speaking of "in the sense that" or "in the

locutions, e.g.

"John is reckless in the sense of

spending money without ever checking his account".
that

if

Note

the speaker’s meaning is made explicit in this way,

then the perceived necessity to which I’ve referred becomes

eminently compr ehens 1 b 1 e

.

For example,

it

is clear

why

a

speaker would take the sentence
John is reckless in the sense of spending money without
ever checking his account if and only if John spends
money without ever checking his account
to be

necessarily true.

But to the speaker’s mind,

this

sentence has the same status as
John is reckless if and only if John spends money

lOJ

without ever checking his account
on this occasion,

if bv
y

r-ar"John
^
Jonn is= reckless"
i

..

l, t

speaker means

a

on this occasion that John spends
money without ever checking his account.
Ihis completes my discussion of
occasional analyticity

want now to take another look at the
vagueness phenomena
noted in chapter 1.
I

1 1 1

I

•

Deficiency and UJDYM-Quest i ons

he meaning "deficiency" of a sentence (i.e.
sentence-

type), with respect to

give rise to

a

a

particular constituent, tends to

certain sort of cognitive phenomenon.

1

propose to analyze this tendency as the sentence’s aptness,
on an occasion of utterance,

to prompt

in a

listener

a

state

of puzzlement relevantly like that of Bo’s in example B.
The essential

features of such

a

state are the parameters of

the WDYM-quest ion one is disposed to ask,

including

conceptual e— reason as relevance relation and
class which serves to single out

a

a

a

contrast—

particular sentence

constituent, the non— urgency of the question, and the presupposing of

a

saying, saying-that (a homophonic interpreta-

tion), and be 1 i ev i ng- tha t

sition of an

i

.

nterpretat l on

Note that without the presuppoit

would not be possible to

offer such a state as entering into an analysis of the

puzzlement; this puzzlement clearly must depend upon an

104

apprehension of the meaning.
position of

a

honiopho n ic

possible for such
1

C

1

a

Moreover, without the presup-

interpretation

would not be

it

state to enter into an analysis of

a

enc V which is presumably
community-wide.

[wo

prompt

a

notes.

First,

a

vague sentence is only "apt” to

state of puzzlement because there are
circumstances

m

which it would not; for example, one’s
audience might
simply not be listening, or not be very
interested.
Second,
1

am not offering here a conceptual
analysis either of

•meaning deficiency" or of "vagueness", since
ordinary terms
do not single out the phenomenon

mentioned.

Rather,

am interested in, as I’ve

I

am simply offering a more elaborate

I

charac ter zat on of the phenomenon.
i

notion of

l

conceptual e-reason,

a

it

Since

it

appeals to the

serves nicely to dis-

tinguish the kind of vagueness with which

am concerned

I

from other kinds.
fo

it

characterize

a

phenomenon

is not

account for it;

to

still remains to explain why the meaning of

might be apt to prompt

a

certain kind of

UID

sentence

a

YM-ques t i on

.

I

will not consider this task until Chapter 5.

I

A.

In the
I

V

.

Multiplicity and WDYM-Quest ons
i

The Set of Possible Speaker’s Meanings

discussion of example

8

in the previous chapter,

identified proper speaker’s meanings of "John

is

reckless"

105

"“h

ans " er5

08 -hich met three constraints:
non-circu-

lanty, possible directness, and
favoring.

Accordingly,
no. Identify the multiplicity
of proper speaker's meanings
of " John is reckless" with
the multiplicity of answers
which
meet these constraints.

remarks

,W °

-

First,

it

1

should be recalled that good-

ness on the favoring criterion is relative
to

function Pr and

a

background corpus K.

a

probability

Insofar as we may

speak of "the" multiplicity of possible
constrained speaker’s meanings, it must be that multiplicity
which is relativized, via the favoring requirement, to a
Pr which models
exactly commonsense reasoning and to a K which
consists

exactly of commonsense knowledge (including the
knowledge
that others are commonsense reasoners).

Second, note that

the continuity of Pr ’s range accounts for the fact
that the

question of whether or not
pi

given speaker’s meaning is

a

oper cannot always be definitely answered.
am going to assume the existence of

I

a

unique set

S

rO

of constrained speaker’s meanings for "John is reckless".

There are two idealizations in this assumption.
is that

there is

commonsense

a

unique commonsense Pr and

The second

K.

is

value can somehow be chosen.

because
to

it

r(j

unique

that a threshold favoring

3
I

make these idealizations

will be simple and convenient to be able to refer

"the" set S
S

a

The first

rO

appears to be uncountably infinite.

It

suffices to

,

1

,
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note that it seems we couldn’t
enumerate the "domains" with
respect to which one might be
reckless, e.g. reckless when
it comes to money, reckless
when it comes to women, etc.
lhUS S

multiplicity is presumably greater than
that of
the positive integers.
Beyond this, 1 am
rO

S

not sure what to

say

.

mentioned in chapter

1

1

that multiplicity stemmed not

only from senses but from senses of senses.

should view S

rQ

as having structure,

in

Accordingly we

the algebraic sense

'his requires the definition of a certain
relation, a task
to which

B.
1

•

1

now turn.

Structuring the Possible Speaker’s Meanings

The Relation

U)

Defined

the members of S^

0

propositions of the form

are constrained answers to
r Al

believes that

to define a binary relation W on S^_^,

p

n
1

.

Q8

now want

the "is answered by"

relation, as follows.

^

Pi ar*d Pg are elements of S^_^, then pi is answered
by p2 just in case p2 is (the core of) a non-c i r cu 1 ar
possibly direct, favoring answer to <p 1 X concep tua
e-reason) for some X such that the members of X and pi
differ exactly with respect to the predicates of their
,

,

content clauses.
(See p.

cores

.

I

1A for

the distinction between answers and answer

)

he definition is s t r a i gh t f or war d save for the stipu-

lation concerning

X.

To understand this stipulation,

recall
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that the contrast-class of Q8 is
such that every possibly
direct, favoring answer is a belief
attribution whose

content is some predication of John more
precise than the
topic predication; answers may thus be
individuated

by their

pred icat 1 ons

.

(See p. 8A

ensure that

is to

X

.

The idea behind the stipulation

)

is such

that if p£ is

a

possibly direct,

favoring answer to
<p

1

,

X

,

concep tua

1

e— reason>,

then the predication of p2 is more precise than
that of pi;

were the contrast-class arbitrary, so that

could be

it

trivial, or differ from the topic in the subject term,
then
p2 might not so relate to pi.

Thus W relates elements whose

predications precisify, not only the topic predication of
tJ8

S

.

,

but each other.

Properties of
1

Ul

now turn to enumerating

a

number of properties of the

answering relation.
W does not define a function of pi.

because
answer

a

(as

This is both

given question may have more than one constrained
indeed the existence of a mu 1

shows), and because pi

1

i

p

1 i

c

i

tous S

r0

is the topic of more than one ques-

tion.
W is not

"connected",

given any two elements of S

i.e.
r0

by the second or vice versa.

it

isn’t the case that,

either the first is answered
For example, of "A1 believes

10b

that John spends money without
ever checking his account"
and "A1 believes that John
runs red lights", neither is
answered by the other.
W

itself.
W

irref iexive,

1S

i.e.

no element of

is

answered by

This follows from the non-circularity
requirement.
is asymmetric,

answered by pi.

i.e.

if pi

is answered by P 2,

p2 isn't

This follows from the asymmetry of the

relevance relation, noted previously.
conceptual e-reason for pi, then

it

If p £

is possibly a

is a more

than pi, so that pi could not possibly be

a

precise belief

conceptual

e-reason for p2.
W appears to be transitive,
is

i.e.

it

appears that

if

pi

answered by p2, and p2 is answered by p3, then pi is

answered by p3.

Transitivity would follow from the the

transitivity of possible directness, the transitivity

of

possible directness and non-circularity, and the transitivity of possible directness and favoring under the specified

conditions.
lo

I

discuss these matters in turn.

show transitivity of possible directness,

to my earlier remark

I

appeal

that a possibly direct answer to Q8 is

one of the form
A1

where

P

believes that John P,

expresses

a

dispositional property, and the content

of the belief that John P is more precise than that of the

belief that John is reckless.
direct answer to

Now suppose p2 is

a

possibly

109
1

where

X

»

,

concep tua 1 e-rea5on>,

15 as

X

described on p.

106,

and where pi

15 of

the

form

believes that John 0.

A1

By an obvious generalization of my
earlier remark, we then

have that pE is of the form

believes that John ^

A1

where

f

expresses

dispositional property and the content

a

of the belief that John

belief that John

,

0.

^

is more precise than that of the

And suppose p3 is a possibly direct

answer to
<p£,
1

(conceptual e-reason>.

X

hen p3 is of the form

believes that John

A1

where 9 expresses

,

dispositional property, and the content

a

of

the belief that John

bel

i

ef that John

Q

0

is more precise than that of

the

Suppose we draw the intuitive conclu-

.

sion that the content of the belief that John 0 is more

precise than that of the belief that John
satisfies the criteria for
<p

1

,

X

,

concep tua

1

a

0

.

Then p3

possibly direct answer to

e-reason>,

the desired result.

Non-c

1

r

cu 1 ar i ty in itself is obviously not transitive.

But it follows from the asymmetry of possible directness and
the transitivity of possible directness that the conjunctive

property of being non-circular and possibly direct

is

transi-

1

>

,

1

1

1

ve

10

.

turning now to the transitivity
of possible directness
and favoring, consider the two
questions
O

1

<pl ,X1

:

,

R

1

and
Q2:

<A1,X2,RB>,

where A1

is a favoring answer

to QB need

not be

a

to Ql.

A favoring answer

favoring answer to Ql because

that the contrast classes are "skewed'

it

AB

may be

For example,

1

.

suppose that Ql is
< Adam eats the apple,
Adam gives the apple to the snake, p-reason>,

and A1

is

Because he was hungry.

Suppose Q2 is
< Adam was hungry, Eve was hungry,
preceding eating
behav i or >

and AB is

Because Eve ate more recently than Adam.
Clearly, A1 favors pi over XI, and A2 favors A1 over XB.
But AB doesn’t favor

(much or at all) pi over XI.

For

it

doesn’t favor (much or at all) A1 over Adam’s being not
hungry.

We might say,

loosely,

that it favors Adam s being

hungry but not Adam’s being hungry

Adam’s ea

1

’

;

so

it

doesn’t favor

nq the apple.

What this example shows is that transitivity of favoring requires some sort of

"coordination" between

XI

and XB.

1

1 1

The condition on

such

in the

X

coordination, as

a

Suppose p2 is
<p

,

1

X

1

,

I

definition of w seems to achieve
will now try to show.

possibly direct, favoring answer to

a

conceptual e-reason>,

for suitable XI, where pi

is of

believes that John

A1

the form

0.

Then p2 is of the form

believes that John

A1

'f

,

where the content of this belief is more precise
than that
of the belief that John

$

.

And suppose p3 is

a

possibly

direct favoring answer to
<p2 X2 concep tua 1 e— reason>,
,

,

for suitable X2.

Then p3 is of the form

believes that John 0

A1

,

where the content of this belief is more precise than that
of the belief that John

^

.

But intuitively,

pi

over

is

more precise than that of p2.

then so does any belief attribution whose content

X,

attribution,
<p

1

,

X

favors

if p£

1

,

it

is a

concep tua

Since p3 is such

a

belief-

favoring answer to
1

e-reason>.

Since, by transitivity of possible directness, p3 is also a

possibly direct answer to this question, we have shown

transitivity of possible directness and favoring.
Since both this last demonstration and the demonstration of the transitivity of possible directness rely on

intuitions concerning comparative precision,

I

don’t take

.

1

1
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myself to have rigorously
established W’ s tr ans i t i vi ty

on S
u

rO

j

Elements which precisify no
nott

only the topic belief, but alec each
other,
<S

we may now

in various „ays

rQ ,W> does not appear to be a discrete structure.

That is,

there doesn’t seem to be

relation "is immediately

a

answered by" (of which W would be the transitive
closure),
call
pi

it

W.,

such that pi stands in

is answered by p2 and

to p2

UC

if and only

if

there is no p3 such that pi is

answered by p3 and p3 is answered by p2.

In any case,

I

have no account of the conditions under which an
answer

would be immediate.
I

would speculate that precisif ication may be continued

indefinitely,

answers it.

i.e.

that given any pi,

Certainly

a

there is some p2 which

conceptual e— reason may be very

complex - consider, for example, what

ethics might mean by

John is moral"

there could be principled limits.

a
—

philosopher of
and

I

don’t see how

Note that this would not

entail that vagueness is omnipresent, but only that degrees
of vagueness are.

On my analysis vagueness requires not

merely that there exist constrained answers, but also that
the question to which they are answers be one that
er would be apt

a

listen-

to ask.

Two structures isomorphic to <S^,UI> are worthy of

.

13

1

note.

The elements of S

r0 are propositions of the form

believes that John

A1

0

.

They correspond one-to-one with
the elements of a set S

propositions of the form
ments of

a

set

r John

^

of properties

^

and

$.

S

mth

and

rl

^

e

of

^_

are,

intuitively, the set of possible senses of
"John is reckless", and the set of possible senses
of "is reckless",

respectively.^

Relations on

S

rl

and

can be defined

which hold between elements just in case

counterpart elements in
to

<S

.

r

0

,

v

Ul

holds between the

S^, yielding structures

isomorphic

W>

*

Semantic Competence and UDVM-Quest i ons

Let s now consider where we are with respect to the two

facets of semantic competence, attunement to deficiency and
attunement to constraints.
fhe meaning of a vague sentence

way.
of

a

This entails that

certain sort.

it

is apt

is

deficient in some

to prompt a WDYM-quest i on

This question, together with its psycho-

logical etiology, represents the cognitive state of one who

apprehends the deficiency.

presupposes

a

In particular,

such a person

homophonic interpretation.

In addition to

this positive, or absolute, notion of

deficiency, there is the comparative notion which accompanies the notion of

a

conceptual e-reason.

The content of

a

.

1 1 <*

conceptual e-reason is intuitively
less deficient, or more
"precise", than that of the belief
to which it relates as an
e-reason.
Note that it is contents of beliefs,
and not

meanings of sentences, which are being
related here.
However, it is natural (though not i
ncontr o ver t i b 1 e

)

to

suppose that content and meaning are
intimately connected,
and later

will develop the means to spell out
such

I

a

connec t i on
In the previous chapter constraints on
possible speak-

er’s meanings were identified with constraints
on answers to
a

relevant WDVM-quest ion, the constraints being possible

directness, non-circularity, and favoring.

Semantic compe-

tence entails knowledge of constraints, which entails
being
able to judge answers according to these constraints.

We

may also characterize knowledge of constraints as knowledge
of the characteristic function of

(or of S

S^_

,

1

depending

on whether we take the expression in question to be "John is

reckless

or

function of

is

reckless").
(S^_^)

S^_

,

is to

^

whether

it

is

in

(S

S^_

).

^

To

know the characteristic

know, given a putative sense,

This knowledge is equivalent to

knowledge of constraints, but the latter is what makes the
former possible.
So far,

without

a

so good.

But my story cannot be complete

general theory of mean i ng /content with which to

explain these observations.

Towards this end,

I

turn now to

examining the relation between speaker’s meaning and truth.

.

NOTES TO CHAPTER

3

See Perry (1979) and Perry (1981).
Perry identifies the
ohjeet of acceptance as a sentence,
but he means a sentence
with a certain meaning, since
2.
otherwise what is accepted
wouidn t, together with context,
determine an
be lef.
Perry’s view is inspired by Kaplan’s object of
distinction
e tween character (which is the
relevant sense of sentence
meaning
and content; see Kaplan (1977).
1

)

Care must be taken here:
by the belief “corresponding"
an accepted sentence, I do not mean
the
object is determined by the sentence meaningbelief whose
together with
on ex
a la Perry.
Rather, I mean simply the belief,
whatever its object is, whose specification
is in a certain
way systematically related to the sentence typically, by
disquotation.
Whether the object of this belief is
determined Perry’s way is a question I leave open.
The
reason for this care will become apparent in
Chapter 5.

3.
to

,

Here
also assume that there is a way of determining
a
unique favoring "value". For questions like Q8 in
which the
contr ast-c 1 ass is a singleton set, the assumption
is
reasonable because a way of quantifying how much "better"
the topic compares to the contr ast-c 1 ass after an
answer is
presumed true than before comes easily to mind:
take the
prior difference between probabilities, take the posterior
difference, and then take the difference of the differences.
It should be kept in mind, though, that a
contr ast-c 1 ass may
have more than one element, in which case my assumption here
involves an assumption that there is a way of integrating
into a unique "value" different qualitative aspects of
favoring; see Chapter E, p. 17.
This is important because I
will eventually reanalyze the question of example 8 as
having a contrast-class with numerous elements; see the
append i x
I

.

Actually, it may be that not all possible senses of
reckless" can be derived from possible senses of "John is
reckless".
Perhaps other subject terms, e.g. "General
Dynamics", "the United States", "the soccer team", and "the
weather", make for new possibilities, including perhaps
metaphorical senses.
Thus, on a complete treatment S
would have to be specified via some quantification over
kinds of subject term.
This task would be far from trivial,
and I leave it for another occasion.
9.

1
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TRUTH AND SPEAKER’S MEAN i Nb

1

A.
1

.

I

ntu

1

in

I

1

1

he Dependence of Truth on Speaker’s Meaning
o ns

this chapter

speaker’s meaning for
meaning"

Introduction

•

I

will consider the implications of

I

a

theory of truth, where by "speaker

mean the sort of speaker’s meaning involving

s

a

conceptual e-reason.
Why think that there are any such implications?

Well,

suppose that someone says "John is reckless", meaning that
John runs red lights.

menon ot
of

a

If

my previous account of

the pheno-

conceptual e— reason is right, then his assessment

the truth of

"John is reckless"

(on this occasion) will

depend on his meaning that John runs red lights.

hor he

regards "John is reckless" as true

John runs

red

lights;

if

if

and only

if

he believes that John runs red lights,

he will consider his statement true.
he had meant something different,

truth might be different as well.

then

Un the other hand,

if

then his assessment ot

Lonsider, moreover

listener who doesn’t know what the speaker means.

1

,

a

hen he

may be uncertain as to the truth of the statement; for

example, he may think that John runs red lights, but is very

cautious with his money.

Asked

1

16

it

he thinks

if

the state

*

i

ment is true, such

a

listener might respond:

depends on what you mean."
remark.)

That

is:

-'Well,

it

(Indeed,

this is

a

the truth ot what

is said

is taken to

depend on what is meant.
indicate that we require

1

a

17

very common

hese considerations seem to

certain degree ot precision

betore being able to judge truth.

The prime tacie conclu-

sion is that the truth on an occasion ot

a

vague sentence

depends on the speaker's meaning.
see two possible objections to this conclusion, and

1

1

discuss them in turn.

id

Natural Kinds

.

I

he data considered above concerns normal speakers'

judgments ot truth, but the prima tacie conclusion concerns
actual truth.
t

a

1

lacy.

In

It

might be held that this constitutes

particular

,

it

might be held that dispositional

adjectives are "natural kind" terms.
normal speakers’

a

If

so,

then, while

judgments ot whether or not something

is

in

the extension might depend on what they mean, actual exten-

sion membership would not.

Actual extension membership

would depend on the presence ot an underlying property which
in general

detec t

only "expert" speakers,

it

there are any, can

.

Just how plausible it is to regard something as

natural kind term depends on the availability ot

a

a

well-est-

ablished scientific theory in terms of which an underlying

.

l

property is specified.

It

dispositional adjectives
"persistent"

is clear

- e.g.

that

lb

in the case ot

"reckless",

"skillful",

-

there is at present no such theory!
hence the
view that these are natural kind
terms is not cogent.
Ihis
is not to deny the possibility:
nobody, not even experts,
need be able to characterize the
underlying property.
But
the tact remains that there is at
present no good reason tor

truth-theorists to treat dispositional adjectives
as natural
k 1 nd terms
H

certain difficulty arises here because

appears

it

that sometimes people do tacitly think of at
least some

dispositional adjectives as natural kind terms, e.g. when
is

suggested that intelligence is an inherited trait.

the terminology of

people

s

the previous chapter,

it

In

this means that

reasons for believing that someone is, e.g.,

intelligent are not always conceptual,

sometimes non-demonstrative, e.g.

if

(heir reasoning

is

someone’s mathematical

acuity is taken as good but not conclusive evidence ot his

intelligence.
ot

However, so long as there is no good theory

an underlying property,

this aspect of everyday usage

cannot be taken seriously in
to

a

theory of truth.

say that we must reject the apparently non-demonstrative

character of the reasoning, as we will see.
say that normal speakers'
to

this is not

is

it

to

judgments might not still be taken

somehow determine extension, for

when people use, e.g.,

Nor

it

is clear

"intelligent", they have

that often
a

particular

.

sense in mind.

And we can appeal to such
usages in our

account ot how extension is
determined.

d

^ gaker

'

It
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Meanin g and Public Context

is a

commonplace that truth can depend on
context.
BUt ° n ° ne P ° S5lble view, the
relevant features ot context
are overt
particular, they do not
,

m

include mental

states ot the speaker.

Since speaker's meanings are p-rea-

sons or e-reasons, which are beliefs
and/or desires, they
could not be truth-determining features
ot context on this
view; in particular conceptual e-reasons
could not be. d bo
this view ot context is presumably
incompatible with the

claim that truth depends on speaker's meaning
(in the sense
ot

a

conceptual e-reason).

I

say "presumably" because it is

possible to maintain that speaker's meaning is always
determined by overt features of context, in which case there
would be no incompatibility.
crous.

(Jbvious 1 y

"reckless" even

if

However, this would be ludi-

can, e.g., mean "runs red lights" by

I

there are no overt clues about this

available to my audience.

Equally obviously, there may be

misleading overt clues, e.g. the previous conversation may
have been about spending money; this would not entail that
what

1

really mean is "spends money recklessly" rather than

runs red lights", but only that
(iiven that overt contextual

meaning may diverge,

in

I

am being

i

mper sp 1 cuous

features and speaker's

the sense that such features are

1

unre 1

i

ati

1

e indicators of

to dec i de what

the speaker-* meaning

truth depends on?

Well,

,

dO

ho „ are we

let’s consider an

example in which there is divergence,
and see whether
earlier considerations concerning
the dependence of truth on
speaker's meaning hold up. Suppose
our previous conversation has been about spending money,
and 1 now
say "John is

reckless", meaning that he runs red
lights.

Ihere are two

relevant judgments of truth here, mine
and yours.
As
regard my statement as true if and only
if Joh n runs red
lights, my judgment of truth depends on my
meaning, our
1

previous conversation notwithstanding;
red lights,

that

1

then

I

if

I

think John runs

will regard my statement as true.

biven

mean that John runs red lights, our previous
conver-

sation has no bearing whatsoever on my judgment of
truth.
Uf

course,

reckless

might be wondered why

it

m

I

chose to say "John is

this context while meaning that John runs red

lights, but that is irrelevant to the question of my judg-

ment of

truth.

Now what about your judgment?

Well, because

the previous conversation you presumably "interpret" me

of

as meaning that John spends recklessly

assume that

1

-

i.e.

you presumably

mean that John spends recklessly.

That

influences your judgment of truth accordingly; for example,
you think that John spends recklessly, then you will

if

consider my statement true.

*

point here, though,

that the previous conversation bears on your judgment

is

or

The crucial

1

Y

i

nsof ar as you infer my meaning from it; you infer my

meaning, and your judgment then
depends on what you take me
to mean.
If f or some reason you
believed, correctly, that
meant that John runs red lights,
previous conversation
notwithstanding, then, like me, you would
regard my statement as true it you thought that John
runs red
lights.

m

both your case and mine,

1

thus

truth is regarded as dependent

on my meaning, and not on the overt
feature of context.

to

the speaker who means something an
overt feature of context

such as previous conversation is irrelevant
to truth; to the

listener it is relevant only insofar as

evidence
is

-

fallible evidence

taken to depend,

i.e.

-

it

constitutes

for something on which truth

the speaker’s meaning.

What this shows is that the view that truth may depend

only on overt (or, at least, necessarily inferrable) features of context isn’t grounded in intuition.

reason

I

because
whom
it
I

I

However, the

am considering this view to begin with is not
it

is

intuitive, nor even because there is anyone to

am prepared to definitely attribute it, but because

might be thought to have certain methodological grounds.

he grounds

that

I

have in mind stem from the W 1

language is "public":

11

gensten an idea
1

we cannot individually ("pri-

vately") determine what expressions mean.

By extension, we

cannot individually determine what they refer to.
I

hope

it

is clear

from previous chapters that the

phenomenon of speaker’s meaning
first part of this broad thesis.

is not

inconsistent with the

fhere is indeed

a

"public

.

Idd

aspect ot
is what

1

a

vague sentence such as “John 15
reckless"

have been calling simply its "meaning".

-

lt

Because

this, speakers may not use the
sentence and mean whatever
they want.
But it is a starting point of this
essay that
ot

difterent things may nonetheless be meant,
within the
public" constraints.
Thus we often fail to fully understand each other even though we share a
language; often we
must ask what is meant,

asking,

in tact)

though we know (presuppose in the

the meaning.

The "public" aspect ot

a

vague sentence does not then entail that whatever
determines
its truth must be "overt".

What must be "overt" is simply

the constraints on a speaker's meaning;

the speaker's

meaning itself may be unknown.
I

he problem is that the extended part ot

the Wittgen-

stenian thesis doesn't follow from the first part; the
public nature of meaning doesn't entail that meaning may not

somehow determine truth in combination with

speaker's meaning.
deal ot

a

private

Nor does the extended part have

independent plausibility.

pendently plausible at all,

I

a

great

Insofar as it is inde-

don't see how its plausibility

could outweigh the foregoing intuitive considerations

concerning the dependence of truth on speaker’s meaning.

**

Lone 1 us 1 ons

bmee
is an

the view that truth depends on speaker's meaning

intuitive one, the burden is on the other side to show

Ldd

incorrect.

it

Neither the objection that the vague
predi-

cates we 've considered are natural
kind terms, nor the
objection that their extensions could not
in principle be
determined by non-overt means, is convincing.
Yet 1 don’t
know ot any more serious objections that
might
be made.

bo

conclude that the intuitive view must be
respected in
theory ot truth.
1

reiterate that when

1

I

say "speaker's meaning"

I

a

mean

the sort ot speaker’s meaning involving a
conceptual e-reason.

I

hose sorts involving other relevance relations, e.g.

in examples

1-7 in the previous chapter, do not bear
upon

truth.

For example,

number”

in

example

4

the truth of
is

"Seventy-four is

a

large

independent of my meaning that

Heagan is too old to be President.

Inasmuch as speaker's

meaning ot any sort has to do with the mental states

ot

a

language user, the study of speaker's meaning generally is

branch ot

"pragmatics".

speaker

meaning involving conceptual e-reasons must in

s

a

The present conclusion is that

addition be included in that part of pragmatics relevant to
semantics, what has sometimes been called "semantic pragmatics" or "indexical semantics".
The way
ot

I

will be studying the nature of the dependence

truth on speaker's meaning is by considering how speak-

er's meaning might be incorporated into
tr uth-cond

i

t

i

ona 1 semantics.

a

framework of

But before doing this it is

important to distinguish my notion of vagueness from other

IBP

notions with which

it

might be confused.

traditional Conceptions of "Vagueness"

B.

Consider the following definitions:
H is vague
(with respect to
15 (or would be) ambivalent
x

x and s)
if and only if s
whether or not P applies to

.

H

is vague
(with respect to x and s) if and only
if
here are times at which s would consider
p to apply to
x and other
times at which s would consider H not to
apply to x
.

H is vague
(with respect
3
is vague
with respect to

to
x

^

P is vague^ (with respect
is vague^ with respect to

to
x

x and G)
if and only if P
and speakers in G.

x and G)
if and only
and speakers in G.

if

P

is vague
(with respect to x and G) if and only if
5
some speakers
in G would consider P to apply to x and
other speakers in G would consider P not to apply to x.
P

In these definitions,
a

speaker, and G is

P

is a

predicate,

x

is an object,

population of speakers.

a

s

is

Gpeakers are

assumed to be semantically competent and to have full

knowledge of the properties of

x

(assumed constant).

Vagueness in the first two senses above has to do with
an individual

speaker

,

and st r a i gh t f or war d 1 y gives rise to

notions of vagueness relative to
"vague^"

.

population,
of

a

population,

"vague^" and

But the last notion of vagueness relative to a

"vague

",

is not

vagueness relative to

a

analyzable in terms of any sort

speaker.

notions of vagueness relative to
ambivalence",

a

1

will call the three

population "speakers'

"intraspeaker variation”, and "interspeaker

1

c!b

variation", respectively.'3
Ihe varlabla s

in

the above definitions may be
bound in

different ways, and different claims
made as to the existence and prevalence of "vagueness".
1

take it that all

empirical predicates of natural language
are such that there
are possible objects and (actual)
populations with respect
to which they are vague
(this is what is sometimes called
3
universal "open texture"); and similarly for
"vague " and

vague

"

I

.

5

also take it that many natural

language

predicates are such that there are actual objects
and

populations with respect to which they are vague^

;

and

similarly tor "vague^" and "vague^".
Ihese tacts concerning the existence ot ambivalence
and

variation,

i.e.

the claims taken above as true, have some-

times been confused with substantive conclusions drawn trom
the tacts;
is

1

have in mind two such conclusions.

that truth is in general

The first

"indeterminate", since sentences

containing vague predicates may be neither true nor false.
This is

a

substantive conclusion because the facts all

involve speakers
actual

i

7

judgments, and do not in themselves entail

ndetermi nacy

;

it

might be and has been held that all

sentences are in fact either true or false regardless of
speakers

7

ambivalence or disagreement.

plausibility in this very strong claim.
predicates
it

is hard

- e.g.

"squishy",

"cute",

to see how anything other

However,

1

see no

There are many

"pleasant" - tor which
than normal speakers"

l

d6

judgments could determine the extension;
hence tor these
predicates it is hard to see why speakers'
ambivalence or
interspeaker variation wouldn't entail
indeterminacy in the

extension.

The claim

strong that one suspects

15 so

motivation other than due consideration

ot

cates, and indeed there is such motivation

preserve classical logic

to
a

good one,

7
.

a

various predi-

namely

a

desire

Even if this motivation were

the view would be no more plausible; but
it has

been shown, and we will see, that classical
logic can be

preserved even
true or false.

it

sentences are not held to be always either

Thus,

I

take it that it follows from the

existence ot ambivalence and variation (though not
immediateiyJ

that some sentences are neither true nor false,

the

opposing view being both implausible and poorly motivated.
(he second substantive conclusion,

first,
Ihis

is

is

a

related to the

that truth is in general a "matter ot degree".

substantive conclusion because, again, the facts

directly concern only speakers'

judgments; conclusions as to

the nature of truth require additional argument.
tion,

it

is not obviously true.

which are associated with
"tall",

"old",

"heavy"

a

In the case ot

In addi-

predicates

measurable property, e.g.

(associated with height, age, and

weight), and in the case of color terms,

it

does seem that

"vagueness" is the result of the predicate's application
being
al.

a

matter of degree, but this is not obvious in gener-

This is partly because the nature of

a

"degree ot

187

truth"

is not

obvious

-

whether it is, e.g.,

construct, an equivalence class, or
what. 8

concerned

statistical

a
l

will not be

with the issues here.

L.

Vagueness, Ambivalence, and Variation

What does vagueness, which entails an
aptness to prompt
a

certain kind of WDYM-quest i on

ambivalence,

have to do with speakers'

,

intraspeaker variation, or interspeaker

van-

at ion?
Ihe first

ness is not

object,

property

of

a

predicate’s vague-

relation involving both the predicate and an

a

i.e.

thing to notice is that

a
a

candidate for the extension;

predicate (with respect to

it

simply

is

a

population).

a

Ihus the vagueness of a sentence may be apprehended without

any thought as to whether the sentence is true.
ple,

in

For exam-

example 8 of the previous chapter, Bo need not be

supposed to be giving any thought at all to the truth of
"John is reckless".

Ambivalence and variation may easily be rendered as

properties of predicates (with respect

to

a

population),

simply by binding the object variable in the definitions of
"vague^",

"vague^", and "vague^"

.

For example, a predicate

may be said to admit of speakers’ ambivalence if there are

objects (and

a

population) with respect to which competent

and knowledgeable speakers (in the population) are ambivalent as to whether the predicate applies.

Flowever

,

it

is

.

,

Ida

clear that the vagueness of

a

predicate is conceptually

distinct from these modified senses
of ambivalence and
var 1 at ion as well.
In addition,

vagueness is not coextensive with
ambivalence or variation.
It does follow from the
existence
claims and the fact that vague predicates
are empirical
predicates of natural language that vague
predicates admit

ambivalence and variation in the modified
senses.
Clearly a competent and knowledgeable speaker
ot

may be ambiva-

lent as to whether a given person is,
e.g.,

reckless; or

a

speaker may have one judgment on one occasion
and another on
a different occasion; or two speakers
may disagree.
However,

a

predicate admitting of ambivalence or variation need

not be vague.

For example,

-'red"

admits of ambivalence and

variation, but “That book is red" is not (very) vague; its

utterance is not apt to prompt

a

request for

a

sense in

which "red" is being used.
it

is worth noting

also that the ambivalence and

variation (in the modified senses) admitted by

a

vague

predicate have multiple sources, stemming from the fact that
when

a

vague predicate is used, the utterer may or may not

mean something by

it

(i.e.

there may or may not be

a

direct, favoring answer to the relevant WDYM-quest on
i

Thus we have two possible sources of speakers"

ambivalence when
e.g.,

1

a

true,
)

ambivalence:

competent speaker takes an utterer of

“reckless" to mean, e.g.,

“runs red lights", and when

F

lev

he doesn't.

Similarly, there are dlfterent
sources ot
intraspeaker variation:
a speaker may make
conflicting
judgments at two different times
while meaning different
things at these times, or meaning
the same thing, or meaning
something at one time but not the
other, or not meaning
anything either time.
Finally, there are different sources
ot interspeaker variation: two
competent speakers might
disagree while meaning different things,
or the same thing,
or while one means something and the
other doesn't, or when

neither means something.
1

he distinction between vagueness on
the one hand and

ambivalence and variation on the other will prove
important
in what

follows.

Here is my plan.

First

I

will provide

partial account of the syntax and semantics ot

a

tormal

a

language containing predicates which admit of ambivalence
and variation,

including vague predicates.

complete the account in two stages.
will

Then

I

will

In the first stage

I

introduce devices proposed by David Lewis, Hans Kamp,

and Kit Fine for the treatment of indeterminacy induced by

ambivalence and variation.

In the second stage

introduce speaker's meanings into the framework.

1

will

This will

enable me to substantiate my earlier conclusion that truth
can depend on speaker's meaning.

show that the Lew i s— Kamp—
or

1

It

will also enable me to

ne devices are either

incorrect

irrelevant for the treatment of vagueness (in my sense).

.

.
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1

•

The Basic Framework

Syntax
L

language with four syntactic categories,
or
terms, sentences, one-place predicates,

is a

types

:

and two-

place predicates.
and

•

I

will abbreviate these as e,

<ehe,t^, respectively.

e and

sions of type

variables in

c

Basic expres-

e

include variables, and these are the only

L.

Basic expressions of either type include

constants, which
no n-b as l

<e,t>,

Among the expressions of type

type <e,t> are basic expressions.

of

t,

will not specify.

I

L also contains

expressions, and the following is

a

rule for

deriving and categorizing these:
yl

thus,

^

*

(X

(

3;

15 of type <§,b>
is of type b.

)

and

ft

is of

type a,

then

sentences can be derived from terms and one-place

predicates, and one-place predicates from terms and twoplace

predicates.

Other rules for non-basic expressions are the

following syncategoremat
YE. If
is of
Y3.
A

.

Y5

.

Y

If

(f>

It

,

c

is of type t,

ype

If (0

Y6. It
<e <e
,

0
t

i

rules:
and v is a variable,

is of type t,

(

0v)0

and

0

)

.

then so is ~ 0.

are of type

t,

then so is

0

is of

type

P

is of

type <e,t>, then >(P

t >>

then

t

t,

<

/v

0

then so is 1(0).
)

15 of type

.

J

.

.
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Y7. It 0 is of type t,
is ot type e.
y

Y8

8.

If

't'

is of

type e,

and v is
1
a variable,

then

Af

i

then

type <e

s

,

v

L

0

a

t >

correspond to familiar logical operators,
Y5 to an "in
a sense"
sense operator, Y6 to a "comparative"
operator, Y'7
Y7 to an
"abstraction" operator, and Y8 to a "predication"
ion" ope
operator
Y4

Y2 and Y7 each allow a kind of
binding;

"open" and

closed" sentences and abstracts can be
defined in an

obvious way

8

-

Semant l cs
8 model

of

M for L

is a

‘-tuple <A,I,F,P>.

A

entities, which fall into two sorts: concrete individuals

and properties.

is a

I

set of "indices",

i.e.

ordered

sequences ot values, where each value is the value
teature, or

some

ot

coordinate", on which denotation may depend.

Une such teature is
1

domain

is a

a

possible world; thus spec i t

involves the specification of

a

I

X

N,

cat

i

on ot

set of possible worlds.

Uther features will be introduced later.

whose domain is

l

I-

i

s

a

function

where N is the set consisting of the

non-logical constants and closed abstracts

ot

L.

P

is a

predication operator, corresponding to the expression
It

is a

function from pairs consisting of

a

possible world

and an element of A to partial functions from elements of A
to

truth-values.
I

he semantic rules for L assign to each expression

:

M

1

.

9

’

.

I

ative to model M,

index

from the variables to A),

and assignment

i,

denotation

a

priate for the expression's type.

I

-

t

appropriate tor an expression of type

a

(function

g

0

he set D

3d

1

-

’

appro-

of denotations

a

is defined as

foil ows
D

*

= A!

where a and

D

t

are types, and D D a is the set of
functions,
£

h

including partial functions, from

D

to D

a

The rules

.

b

include the following.
SC.

If 0 is a non “lfi,gical constant or
abstract, then 10 j"’ 1 ^ = F (i,
0 ).
f 0*

J

^
^

c

«.<

s2

lable

a

1

g(0

=

9

T

=

t?

(i

*

P

closed

a

variable of type e), then

‘

^

type ^a.b^, and O is of type
! t

ccx^’

9

then

a,
-

<[$

of type
n
_f $ v is a variable, then
= 1 iff
= 1 for an g- like
except perhaps for the value assigned to u
lVu 0] R,1 ’5 = o iff [0 j 1 9 = 0 ffor some such g
1

L MM,iTo
’9
CVu01
‘,

’

1

g

;

’

’

S

of
w f^l!i?L 15=0;
L0I

s *+L

0

iff

jlfcOi
J
[

0D’mM

’

j1

then

~ 0

~

C

,g

0

=

J

M

ift
’

9

are of type t, then [ 0 A ^ J M 1 9
9 =
and [ ^ 3
A^3 M,1
1; and
n
q
i
M,1
’9
g = 0.
= o or C^l

’

and

’

type
and t

’

1

=

^

q

iff

l

0

,

’

1

J

’

'

=
_

’

g

i.
x

=

ifT
o

’

Note that Sl-SA correspond to Vl-YA.
Ihe following definitions complete this preliminary pre-

sentation of the semantics of

L.

1
*
f 0 is an expression of tyoe.t, then
0 is true with
g = 1 tor
respect to M and i iff [0 1
each ass
assilgnment g
’

1

’

if 0 is any expression, then the intension of 0 with
respect to M and g is that function h with domain 1

.

1

such that for all

d

ln I,

1

,V,,1

h(i)

is

0J

l

’

3d

g

Informal Remarks

•

My labels for the syntactic
categories may remind the

reader of Montague’s system of types,
and <*’*>’ where a and

adopted this system because

b

it

in which

are types.

I

generates

a

the types are

have not

hierarchy of

property-types, i.e. types of the form <a,t>,
with

arbitrary type, whereas

1

wish to adopt

a

a

an

simpler view of

properties according to which properties are individual

entities which may apply freely to any other individual
entity;
all

I

will elaborate on this later.

the types of

the full

Also,

type theory;

do not need

I

instead

have

1

specified just the types which, together with the syncate-

gorematic rules, meet my needs.
in

is

Nonetheless the framework

the spirit of Montague’s in basic respects.

particular, the correspondence of

a

in

semantic rule to each

syntactic rule, specifying how the denotation of

a

expression is determined from the denotations

the struc-

tural parts,
a

-

,

1 i

ty
.

of

complex

implements Montague’s version of composition-

V

in

the following two sections,

account of the semantics tor

L.

I

First

will complete my
1

will

coordinate which will permit the formulation
rules tor the operators

1

and >.

Then

I

will

introduce
of

a

semantic

introduce

a

speaker’s meaning coordinate, the governing of which will

.

i

requ ire semantic rules tor the
abstraction and predication
operators

B
1

•

^

.

treating Indeterminacy

Accomm odati on ot Ambivalence and Variation

the denotation of an expression at
an index may be a

partial function.

This is true,

expression of type <e,t>, i.e.
at

any given index

a

in particular,

one-place predicate.

predicate may be thought

a

tioning the domain into three subsets.

definitely in the extension of

a

an

of

of

as parti-

The set ot objects

predicate at an index will

be referred as its "positive" extension; an object
to

belongs

x

the positive extension just in case the denotation of the

predicate at
to

thus,

1

yields

1

when given

Similarly,

x.

belongs

x

the "negative" extension just in case the denotation at

yields 0 when given

If

x.

negative extension, then
1

it

x

is neither

is

in the

1

in the positive nor

extension "gap"

will use the term "indeterminate" for a denotation

which admits of an extension gap at an index, or tor

predicate with such

a

denotation.

As

I

a

suggested earlier,

predicates which admit of speakers' ambivalence or

ot

intraspeaker or interspeaker variation, and for which

ordinary speakers’

judgments of extension membership must be

regarded as decisive, consequently admit of indeterminacy.
It

is tor

the sake of such predicates that partial functions

are allowed in the current framework.

-

1

.

.

Id5

course, there are other possible motivations tor

Ut

positing indeterminacy, e.g. presupposition failure or

Mortal incorrectness".

But

I

will be supposing that all

indeterminacy in the present fragment stems from ambivalence
and var 1 a

t

1

1

on

he Delineation Coordinate
1

have identified an "index" as

sequence

a

coordi-

of

nates, and have mentioned the possible world coordinate.

Now

want to introduce another coordinate, originally

1

proposed by David Lewis tor the treatment of indeterminacy
induced by ambivalence and variation (what he calls "vague-

ness "

1

1

)

hor Lewis

boundary.

a

"delineation" is

example,

(-or

a

specification

in the case of

t,

"

cool"

at

l.

at which the

a

temperature less

and the negative extension consists of

t,

those objects with

i

the positive extension of

"cool" consists of those objects with

than or equal to

a

"cool" it is a

certain temperature: relative to an index

temperature delineation is

of

a

temperature greater than

is determinate;

t.

Thus, at

no objects are in the gap of

"cool"

Liearly, different predicates will require different
;

regarded as

a

thus the delineation coordinate must be

sequence of delineations, each delineation

certain predicate or predicates.

i

m

..

.
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In general

a

coordinate may be empty at an index, and

this is true of the delineation coordinate.

Thus,

the

introduction of the delineation coordinate is
not incompatible with the existence of indeterminate
predicates,
since

it

isn’t required that a boundary specification
always

exist.

A

predicate may be indeterminate at an index

at

if

that index the appropriate delineation is
empty.

Delineations enable treatment of

number of construc-

a

tions and notions putatively related to
induced by ambivalence and variation.
es",

the comparative construction,

degrees of truth.

i

ndeter

1

nacy

These include “hedg-

logical truth, and

will confine attention to the "in

I

a

sense" hedge, the comparative construction, and logical
truth
Let the operator "in a sense" be represented in L by
"I",
t

an expression which combines with an expression of type

to form a new expression of type t.

Lewis proposes

essentially the following semantic rule:
type t, then C I 0 1 M 1 ^ = l iff there
is some index i
like i except perhaps at the deline1
’^ =
ation coordinate such that C 0 j
l:
,1,(3
1
^ = 0
= o iff for all such i
C I
0 3
[ 0 J
S5

.

If

0

is of

’

’

)

(

’

’

’

<

’

)

"In a sense"

is thus an

" i

ntens i ona 1

"

’

operator in the sense

that the denotation at an index of a complex expression

formed by the operator is not determined solely by the

denotations of the constituent expressions at the same
l

ndex

According to Lewis,

it

is related

to

the delineation

7

13

coordinate just as the modal operator
"possibly" is related
to the world coordinate.
Let the operator "is more
L by

than

by represented in

1
'

an expression which combines with an
expression ot

type <e,t> to form an expression of type
<e,<e,t>X
that

sentence is true over

a

index

a

set s of delineations at an

just when at every index

i

the delineation coordinate,

when the delineation of

i’

And say

i

’

like

i

except perhaps at

the sentence is true at

belongs to

i’

just

Following Kaplan,

s.

Lewis proposes essentially the following semantic rule:
If ^
of t YP e <B»t> and
and § are of type e,
then
?n CXP
LX P ><<
(< 0
a.
9 >> i n T ’9 = 1 iff the
k
(,§
set of delineations over which £ <$
15 true at i is a proper
subset of the set of delineations over which
g (X
is true at i; 0(9
<
3 > )] n 1 9 = 0 iff the latter
set is a subset (proper or improper) of the former set.

S6

•

’

)

t

^

4-

)

(

’

)

(

)

’

,

fhe denotation of a comparative construction in thus defined
in terms of

the deno tations of the cor r espo nd ing positive

construction, at various indices?

in this sense the seman—

tics of the comparative is derived from the semantics ot the

positive.

This is appealing, given the fact that the

comparative is morphologically derived from the positive.
Since the denotation at an index of

expression of type

t)

may be

a

a

1

p

sentence (an

partial function, the sen-

tence may be neither true nor false? for example,

it

can be

seen by inspection of SI that "Px" is neither true nor false
at an

index

if

the denotation of "P" applied to the denota-

tion of "x" is undefined.

That is why SE

,

S3,

and SF

,

the

^

3

.

1

3ti

rules tor the logical operators, require
two clauses, one
for truth-conditions, the other
for falsity-conditions.
Thus even classically valid sentences
may be neither true
nor false; for example, at the index
just described •‘~< PxA
P><

}

"

iS neither

tr ^e nor

false.

Therefore

a

straightforward

definition of logical truth as truth at every
index of every
model would not preserve classical logical
truths.
lo

remedy this, Hans Kamp and Kit Fine have proposed
using van
Fr

aassen

’

s

device of

a

super va 1 uat i on

1

in the present

context, the proposal amounts to defining logical
truth as
truth at all of only certain indices of every model:

those

indices whose delineation coordinate has no null elements.
At such
so,

indices there are no gaps (or so we may suppose),

given the classical definition of the logical connect-

ives,

the sentences which are logically true on the new

definition are exactly the classical ones.
fhe basic

idea of S5

,

S6

,

and the account of logical

truth is to consider indices at which predicates’ extension

gaps have been closed.
this basic idea,

it

Whatever the intuitive appeal of

is clear

that the adequacy of all these

accounts depends on what can be made of the notion of
delineation.

is not

It

specification of

a

enough to simply say that is

purpose of closing up gaps.
is:

a

a

boundary; so far that is just to say

that, whatever a delineation is,

delineation

a

it must

serve its intended

Lewis does in fact say what

number, e.g.

a

a

temperature in the case of

~

.
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"cool".

What he has in mind are "scalar"
adjectives, whjch

are associated with
tall",

"cool",

a

numerically measurable property (e.g.

"heavy",

"expensive", assoc i ated w i th

height, temperature, weight, and price);
the delineations
correspond to points along a "scale". And
it is clear how
delineations so conceived eliminate gaps.
The question arises, however, what sense
can be made ot

delineations

-

gap-closers

-

appropriate for predicates

other than scalar adjectives, e.g. dispositional
adjectives.
(I

am thu5 assuming a sense of "delineation" which
may be

broader than what Lewis has in mind.)

If

it

is held

that

the method of delineations is quite generally
applicable, as

Kamp and Fine (in effect) do, then this question becomes

pressing.

I

will be considering it further below.

C.
1

•

I

Treating Vagueness

he Speaker's Meaning Coordinate
I

he truth on an occasion of

a

sentence such as "John is

reckless" depends on what the speaker means.

Flow

can this

be accounted for?
Line

approach that might come to mind is one that is

popular tor the treament of lexical ambiguity.

Un this

approach we would posit, for each dispositional adjective,

distinct lexical homonyms for distinct speaker's meanings.
But this is not a viable option, because the resulting

account of competence is both impossible and m i sconce i ved

.

140
It

is

impossible because for each adjective
there would have
to be an infinite number of
basic items, making English
unknowable to everyone but God.
It is misconceived because
vagueness and ambiguity are distinct phenomena.
Unlike an
ambiguous term, a vague term has a unitary
meaning, but on
the proposed account there is no provision
for such a

mean i ng
1

propose instead to introduce

a

speaker’s meaning

coordinate to which the denotation at an index of certain
predicates is sensitive.
The most fundamental

difficulty with this proposal is

that speaker’s meaning cannot be allowed to influence denota-

tion uncond

reckless

1

t

1

ona 1 1 y

.

Someone might mean by "John

is

that John eats slowly; we wouldn’t then want to

say that the statement is true if John eats slowly.

Truth

depends on what is meant only when conventional constraints
are not violated.

In

previous terminology, this means that

we must concern ourselves, not merely with non-circular and

possibly direct answers to appropriate WDYM-questions, but
with non-circular
fhe only way

possibly direct, favoring answers.

,

I

see to do this is by specifying the

speaker’s meanings in the model, in particular the set
indices.

tion

a

I

The specification of this set includes specifica-

set of possible worlds.

To allow for a speaker’s

meaning coordinate, we specify, for each vague adjective
a

set

of

(X,

of properties corresponding to possible speaker’s

. ,

meanin9S

To

'

take constraints into account, we
aimply

require the properties to correspond
to the suitably constrained speaker's meanings.
Thus, if in a context someone
means by "John is reckless" that John
eats at noon, the
speaker's meaning coordinate is not given
by “eats at noon";
given the specification of the set I, this
would be impossible.

Specification of the
results.
S

rE

°f

S

the

reckless
P rev

i

>

S

^

’

5

is easy

for example,

°us chapter,

i.e.

given previous

is none other

than the set

the set of properties

corresponding to the set of non-circular, possibly direct,
favoring answers to the question:
believes that John is reckless, A believes that
John is not reckless, conceptual e-reason)
<A 1

The other

S^’s

can be similarly specified.

We could

if

we

wished also define an answering relation (“more precise
than

)

structuring each S ^

,

but this will not turn out to

be necessary.
1

am assuming for simplicity that each

though as

I

is unique,

mentioned in the previous chapter, this involves

certain idealizations.

For convenience

I

will refer to

as the set of possible speaker’s meanings for

though strictly speaking it is only

a

cK.

even

set of constituents of

speaker’s meanings.
Note that speaker’s meanings are no less interest-relative in semantic theory.

We are interested in conceptual

142

e-reasons because we are interested in
truth, and conceptual
e-reasons bear on truth.
Let V be the set of predicates which
are sensitive to

speaker’s meaning coordinate.

For each element

a

of V

c*
j

there is

a

°f

Wl11 5UPP ° 5B that each S*

°V

1

set S*.

the set of possible speaker’s meanings

,

also contains

"null

a

element" of some sort, for reasons to be explained.

The

speaker’s meaning coordinate is

a

sequence of components,

each component corresponding to

a

predicate of

precisely:
of

x

Sc*

V.

More

the speaker’s meaning coordinate is an element

S*

^

x

e

...

x

S*

n

.

What should be in V is an outstanding open question.
As

I

see it,

there are two difficulties in deciding it.

The

first is whether to admit all predicates which have possible

speaker’s meanings, or only the vague ones.
conditional on the first,
in particular

is

determine which predicates

to

are therefore in V.

Neither of these ques-

tions is yet clear enough to answer
it

is clear

at

The second,

.

I

hope, however,

least that V is non-empty.

In any case

that
I

will suppose that it contains a small number of disposi-

tional adjectives.
Though the speaker’s meaning coordinate is actually

sequence,
to

a

I

hereby warn the reader that

I

a

will often refer

single component of the sequence as "the speaker’s

meaning coordinate” when

it

is clear

When there is an entry in

a

which component

I

mean.

component of the speaker's

1^3

meaning coordinate at an index, that will
mean that in the
context of utterance there 15 a speaker’s
meaning in the
sense, not merely of

a

favoring answer to

relevant WDYM-quest i on

a

non-circular, possibly direct,

true and direct answer.

,

but also of

a

That is, the speaker in the context

will have a certain conceptual e-reason for
the belief

expressed by his utterance.

directness relative to

a

We might say that truth and

context tie

a

member of the set of

possible senses to that context.

2

•

Properties, Abstraction, and Predication
The point of

introducing

is to allow speaker’s meaning

a

speaker's meaning coordinate

to

influence denotation.

before showing how this may be done,

I

But

must discuss some

prel iminaries.

Properties are irreducible entities in the domain of
the model.
a

The function P,

property and

a

a

component of the model, takes

world and returns

a

denotation

-

a

function

from individuals to truth-values which yields true just for
those entities which have the given property at the given
world.

Thus, properties have a "dual mode of existence",

in

that there are both properties as individual entities and

"propositional functions" which correspond to them.

^

Corre-

spondingly, there are two kinds of expression denoting the
Closed expressions of the form

two modes.

properties

-

irreducible entities

-

r

x[

0

denote

while closed expressions

.

l<f<f

x[0]^

form

(as well

as basic expressions of type

<e,t>) denote functions from
individuals to truth-values,

functions which are determined by the
property denoted by
16

The following rules implement these
ideas.

7
f
Lvl0
‘

J

f type
^l,i^g°
’9

=

:

F(i

and

,V[0]

isj

v

variable, then

::.%)), Where the

(

are the variables occurring free in

=u k

Y k’

vC

^

J

(

a

s

y

and for all

,

-

is

y.'--

v[0]

vC

$

3

with the

a

vk

’

replaced by the

s

respective u.’s; the latter are stipulated to be
constants
of type e such that F

(

i ,’u

= u

)

,

for all

vC

i.

|<

is thus guaranteed
to

relative to

it

SB
i

P must

,

l

-

L

t
X,

to be closed,

j

<

"

'

\
(

u ")
y*

so that F assigns a value

i.

^Mii,§9 f type
J

u

0 Jay.-'

)

then

=

P

(world of

.

be defined for entities which are not properties as

well as for properties, but

I

will not be concerned with how

this is done

3

•

Speaker’s Meaning and Denotation
Since properties are

sense that

c

"

intensional

"

entities,

in the

oex tens i ona 1 properties need not be identical,

the property denoted by a closed abstract will not vary from

world to world, as extensions do.

denotation of

a

More precisely, the

closed abstract will not vary as the world

coordinate is varied and the other index coordinates are
held fixed;

in this sense the denotation of a closed ab-

stract is "rigid".

However,

it

is still

open for the

:

1

denotation of
nates.

a

closed
=h =
sea abstract
to vary with other coordi-t-r-

In particular,

meaning.
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may vary with the speaker’s

it

The denotation of the corresponding

^expression

would then be indirectly influenced as
well.

In this way

the extension of a predicative expression
would depend on
the speaker’s meaning.
I

he following semantic rule realizes these
ideas.

SO. If P is an expression of type <e,t>
which is an cX
for some of e V, and if v is a variable, and
if the j4h
component Of the speaker’s meaning coordinate of i
is a
non-null element p, then CvC^(v)] n,1,<3
_ p

j

SO says that
a

if

there is

a

_

speaker’s meaning at an index for

vague predicate, the correspond i ng abstract denotes the

property which is that speaker’s meaning.

By SB,

denotation of the predicative expression Av [

Q(v)

J

the
0

would

then be the denotation determined by the speaker’s meaning

property) at the world of the index.

(a

Thus we have the

dependence of truth on speaker’s meaning.
Note that since the model function

assigns properties

closed abstracts relative to indices, SO may be regarded

to

]as a constraint on F.
fo

F

1 1

Another constraint on

F

is

the

ow i ng
SP

If 0 is of type t, v is a variable,
and
“
g _
constant of tyoe e, then C x^ ] N
L A v L
Z
0 ]
.

,

i

£.

i

s a

,

<2)

(

where 0 ^

£

17
.

is

0 with

all free occurrences of v replaced by

SP enables me to abbreviate

predicates when convenient.

A -express ons by simple
i

,
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•

Occasional Ana yt ic i tv
1

In Chapter

2,

I

noted that the having of

e-reason gives rise to
relative to

a

a

speaker.

a

conceptual

certain kind of necessity, at least
If,

f or

example, someone on an

occasion means by "John is reckless" that
John spends money
without checking his account, then that someone
will on the

occasion consider the sentence "John spends money
without
checking his account if and only if he is reckless"

to be

necessarily true.

Now that I’ve concluded that truth

depends on speaker’s meaning,
of this necessary truth.

I

I

drop the speaker -re 1 at i v i ty

now say that, given that the

speaker means what he does, the sentence is on this occasion

—

t^ c t necessarily true, and not merely in the view of the

speaker
To

.

see how this is implemented,

let’s first suppose for

simplicity that the only two index coordinates are the
speaker’s meaning and the possible world.

Now suppose A

and A2 are closed abstracts, where A1 but not A2 is sensi-

tive to the speaker’s meaning coordinate.

ance with SO, A1 denotes

properties

s and

s at

Then in accord-

<<..., s ,...>, w>

worlds w (where

tor all

is the entry at

s

the

component of the speaker’s meaning coordinate corresponding
to Al).

Let 5^ be some property which A1 denotes at

<<..., s ,...>, w> for all w.

Suppose A£ denotes

si

at

for all speaker’s meaning coordinates S and worlds w.

that since A2 is not sensitive to

a

speaker’s meaning

<S,w>
(Note

IV/

coordinate, saying
same as saying

denotes

it

denotes

it

like Al, denotes s

at

the

property at all w.)

<<..., s 1

x

by SB,

a

property at all <S,w> is the

a

*> f or all *

A-expr ess i ons cor respond i ng to

the same denotation at <<...,

Al

Then AS,
H ence,

.

and A£ have

,...> ,w> for all w.

In other

words, the predicative expressions corresponding
to Al and
AB are necessarily equivalent given the speaker’s
meaning
for Al

Thus AAl(j)

.

*

AAB(j)"

the speaker’s meaning for Al

necessarily true given

Thus, for example,

"John is

John spends money without ever

if

check 1 ng his account

is

(and given a standard account

the desired result.

reckless if and only

1

necessarily true on an occasion

is

if

on the occasion the speaker means by "John is reckless" that

John spends money without ever checking his account.
If AB

is complex,

as

I

am supposing,

then it is not on

the present treatment sensitive to the speaker’s meaning

coordinate. But

it

interesting to consider the case where

is

AB is thus sensitive.
by SO it
<<•

.

.

,

s

nent.

<<..., s

,

If Al

is true of each
.

.

.

>

,

w>

,

where

Let Al denote s^
,

s

s

and AS are both sensitive,

that it denotes s at all
is an entry at

the relevant compo-

and AS denote sB at

,...>, w> for all w, where s^

sponding to Al

,

is the entry corre-

and sB is the entry corr espond i ng to AB

then have that if si

is

identical to sB

,

r

AAl< j)«—> AAB(j)"

1

is

.

then Al and AB

denote the same property across all worlds, from which

follows that

then

it

necessarily true given

We
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the speaker’s meanings for A1
and A2

In other words,

.

identical speaker’s meanings give rise
to occasional analytic

1

ty

18
.

It

is useful

ana lyticity with

compare this treatment of occasional

to

standard treatment of traditional analy-

a

ticity, one which uses the notion of
A

meaning postulate is

but non- logical

a

a

-'meaning postulate".

device for formalizing

a

necessary

inference such as that from "The ball is

red" to "The ball

is colored".

It

may be regarded as

a

formula which any model must make true, at every
index.

For

example, the meaning postulate
<

V

x

)

(Rx -4 Cx

)

guarantees that at any index of any model, anything in the
extension of "red" is also in the extension of "colored".
Clearly, however

,

the validity of inferences involving con-

ceptual e-reasons couldn’t be accounted for in this way.

First of all, such inferences are not valid at every index;
and even putting this aside,

it

would be impossible to

specify all the required meaning postulates.

These diffi-

culties reflect the difference between traditional analyticity and occasional analyticity: the latter is necessary
truth given a speaker’s meaning, which implies both occa-

sion-dependence and

5

.

a.

a

multiplicity of possible occasions.

Denotation at an Empty Index
Introduction

199

mentioned earlier that each

I

element.

a

it

is null.

it

When there is

a

speaker’s meaning in the sense of

direct, favoring answer to

there is

a

null entry,

a

does not cover the case

non-null entry, there is
a

true,

non-circular,

relevant WDYM-quest i on

there is no such answer.

there is a true and direct answer which is not
i.e.

improper. 19

.

When

There will

generally be one of two explanations for this.

answer,

null

a

But while SO covers the case where
the speaker's

meaning coordinate is non-null,
where

contains

S

One is that

favoring

a

the speaker has a conceptual e-reason which is
The alternative is that there is no true,

~T~

direct, and non— circular answer,

nothing more precise in mind.

i.e.

the speaker has

In either

case,

the speaker

has given up his prerogative to influence denotation, thus

giving way entirely to "conventional" mechanisms.
I

will call an index at which a component of the

speaker's meaning coordinate is null an "empty" index (where
the significance of this is understood to be relative to the

predicate to which the component cor r esponds

)

.

If SO

is not

invoked because an index is empty, then other semantic rules
(SC,

if

is a vague adjective)

will determine denotation.

But this is not to say very much about the nature of this

denotation.

b.

I

turn now to

discussion of this issue.

a

The Attributive Theory of Adjectives
I

begin by considering

a

well-known theory of ad jec-

150

ves which entails that dispositional
adjectives are not

predicates at all, contrary to what we’ve
been assuming.
According to this theory, the meaning of
an adjective is
function from intensions of common noun
phrases to other
such intensions. 20
is held

to be a

For example,

the intension of "skillful"

function that maps the intension of, e.g.,

"doctor" to the intension of "skillful doctor".
the proposal

a

is that

all

Formally,

adjectives take an expression of

type <e,t> to form another such expression, and the
semant

rules for the denotation at an index of

a

1

c

complex <<($), withoC

an adjective and 9 a common noun phrase, depends on the

denotation at that index, and perhaps other indices, of
Q
in this sense all adjectives are "attributive".
It is

;

plausible to maintain this for all adjectives because many
different kinds of dependency can be accommodated. 21
1

would suggest, however, that dispositional adjectives

are not attributive.

As

I

see it,

the basic facts about

"skillful", for example, are that "skillful" is very vague
so that when "skillful" does not explicitly modify a common

noun phrase, as for example in "John is skillful", one is

quite likely to wonder what is meant
ness may be reduced by providing

speaker’s meaning.

Now,

if

a

-

and that this vague-

(properly constrained)

"skillful" were attributive,

then certain ways of reducing vagueness would enjoy

privileged status.

a

The denotation of an expression con-

taining "skillful" would be defined in exactly those con-

-
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texts in which by "skinful" the speaker
means something ot
"
the form r skillful p
(to put it loosely).
So, for example,
1

the denotation of an expression of the form r
John is a

skillful P

*
1

would be defined, as would the denotation of

"John is skillful", provided an <e

,

t

>- i ntens i on were given

by context; but otherwise the denotation of "John
is skill-

ful" would be undefined.

n
is

This strikes me as artificial.

the one hand, why should we suppose that denotation

defined at all contexts of the specified sort?

denotation is denied "John

skillful" for reasons of

is

vagueness, then the question arises why
John is

a

If

it

is not

denied

skillful basketball player", for example.

The

latter is less vague than "John is skillful", but of course
a

speaker still might mean different things by "skillful

basketball player", e.g. that John is an accurate shooter or
that John easily eludes defenders.

The difficulty is that

we have no account of why the reduction in vagueness pro-

vided by ’"skillful P n is guaranteed to be "enough" of

reduction to insure

a

a

denotation, and such an account is

required in light of the fact that denotation is denied
"John is skillful".
On the other hand, why should we suppose that denota-

tion is defined only at contexts of the specified sort?

Suppose that by "John is skillful"
is able to walk
I

a

speaker means that John

along narrow surfaces with his eyes closed.

take it that there is no <e

,

t

>- i ntens i on such that

this

1

speaker

’

s

52

meaning is exactly captured By applying
the

intension of '•skillful.' to this intension.

The intension of

"walker of narrow surfaces" comes to
mind, but this won’t do
because a speaker might mean by this, not
that John is able
to walk along narrow surfaces with
his eyes closed, but that
he can do it very quickly.
According to the attributive
theory, then, the denotation of "John is
skillful" is

undefined in this context.

But

if we are going

to allow

denotations at all, as the attributive theory does in
certain contexts,
ruling
1

it

it

is hard

to

see how we could justify

out in this case. 22

emphasize that my point here is not that in this

instance there is no noun-phrase with an appropriate <e,t>lntension.

That would not be a very telling point, for the

attributive view does not entail that an appropriate <e,t>intension be expressible at all;

a

non-pr enom i na 1 adjective

might somehow be supplied with such an inexpressible inten-

sion from context.

My point rather

is

that there is no

appropriate intension at all, expressible or not; there
no

intension which,

in combination with

is

the putative inten-

sion of "skillful", would capture the meaning of "being able
to walk along narrow surfaces with one’s eyes closed".

The

intuitive reason is that any result of applying the intension of "skillful" to an <e
to

the fact that

in

,

t

>- i nt ens i on cannot do

justice

"being able to walk along narrow sur-

faces with one’s eyes closed", the word "skillful" has been

.
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"unpacked "
In sum,

I

take it that the temptation to regard
"skill-

ful" as attributive stems from its
being very vague, and the
fact that this vagueness is reduced when
there is a modified

common noun phrase.

It

tempting to say that

is

sentence

a

such as "John is skillful" can’t be "interpreted",
while

"John is

skillful doctor", for example, can be;

a

it

is

then

natural to suppose that the denotation of "John
is skillful"
is

undefined, while that of "John is

defined.

I

a

skillful doctor" is

think that there is in fact a sense in which one

can’t interpret "John is skillful" (cf. Chapter 2
But this sense of "can’t

required sense of "lacking

a

,

pp

.

interpret" isn’t the

(communal) meaning", but rather

has to do with the apprehension of vagueness.

Moreover

this vagueness may be reduced in many different ways, and

it

seems quite arbitrary to single out the providing of

a

common noun phrase as necessary and sufficient for

denota-

tion.

It

a

seems more natural to regard "skillful" as being

of

type <e,t>, but context-dependent. Then for every proper-

ly

constrained speaker’s meaning, there

is a

denotation

(appropriately influenced).
An apparent difficulty with taking "skillful" to be

<e,t> is that it seems to follow that

must be analyzed as
to entail

r John

is skillful

that the argument

r“

John is a skillful P

and a R

n
.

This seems

^
1

John is a skillful doctor;
John is a basketball player;
Hence, John is skillful basketball
is valid,

which

is not.

it

Z)H

player,

However, as Huffy Siegel has

pointed out, such an invalidity need not
commit one to an
attributive reading of an adjective.
The argument
John is a tall doctor;
John is a basketball player;
Hence, John is a tall basketball player.
is

likewise invalid, but Siegel argues that '‘tall" is

nonetheless <e,t>.
pendent;

is

It

in particular

,

just that "tall"

^

context-de-

that denotation depends on

textual 1 y-g i ven "comparison class".
1

is

a

con-

Un this analysis there

prediction of validity, since we may have different

contexts in different lines of the argument.
be a doctor,

tall

(for a doctor),

without being tall (for

a

lhus,

John can

and a basketball player,

basketball player).

Similarly,

would argue that John can be

a

capacity as

basketball player, without

doctor), and

a

being skillful

a

doctor, skillful

1

(in his

(in his capacity as a basketball player).

The only difference is that here the denotation is dependent
on a different feature of context - not

a

comparison class,

but the speaker's meaning.

Hans Kamp has criticized that view that all adjectives
are attributive, arguing that the interpretation of the

comparative form
terms of the

l

of

an adjective ought to be definable in

nterpretat i on of the cor respond l ng positive

i

torm,

and that

adjectives are treated attr ibutively,
this

it

be done in

a

satisfactory way.

willing to allow that
be so treated.

bb

a

However, Kamp is

wide range of adjectives might still

He remarks:

It should be pointed out that the
second theory Li.e.
his theory treating adjectives as predicatesJ
itself
can^ hardly be regarded as compr ehend
1 ng
all adjectives,
is
alleged" a predicate, even in the most diluted
sense
It seems not... The same can be said
to be true,
to an almost egual degree, of adjectives
such as
take
skillful", or "good".
Where precisely we
should draw the boundaries of the class of adjectives
to which the second theory applies 1 do not
know.
hor
example, does "skillful" belong to this class? Surely
we must always ask "skillful what?" before we can
answer the guestion whether a certain thing or person
is indeed "skillful"; this suggests that the theory
is not applicable to the word "skillful".
Vet there
appears to be some plausibility in the view that
having a good deal of skill" does function as a
predicate — be it a highly ambiguous one as there are
so many different skills.
Here the guestion whether we
face an expression that stands for a function from
properties to properties Ci.e. an attributive adjective! or rather an ambiguous predicate which is disambiguated by accompanying expressions for properties has
perhaps no definite answer.
Both views appear to be
equally plausible accounts of the same phenomenon. So
it may be impossible to determine in a non-arbitpary
manner how far the domain of our theory extends.
?

,

1

have been arguing that the two theories do no t provide

"equally plausible accounts of the same phenomenon".

Once

we are clear on the phenomenon, on the "highly ambiguous"

nature of

"skillful"

"must always ask

<

and

1

would suggest, not that we

'skillful what?’", but that more generally

we must ask, or would be apt to ask,

sense!

1

"

- a

"’skillful'

1

in what

paraphrase of the relevant WDYM-quest i on

attributive construal seems artificial.

)

,

the

The set of adjec-

S
i

bt>

ves to which the attributive theory
comfortably extends,
granted that it is not empty, is thus
smaller than Kamp s

remarks suggest; correspondingly, the
domain ot kamp’s own
theory is larger.
Now, inasmuch as my arguments have
explicitly concerned only dispositional adjectives,

confidently specify
tion:

But

too cannot

offer this specula-

1

the attributive theory extends only to those
adjec-

tives which, without
with

boundary.

a

1

a

a

common noun phrase, cannot combine

subject term to form

sentence.

a

tor example,

So,

extends to "alleged" and "former", since "John

it

is alleged"

and "John is former" are not grammatical, but not to
"take",

"skillful", or "good".

This speculation is based on my

guess that almost all adjectives not in this class, even
they exhibit
ness,

it

important differences with respect to vague-

are sufficiently similar to the dispositional adjec-

tives so that the arguments

I

’

ve made against an attributive

construa 1 of "skillful" apply.
1

claim to have shown that "skillful" is not an attri-

butive adjective.
such thing. As

I

Strictly speaking, though, I've shown no
mentioned earlier, many adjectives can be

treated formally as attributive.

In

particular, an intui-

tively predicative adjective can be treated as attributive

provided that in every model there is an <e
such that the denotation at an index

common noun phrase,

evaluated at

i

is

i

ot

,

pc

t

(

>- l ntens l on A
),

with

£>

a

identical to the conjunction of A

and the intension of

3

evaluated at

i

(with

y

t
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'conjunction" defined in an obvious way);
A would thus be
the "intuitive" intension of DC.
I
am content, however, to

conclude simply that "skillful"

is not gar ad i gma tic a 1

attributive, but rather is intuitively
predicative.
1

m right

1

But

it

speculating that the arguments I’ve used for

in

"skillful" are widely applicable, then presumably
the
ar

t

l

f

i

c

i

a

1 i

ty of

treating all adjectives as attributive

would weigh against the gain in uniformity.

In any case

1

will continue to suppose that dispositional
adjectives are
£6

of

type ke

b.

bluster Concepts
1

)

>

,

.

have been concerned with the nature of

adjective

denotation at an empty index.

s

It

a

vague

vague adjec-

tives are not attributive but predicative, then this denotation is
(Note,

a

function from individual entities to truth-values.

incidentally, that the existence of such

entails that
tion of

meaning.

a
)

it

denotation

would be inaccurate to say that the denota-

vague sentence is
I

a

a

function of the speaker's

now want to examine the nature of this denota-

tion.

Une might infer from the vagueness of "reckless" that

nothing could be reckless or not reckless simpliciter, but
only in this or that sense

.

In that case the partition of

"reckless" at an empty index would be, as

a

matter of

principle, completely indeterminate (i.e. everything in the

15H

gap., where by "a matter of
pr.nc Ipl e-,

1

mean that the

indeterminacy is independent of
properties of individuals in
the domain.
Ihis entails that competent
speakers can't
judge the truth of

"John is reckless"

if

they assume that

there is no speaker's meaning
(given that dispositional
adjectives are not natural kind terms).
But this seems
incorrect.
1
noted earlier (pp. 128-9) that one's
uncertainty with respect to whether an object
is in the extension

vague predicate may stem from not knowing
what the
speaker means.
This phenomenon is of a piece with the
ot

a

commonsense notion that truth depends on speaker's
meaning;
tor obviously

if

one takes this to be so, one will not

presume to judge the truth of

a

vague sentence without

knowledge of the speaker's meaning.

However, this does not

entail that if one supposes that there is no speaker's

meaning, one can't possibly judge truth; that is
matter.

To

see that this isn't so,

it

a

different

suffices to consider

the possibility of an individual reckless in every possible

sense; by anyone's lights, such an individual would surely

quality as reckless simpliciter (as opposed to reckless in

such-andsuch

a

sense).

So

if

John is such an individual,

then "John is reckless" is true at an empty index (and, ot
course, at all other indices as well). 27

However, being reckless in every possible sense is

surely not necessary;

consider, e.g., an individual reck-

less in every possible sense except the sense of liking to

)

1

race mqpeds down

aH eys

guest ion then arises:

crowded with hot-dog vendors.

,

59

he

given that definite membership
at an

empty index is possible in principle,
what exactly is
7
required
(Of course an analogous
question arises for
definite non-membership as well,
but 1 will concentrate on
the positive extension.
don't know how to give

i

a

precise answer to this

question.

Here we face difficulties similar to
those which
have led some to posit, with respect to
certain
terms,

cluster concept".

a

Perhaps we may view the membership

conditions at an empty index as an infinite
disjunction

of

conjunctions, each conjunction consisting of
properties
deemed jointly sufficient for membership.

I’m not sure if

everyone would be happy with this way of char ac ter
cluster concept, but in any case

I

1

z

1

ng a

wouldn’t want to say

without qualification that dispositional adjectives give
rise to cluster concepts.

The crucial point is that we are

talking here about the special circumstance when there is no

speaker’s meaning; when there is

a

speaker’s meaning, the

requirements tor membership are more definite (but see
below)

.

1

take it that no similar allowance is part of the

usual notion of
said,

though,

a

cluster concept.

Perhaps

it

could be

that a dispositional adjective gives rise to a

cluster concept relative to an empty index.
Earlier in this chapter

I

remarked that sometimes

people tacitly think of dispositional adjectives as natural

1

klnd terms

6U

that they might take themselves
to be reason-

’

ing non-demonstratively

in saying,

e.g.,

-'if

John is good at

math,

then he is intelligent-, as opposed
to taking John to
be intelligent just in the sense
of being good at math.
While 1 argued that nonetheless these
adjectives could not
be regarded as natural kind terms,
1
also said that we could
still perhaps allow for a non-demonstrative
rendering.
It
is now

apparent how we can do this.

In cases of

non-demon-

strative reasoning, an utterer of, e.g., "John
is intelligent" has no conceptual e-reason, but only
one, e.g.

John’s being good at math.

must be evaluated at an empty index.

a

non-conceptual

Hence the sentence
Since being good at

math is presumably not sufficient for being
intelligent

simpliciter,
intelligent'

demonstrative

i.e.

for being

at

this index,

-

in the positive extension of

the speaker’s reasoning is not

the desired result.

Of course,

it

is not

the sort of non-demonstrative reasoning that the speaker has
in mind;

sort of

is not

it
b

l

o

1

an inference to the possession of some

og i ca 1 1 y-based property, but rather to the

possession of certain superficial properties.

But

in my

view the speaker is simply mistaken as to the nature of his
non— demonstr at i ve reasoning, owing to his mistake of taking

"intelligent" as

a

natural kind term.

the empty-index denotation of

a

vague predicate allows

me to account for sentences like:

John and Bob are both reckless, but in different ways.

:
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Intuitively, "reckless" here has
so» e reading -Met, ls
dlst.net from any particular sense
in -hich John or Bob
might be reckless.
In contrast, consider the
deviant
sentence
3

Ch

kindss. ?e
n°VH
<e.g.
John to
fhe reason this

t0 * bank
but to Afferent
river bank, Bob to a money bank)
’

a

deviant is because "bank

is

neutral reading, but

it

has none.

here requires

1
'

a

Whereas an occurrence ot

bank" must be associated with some
particular sense, an

occurrence

ot

"reckless" can be read neutrally via evalua-

tion at an empty index.
It

is a widely

difficult to give
definition.

In

a

recognized fact that
word

a

is often very

it

precise contex t- 1 ndependent

the case of dispositional adjectives (and,

actually, many other words as well),

I

would relate this

difficulty to that of specifying the membership conditions
at an empty

how is
it

it

index.

This difficulty raises the question:

that we can know the meanings of these words when

is so hard

to say what

they "mean"?

problem is

a

variant of the W

meaning ot

a

word is not

a

i

t

My solution to this

tgensten 1 an doctrine that the

thing that can be "given", but

rather is something that one acquires upon learning how to
"use" a word.

For me the relevant sense ot

"using"

(vague) expression is meaning something by it

relevant sense), and knowing "how" to use

constraints on what one can mean.

fhe

it

a

(in the

entails knowing

latter must be

6cf

1

carefully distinguished from
knowing membership conditions
at an empty index (such as
they are,.
,his is not that

which is known by

competent speaker, but is merely
an
”
e Piphenomenon'' stemming from
the multiplicity of possible
usages, one which appears when
there is no
a

usage.

Its

intractability indicates not that we
don’t know the meanings
of our words, but only that usage
is essential to understanding, both of each other and of
the world.

6

•

"In a Sense" Revisited
1

now turn to considering how the introduction
of

a

speaker’s meaning coordinate affects the
constructions
considered earlier

I

.

begin with "in

a

Intuitively, the application of "in

sense".
a

sense" to

a

sentence such as "John is reckless" should induce
evaluation
at

indices which differ at the speaker’s meaning coordinate,

and not the delineation coordinate.
be true if

"John is reckless" is true at some index where

the speaker means, for example,

even
Thus,

it

at

Lewis’s account of "in

correct

that John runs red lights,

this index "reckless" has an extension gap.

not fully general.
is

The construction should

if

a

sense" is, at the very least,

leave open the question of whether

it

we confine attention to scalar adjectives.

1

I

also leave open the question of whether the speaker’s

meaning account subsumes, or could be made to subsume, the
scalar case.

f

:

.

16d
In any case we need

new semantic rule.

a

rule which

A

exactly analogous to Lewis’s but
in which the speaker's
meaning is shifted instead of the
delineation is the folis

iowi ng

S9
It (f) is of type
some index i
like 1
meaning coordinate C
1
t
tor all such 1
.

t

’

then

Cl

(

0

M
)

’

1

J

=

if t

l

’

tor

7

"f

(he

multiplicity of (constrained) speaker’s
meanings means
that a great many indices are considered.
So it
is very

easy tor

a

sentence such as "In

a

sense John is reckless" to

be true.
M

further development seems to be necessary.

"In a sense John is reckless and diligent."

Lonsider

Assuming that

the speaker’s meaning coordinate has components
tor both

reckless

and

"diligent", this sentence is true at an index

on the present account

just when the conjunction is true at

some index dittering at either or both components,

when John is reckless in

sense

Since

•

a

in a sense"

i.e.

just

sense and John is diligent in

a

is treated as a sentential

modifier, there is no way for either adjective to be singled
However,

out.

it

appears that "in

a

sense" can in tact be

selective, as for example in "John is reckless in
and diligent".

mod

l

i

That is,

a

sense

"in a sense" can act as a predicate

er

Let "I

be the sentential

"

defined by S9

,

"in a sense" modifier

and let "Ip" be the predicate modifier.

It

9

.

(

1

£>H

nught appear that latter renders
the former superfluous.
hor example, “Ig.Rj A D j>"
might be rendered as
I
<R,,,J A
P
'IpdlMj"). However the sentential
modifier may in tact be
indispensable, for reasons 1 will
explain later.
,

In any case,

S10.

If

propose the following rule.

I

£ is of type <e,t>,

then

/'

’

1

’

9

Q
ls th t
function from individuals to truth-values
which,
when
given an individual a, yields true
iff L P j^’ 1
S trUe + ° r S ° me 1
ilke 1 exce P t Perhaps at thi
lnVu
speaker
s meaning coordinate; and Cl (P)]^’ 1 ’^
Vlf=ldc
o given a iff 1
P’ 1 9 a ytelds 6 for all i^Uke t
e
except perhaps at the speaker's meaning
coordinate.
course, a new syntactic rule must also be
[ I__

)

(

’

(

)

’

.

>

<

f

>

introduced.

Now consider the related operator "in
the sense of ..."
(as

in

"John is clever in the sense of quick-witted").

Intuitively what this operator does is induce
evaluation

of

the operand at an index with a particular
speaker's meaning;

the relation between "in a sense" and "in the
sense of" is

analogous to that between "somewhere" and "in Chile".
Assume that "in the sense of"

represented in

is

L by

expression which takes an expression of type <e,t>

"J",

to

an

form

an expression which takes an expression of type <.e,t> to

form another expression of type <e,t>; that is,

predicate to form
Sli.

a

If £ _ and

predicate modifier.

1

"J"

takes

a

hen we have:

are expressions of type <e,t>, then
that function from individuals to
^
truth-value^ wt^iich, when given an individual n, yields
,X
^ <n) yields 1 for an i
1
iff C
3
which is like
l
except that the (component of the) speaker’s meaninq
1
^ (for an arbitrary
coordinate for
is Cx[Q x 3 J
1
variable X
P
=*pd t J
^
^
yields 0 when given
^_
^
n iff C
3
(n) yields 0 for an i’ which is like i
excep t
etc
L

(

J

)

JfcL

is

3

’

’

’

(

’

(

)

’

.

.

.

’

(

)

)

(

’

)

)

’
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Sll guarantees the necessary
equivalence ot

,

tor

example,

John is clever in the sense
of quick-witted" and
"John is clever" evaluated at
an index where quick-wi ttedness is the speaker's meaning;
if this coordinate is
held
fixed, the sentences are true
in all the same worlds.
Sll
is motivated by my observation
of the previous chapter that
"in the sense of" is used to
make a speaker's meaning
explicit <p. 102-3).
Mote, however, that if x C ?<x,J
does
a
not denote a proper speaker's meaning
fori, then, given
the specification of
not exist,

the set

I,

the required index

so that neither the truth nor

i

'

wi

u

the falsity clause

is

satisfied.

of

being slow afoot" is truth-valueless at any
index, regard-

So,

for example,

-John is clever in the sense

less of whether John is slow afoot.

evaluation

"John is clever" in

of

a

Note that,

in contrast,

context in which the

speaker means that John is slow afoot is evaluation
at an

empty index, so that the result is not necessarily truthvalue essness
1

.

This disanalogy seems right to me;

the fact

that the improper speaker's meaning is explicit in the one

case but not the other seems to me to matter.
but not the other

,

in what case

there's something deviant about "what is

said".
I

he existence of

treatment of "in

a

meaning coordinate.

"in the sense of

..." confirms the

sense" as shifting on the speaker’s
For evidently the latter must shift on

whatever sort of thing is expressed by the "..." in "in the

1

sense of

mean 1 ng

and this is not

boundary

.

When
model,

a

<b6

I

proposed specifying speaker’s meanings
in the
mentioned that it W as possible to detine
I

an "an-

swering

relation on

set of speaker’s meanings.

a

this relation is not needed for S9

,

S10, or Sll.

However,
As

am

I

not aware of any other operators which
would require the

relation,

presume that we can do without it.

I

Ihe account of

partial.

applies

"in

Not only am

sense" offered here is at best

unsure whether or how "in

I

scalars, as

to

a

sense"

mentioned previously (see note £8),

I

am also unsure whether or how it applies to
normative

1

terms.

Ihe

latter problem arises in light of my previous

conclusion that
er s meaning

PP

'

^

a

"sense" of "good" does not involve speak-

in the sense of a conceptual

Perhaps "in

^

a

e-reason.

linked to

a

different coordinate.

clear that "in

.

a

But

sense" can’t be given

it

simply must be

in any case
a

it

is

uniform treatment.

Ihe Comparative Revisited

When the truth of
is

(See

sense" can’t be treated as an

operator at all in these cases, or perhaps

7

a

a

simple vague sentence such as "John

reckless" depends on what the speaker means, so too does

the truth of a correspond i ng comparative sentence, such as

"John is more reckless than Bob".

The latter sentence, for
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example, might be true if what
is meant lB that John runs
red lights more frequently
than Bob, but false if what is
meant is that John is more
careless with money than Bob.
In
order to take this into account,
we must modify SB’s policy
of considering every possible
delineation in the semantic
rule for comparatives.
Ue should consider only those

delineations dictated by, or "consistent
with", the speaker's meaning.
For example, if a speaker means
that John
spends recklessly, then we should consider
only those

delineations which somehow render definite
judgments on
borderline spenders.
My goal

is not

formulate

to

a

new rule which will be

able to handle scalar adjectives as well as
vague ones;
rather
if

will concentrate on the latter task.

I

the new rule were to succeed,

arise whether

it

supplement, S6

.

To be sure,

then the question would

could be made to subsume, rather than
It

will

turn out,

though,

that the question

doesn’t arise.

Define the "SM-set" of delineations over which
true at

i

to be the set of

delineations over which

(j)

sistent with the speaker

s

0

is

those member s of the set of
is

true at

meaning at

1

1

which are con-

(or,

more precisely,

with some speaker’s meaning in the speaker’s meaning coordi-

nate at i);

let D(i,

(/>

)

designate this set.

Ihen we can

formulate the following rule:
S12.

If

P is of type <e,t> and

Od

and

$

are of type e,

j

)

1

then
<«>*))

D<

" hB

i

[>(?)(a

;

?(
<?

,

(

Q
£

)

relatlon

)

"

3
°

>

,

v

M

i

,

D

T

1
>

g 0

1

<

»

iff D<

.

? <_5
C
e <crf
)

i

)

)

,

)

C

60

D(i,e

consistent with", defined on the
set of
delineations and the union of the sets
of speaker’s meanings, ,s now presumed specified
in the model.)
Notice that
the conditions for the negative
r
extension
is

of

>

<

?

)

(

< at

,

g

>

are those we’d want to specify
for the positive extension of
r >=(P)(<l§
,oi>)"\ where >= p n may be read „
at least a5 p
(

as "

,

.

tariier

expressed my belief that an "in

I

sentential operator, as defined in S9
able in favor of
now in

m

I

a

predicate operator

position to say why.

a

more reckless than Bob".

is

sense"

a

,

may not be dispens-

,

as defined in S10.

Consider "In

a

sense John

On the S10 reading of "in

a

sense", we must, despite appearances, render this
as
>

(

I

(

R

)

(

<

,

b

>

)

scope than "in

"

that is,

;

sense".

a

correct reading.
SIC and SIB "In
true at

i

some

which

l

’

nate is
at

i)

nate,

d

the comparative must have wider
But this is not an intuitively

Indeed,

it

is

difficult to understand; by

sense John is more reckless than Bob" is

a

only if, whenever "Bob is reckless" is true at
i

’

(where

like
d

is

i

except that the delineation coordi-

consistent with the speaker's meaning

and except perhaps at the speaker's meaning coordi-

"John is reckless" is true at some

'

i

'which is like

1

except that the delineation coordinate is d, and except

perhaps at the speaker's meaning coordinate.

The intuitive
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reading, however,

is one

in which

"in a sense" assumes wide

scope;

this requires construing "in
a sense" as a sentential
operator.
Thus, if the comparative is to
be construed as an
operator forming two-place predicates
out of one-place

predicates, then we must have S9 in
addition to S10.
Since I've posited an empty-index
denotation for
positives, evidently
must do the same for corresponding
comparatives.
But SIB does not yet determine a
denotation
at an empty index, since the SM-set
of a sentence
I

at an

empty index is undefined.

So

let

it

be defined as the set

of those delineations over which the
sentence is true at the

index which are consistent with some speaker’s
meaning;

presumably this is simply the set of delineations over
which
the sentence is true at the index. 31

John

Then SIB entails that

being more reckless than Bob in every possible sense

s

suffices for "John is more reckless than Bob" being true
at
an empty index.

For

if

John is more reckless than Bob in

every possible sense then "John is more reckless than Bob"
true at every non-empty index;

is
i

,

D

(

i

,

R b
(

)

)

d

D(i

,R(j)).

i,

for every non-empty

And given the definition of

the SM-set at an empty index,

index

i.e.

this entails that at an empty

D(i,R(b)) C D(i,R(j)), which is to say that at

"John is more reckless than Bob" is true.

1

The latter,

however, may not entail that John is more reckless than Bob
in every

possible sense;

it

depends on whether there are

subsets of the set of speaker’s meanings of "reckless" such

>

"

1

.

1

7U

that all delineations are consi^tont
unsistent with some speaker's

meaning in the subset.
S

cour se,

’

indeterminacy at an empty index.

see this, suppose that John is
more reckless than Bob in
one sense, but Bob is more reckless
than John in another
M 1
sense.
That is, [ > R
9 _ 1
J
< j b
and
To

’

(

[

->(R)(\b,j>)]

9

)

=

(

,

»

)

where the speaker’s meaning of

1,

distinct from the speaker’s meaning of

is

that D(i2,R(j))

D(i,R(j))
D

(

i

,

R b
(

)

)

C. D

is not
;

a

(

i

2,R b
(

)

Hence if

)

wise, of D<i,R(j)).

So by S 1 2

In

speaker’s meanings,

,

fheref ore in

a

index,

in a

is

proper or other-

<j,b> is in neither the
"

>

(

)

R

at

i.

(Simi-

light of the multiplicity of possible

true-to-life model

<x,y> to be such that

in one sense but y

D<il,R<j>), and

is an empty

i

is not a subset,

positive nor the negative extension of

for a pair

C

subset, proper or otherwise, of

and D(i,R(b))

larly for <b,j>.)

By the first

12.

clause of S12, this means that D(il,R(b>)

ll

x

it

is very easy

is more reckless than y

more reckless than

x

is another sense,

true-to-life model indeterminacy at an empty

index is very great.

Scalar adjectives are linear in the sense that their

comparative forms don’t admit of extension gaps; the preceding shows that dispositional

this sense. 32

Note, however,

adjectives are not linear in
that

it

would be misleading to

call dispositional adjectives "multidimensional",

inasmuch

as this suggests that they can be "resolved"

linear

into
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"components"

In the present context this
wouid amount

.

the claim that

a

simple comparative like "John is
more

reckless than Bob", though nonlinear
at an empty index,
nonetheless linear at any non-empty
index.

intuitively.

50,

to

is

But this isn't

An informal analogue of the
argument that

there pan be indeterminacy at an empty
index can be made for
any non-empty index whose speaker's
meaning intuitively has
further speaker’s meanings.
(I can't, however, construct a
formal analogue without expanding the
current framework to
allow for the sensitivity of complex predicates
to a speaker s meaning coordinate.)
'

The foregoing conclusions are all

conditional on the

correctness of 512 as an account of vague comparatives.
is

it

correct 7

But

As I’ve noted previously, we must have some

account of delineations beyond simply the stipulation that
they close up gaps; without such an account, S12 is just

wishful thinking.

However

,

the needed account proves

Delineations are satisfactorily explained as
numbers in the case of scalars, but evidently we can’t say
the same for
for

d

i

spos i

"intelligent",

t

IQ

i

ona 1 adjectives (not even,

tests notwithstanding).

I

presume,

What then?

Delineations could not be speaker’s meanings, as

I

noted in

connection with "in

a

not close up gaps.

Nor could they be arbitrary stipulations

sense", since speaker’s meanings do

("this object is in, that one is out, etc."); they would

close gaps, but then by S12 no object could ever be more

1

72

anything than anything else. 33
submit that gap-closers for
dispositional adjectives
3
do not exist. '
Kamp similarly concludes that
gap-closers
don’t in general exist, saying
that -'most tsemanticalj
decisions will fail to render the
relevant predicates
completely sharp.
They will only make them sharper-'
(where
by "sharp" he means "determinate"). 35
But he doesn’t then
give up the notion of a gap-closer.
Rather, he renders a
"complete model" (in effect, the model
function F evaluated
at an index where there is no
indeterminacy) as a construction out of "partial models" (F at indices
where there is
1

indeterminacy) which have been made more determinate,
by
"semantical decisions", than some original partial
36
model.
If
<

3

Kamp is right, we no longer need an account of

a P~ c losin<3

Provided we have an account of gap-narrowing.

But what are these semantical decisions which
are supposed
to

narrow gaps 7

Evidently, the same properties which Kamp

would call the results of potential decisions

I

would call

speaker’s meanings; tor example, on Kamp

'

s

account

we might try to reduce the extension gap of "clever" by

deciding on gu i c k— w i t tedness as

indeterminate cases.

a

criterion for judging

So the question can be put this way:

is the gap of a vague predicate at a non-empty

index neces-

sarily narrower than the gap at an empty one?

In other

words: does

a

indeterminacy?

reduction in vagueness entail

a

reduction in

:

.
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see that the answer is

lo

note first that any

•'no",

narrowing is presumably systematic
in the sense that the
more determinate partition
preserves the definite judgments
ot

the original partition.

Fine describes this requirement

35 foil ows

...a sentence does not become
indefinite upon being^
made more precise
_ __
Th^
,hatt ls
erha
P
partly definiP5
lonal of H making more precise".
For what distinguishes this operation from a mere
change in meaning is that
Pre5er e
ruth value.
To precisify is to rule out
thp possibility
^ ^
the
of certain truth-value gaps.
In any
case, it would odd if definite
truth-value could
disappear upon prec i s i f 1 cat i on
>

’

»

,

};

Now consider as an example the positive
extension of "reckless" at an empty index; and consider the
positive extension
of

"reckless" at

the former

7

a

non-empty index.

Need the latter contain

Ihis is tantamount to asking whether something

need be reckless in every possible sense in order
to be

reckless simpliciter.

But this question has already been

considered, and answered negatively.
be made for the negative extension.

A similar

argument can

Hence the gap at

a

non-empty index need not narrow the gap at an empty index.
Recall that

prompt

I

am taking vagueness to entail aptness to

certain kind of question, and the reduction of

a

vagueness as the supplying of
to

such

a

question.

a

properly constrained answer

As I’ve remarked,

it

is

entirely in

keeping with ordinary usage to describe the supplying of

speaker

s

cise".

This aside,

a

meaning as being less "vague", or being more "prethe important point here is that the

.

i

supplying ot

a

speaker's meaning doesn't necessarily
reduce

indeterminacy, however "odd" this might seem.
ne s "making more precise"

supplying of

a

/H

speaker

s

is supposed

to

Thus,

if

include the

meaning, his account of

it

is

incorrect; whereas if it just supposed to
mean "gap-narrowing", then his account, while unexceptionable,
doesn't

apply to predicates which are vague in my
sense.

betrays

a

(Fine

certain ambivalence as to what he means,

a

fact

1

will discuss shortly.)

don’t see what could do the job of gap-narrowing,

1

possible speaker's meanings don't.

Therefore

it

seems to me

that kamp's attempted rescue of delineations fails.
my objection to S12 stands:

if

And so

gap-closers for vague adjec-

tives don't seem to exist.
S12 is the result of trying to account for vague

comparatives by extending S6

.

If

I'm right,

S6 can’t be so

extended.

This, of course, doesn't mean that S6 isn't

correct in

a

limited domain (i.e. the domain of scalars).

Nor does it mean that vague comparatives may not be accountin some other

ed for

don't

8

.

k

way.

But what way this might be,

now

Logical Truth Revisited

Without an account of delineations, the definition
logical
it

1

truth cannot invoke the notion of

did previously.

a

of

delineation, as

This leaves us facing the dilemma which

.

)
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motivated that definition:
be preserved

in a

ho. can class.cal logic.! truth

language which allows extension
gaps?

The answer is simple:

truth at all

we again define logical

indices at which there are no gaps,

truth as

in every

model, but simply allow gaps to be
closed arbitrarily rather
than by delineations. 38 This method
of preserving classical
logical truth in a language which allows
extension gaps has
a precedent in Thomason’s treatment
of sortally incorrect

sentences, e.g.
Ihe basic

-'The

theory of relativity is breakable". 39

intuition that

sentence which is true no matter

a

how indeterminacy is resolved ought to count as
true is,

1

believe, the same whether the indeterminacy stems from
sortal

or from ambivalence and variation

D.

Vagueness and

Earlier in this chapter
have been construing it,

is

I

I

-TO

ndeter m i nacy

noted that vagueness, as

1

conceptually distinct from

intraspeaker variation, interspeaker variation, and speakers

ambivalence.

Naturally

tinct from indeterminacy,

it

i.e.

is also

conceptually dis-

gappiness, posited to account

for variation and/or uncertainty.

also showed earlier

I

that while a vague predicate admits of variation and uncer-

tainty, and hence is indeterminate,

a

predicate might admit

of variation and uncertainty without being

(

par t i cu 1 ar 1 y

vague
(he fact

that vague predicates are indeterminate should

s

.
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be treated with some care.

It

tempting to think that,

15

While Va9Uene5S m *V not be coextensive
with indeterminacy,
it

nonetheless coextensive with

is

indeterminacy.
fact that

a

certain high degree ot

However, this seems to be refuted by the

predicate less vague than another needn't be
less determinate.
I
take this fact to follow from
a

the

recent conclusion that

a

speaker's meaning for

predicate, presumably expressible by
•-perhaps complex),

vague

a

less vague predicate

a

need not reduce indeterminacy.

Note also that the denotation of

a

vague predicate may

be indeterminate at either an empty or a non-empty
index.
Ht an empty
no speaker

index,
s

indeterminacy reflects ambivalence when

meaning is assumed,

intraspeaker variation over

times when there is no speaker’s meaning, and/or inter-

speaker variation when the speakers in question do not mean
anything.

Ht a non-empty

index,

i

ndeterm nacy reflects
1

ambivalence when the relevant speaker’s meaning is assumed,
intraspeaker variation over times when the relevant speaker’s meaning is present, and interspeaker variation when the

speakers in question have the relevant speaker’s meaning.
Note that variation involving

a

speaker’s meaning at one

time, or for one speaker, but not at another time, or for

another speaker, and variation involving different speaker

meanings are not sources of any indeterminacy.
128 - 9

.

(See pp

)

It

appears to me that whatever temptation there might

’

1

177

be to think that the del ineational
rules for "in

a senseend the comparative are, or could
be made, applicable to

vague adjectives can only stem from the
tacit conflation of
vagueness/precision with i nde ter m nacy / deter m i nacy
Intuitively, the "in a sense" operator induces
the consideration
i

.

of

"precise" indices, but once "precise" is
appropriately

understood,

it

seems clear that

not the relevant one (at

a

delineation coordinate is

least not

tive which is being operated on).

vague adjec-

if

it

is a

It

is

plausible to regard

the comparative operator as inducing the consideration
of

determinate indices, but the mechanisms at our disposal for
increasing the "precision" of "vague" adjectives are evi-

dently inadeguate to

precision

and

the creation of such

vague" are appr opr

a

de

I

suspect that Lewis, Kamp

1

1

a te 1 y

md ices

,

once

understood (making

neat 1 ona 1 approach to logical truth suspect as well).
,

and Fine are all guilty to a

certain degree of the conflation.

In any case my main point

here is that my criticism of their approach (construed as

a

gener a 1 approach) depends upon my construal of vagueness.

E

Cone 1 us ion

hope to have shown how

I

ating

.

a

a

formal framework incorpor-

speaker's meaning coordinate can both account tor

the intuitive dependence between speaker's meaning

sense of

a

(in the

conceptual e-reason) and truth, and help make

clear the distinction between vagueness on the one hand and

i

78

indeterminacy stemming from ambivalence
and variation on the
other.
in the next chapter I will
consider whether it has
the significant additional advantage
of accounting for the

mean 1 ng of

a

vague sentence.

.

.

Nu ES
I

1

.

bee Putnam

(

1
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CHAPTER

A

)

conversation, Hans Kamp has suggested that
competent
speakers divide equally among those who use
dispositional
adjectives as natural kind terms and those who
use them
particular senses.
am not entirely happy with saying that
halt ot us misconstrue the nature of
dispositional adjectives, but it Kamp s suggestion is right
1
must.

m

1

'

d.
lo review: speaker’s meanings are
answers, but need not
be actually expressed in response to either
an actually
asked or tacit question.
So there is no problem in saying
that a speaker's meaning may be covert.
1
do not, however, venture even so tar as to attribute
this view to Wittgenstein (though tor all I know it is).

H.

5.
ot

See Alston (1968), and references therein, for discussion
some ot these notions and related notions.

Un open texture, see Wittgenstein (1958), Waismann
(1968), and Margal it (1979).

o.

7.

See Uuine (1970), Scheffler

(1979).

8. See Black (1939), tor a statistical construal, and Cresswell
(1976), for an equivalence class construal.
7- See Dowty, Wall, and Peters (1981) for an introduction to
Montague semantics.
It would be more in the spirit of Montague s program to avoid syncategor emat c rules, but tor
convenience
am using them nonetheless (as Montague did
himself
Not much is at stake since the syncategoremat c
rules (syntactic and semantic) invariably have strictly
compositional equivalents in a language enriched by further
categor es
l

1

)

.

i

i

lO. A longstanding objection to this approach is that there
can be no more justification for sharp lines between determinate and indeterminate cases than there can be for a sharp
line between determinate cases (i.e. between positive
extension and negative extension); see, e.g., Copilowish
(1939).
lhis is a powerful objection, but 1 have nothing to
say about it; see Fine (1975), and kamp’s commentary in Kamp
(1978), tor an advanced discussion.
The difficulty might
lead one to prefer a semantics based on fuzzy-set theory,
but this alternative has very serious problems of its own;

179

t

.

.

l

see Kamp
1 1

.

IS.

(1975)

See Lewis
See Kamp

(

for discussion
1972)

(1975)

5ee Kamp, ibid.,
(1971), pp
99-6
13.

Bo

and Klein (1980) for discussion.
and Fine

(

1975)

;

see also van Fraassen

.

More precisely, we proceed as follows.
Consider an
index relative to which there is
indeterminacy in the
extension of at least one (n-place) predicate.
For any
such index there is a set of ways to
eliminate all indeterminacy, each way corresponding to an index
at which the
delineation coordinate has no null components.
Lach such
way determines a total valuation, i.e. a
function which
assigns truth or falsity to every sentence.
A Supervaluation relative to the original indeterminate index
can then
be defined as a valuation which assigns true
to a sentence
just when it is assigned true by every valuation
in the
induced set of total valuations, assigns false just
when
every total valuation assigns false, and assigns no
value
otherwise.
Logical truth is then defined as truth in every
super va 1 ua i o n
in every model.
1h

,

15. See Chierchia and Turner (1985), from which the
current
treatment of abstraction and predication is taken.
(thanks
to Michael Jubien for assisting my reading of this paper.)
they attribute the basic insight to Frege.
16. For my purposes property-abstracts suffice, but in
general we may have proposition-abstracts [ 0 J and n-place
relation abstracts v^...v
J
(for n > 1) too; see ibid.
17.
Lhierchia and turner do not fully endorse this constraint, which is the semantic counterpart to the axioms of
" A -reduction"
and " A -expansion"
They reject the latter
so as to block the derivation of Russell’s paradox.
But
Flans Kamp has pointed out to me that paradox can alternatively be avoided by disallowing self-predication by properties in the following manner:
given a property p, the
function P, which maps properties to "propositional functions" (denotations of type <e,t>>, returns a partial
function which returns no value when given p.
.

18.

Barbara Partee has helped me here considerably.

If Wittgenstein is right, meaning something improper is
psychological impossibility; see Wittgenstein (1958), sec.
510.
But 1 prefer to take the possibility into account,
even if it is not a psychological possibility.

19.

a

f

.

e

.

10

20.

See Montague (1970).

Sven so, some adjectives are certainly
not in its
province.
he adjective "tantamount", tor
example, takes
prepos i t ona -phrase complement and
cannot occur prenomi—
na 1 y
21

1

.

1

1

i

a

1

2
might be replied that in the context
describe, the
intension ot
walker" suffices.
Presumably the speaker
e
a11
mGan that John ls a skillful walker; it
s
just!\r
that the speaker doesn't mean merely
this, i.e. he in
turn would mean something by "John is
a skilltul walker", in
response,
can only complain that the "most precise"
speaker's meaning, i.e. one which is not answered
by (in the
technical sense of chapter 3) a true and direct
speaker s
meaning, will not have been taken into account.
1

^

’

1

23.

In fact, when in order to reduce vagueness
one seeks an
"interpretation" by asking the relevant WDYM-quest l on
one
presupposes a homophonic l nterpretat ion as
argued at
length in the previous chapter.
The apprehension ot vagueness depends upon an apprehension of the (communal)
meaning.
Ihis fact might be used to argue against the
attributive
theory in the following way.
If "skillful" were attributive, then "John is skillful" would be strictly meaningless.
But if that were so, then it would no t be poss b
to
apprehend the vagueness of "John is skillful", any more than
it is possible to judge that "John is grswslo" is
vague; the
apprehension would not be ot vagueness, but ot meaninglessness.
But surely we do apprehend vagueness, and hence
the attributive construal must be wrong.
1
endorse this
argument, but it doesn’t strengthen my position.
For it
might be replied that the necessary homophonic interpretation ot "John is skillful" is given by something like
here
ls a
such that John is a skillful P
And against this i
can only once again complain of ar t l i c l a 1 i ty
,

,

I

l

1

I

k'

.

See Siegel (1979).
What Siegel calls "measure adjectives are adjectives of type <e,t> which are sensitive to a
comparison class.
fhey include all but not only scalars;
for example, Siegel notes that dispositional adjectives like
"clever" and "intelligent" have measure readings.
The "for
a" and "as a" paraphrases ot prenominal constructions which
ve used here to distinguish comparison class dependence
1
from speaker’s meaning dependence were originally proposed
by Siegel in order to diagnose measure readings and attributive readings, respectively.
For example, the tact that
"Bonzo is a clever monkey" may be paraphrased as "Bonzo is
clever tor a monkey" is supposed to demonstrate a measure
reading for "clever", while the fact "Bonzo is a skillful
doctor" may be paraphrased as "Bonzo is skillful as a
29.

)

182
a ™°" 5tra ‘ e an
citrus,
no ^ uarrel with "tor a" as
diaono^m
a measure reading, but
as I've indicated 1 take "as
a" as
diagnostic, not of an attributive reading,
but
of
speak
r
ni 9 d
ndenc
My positi ° n
»u« t re 55ei by
:
t
dJ
WhlCh have sab; an attributive
‘;
Vl
reading, such
a
t?
as
alleged",
"temporary", and "former", never have
"ai a
paraphrases:

or^n^ur^ 0 ^::
1

’

TVK

:“

h

1

-

r

* Mark is former as a
senator.
light of this, "as a" can't very
comfortably be taken as
lagnostic of an attributive construal.
(I thank Barbara
Hartee for pointing this out to me.)

In

25

.

Ramp

(

1

975

159

.

But see Siegel (1979), pp 236-7, for an
argument
against treating predicative adjectives as
attributive
the way I ve described.
SO.

.

in

'

Perhaps there is no such individual because some
possible senses are mutually inconsistent.
But the same point
could be made with respect to a maximally consistent
set of
senses; surely an individual with all the properties
in the
set counts as reckless simpliciter.
2/.

E8. It Lewis's account is okay for scalars, then this
latter
question is the question of whether speaker’s meanings can
subsume delineations. If Lewis's account is not okay, then
it is the question of whether the speaker’s
meaning approach
can subsume an adequate alternative account, if there is
one.
For reasons to be given below, I’m inclined to think
that Lewis’s account is not okay for scalars, i.e. that "in
a sense" never shifts on a delineation coordinate.
But
am
tentative about this; and even assuming my suspicions are
right,
am not sure whether or how "in a sense" does apply
to scalars.
So I am in no position yet to decide on the
generality of my own account of "in a sense".
1

1

Hans Ramp has objected that the S9 read mg of "In a
sense John is reckless and diligent", according to which the
"reckless" and "diligent" components of the speaker’s
meaning coordinate vary independently, is not the intuitively correct one; rather, the sentence seems to say that there
is some "single way" that John is, which is both reckless
and diligent.
Barbara Partee has suggested accounting for
this by positing a pragmatic effect which interacts with the
semantics, i.e. S9
Another possibility consistent with S9
is to treat "reckless and diligent" as a complex predicate
with its own component in the speaker’s meaning coordinate.
cannot yet decide between these a 1 ter nat l ves largely
because
am not considering the issue of speaker’s meanings
29

.

.

1

,

I

—

m

,
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tor a complex predicate considered
as a whole
as opposed to
y a com P le>< som e simple constituent or
^‘
constituents
or
wh ich is or are sensitive to
speaker’s
Ihat is,
while it is clear that there are such meaning).
speaker s meanings
6
tD WDVM -P uest '°t,* expressed by
interrof"
e
”
Quotes enclose complexes), I’m setting
L.ie
th
aside the
question ot whether the denotation ot a
complex
<

can be sensitive to the speaker’s
meaning coordinate,
whether a complex predicate can belong
to V

(see p.

i

e

lqe).

JO.

I’m now in a position to state my
suspicions concerning
the adequacy ot Lewis’s "in a sense"
for scalars (ct. note"
SSUm 1 ng that there is a corresponding "in
the sense
°f
*° r " ln the sense that"),
the del ineational account
predicts the non-deviance of a locution such
as
Kareem is tall in the sense of being seven-toot
tour,
hut to me this sounds funny; hence I’m inclined
to think
that in
Kareem is tall in a sense,
"in a sense" is not an operator linked to a
delineation
coordinate.
1
tacitly revealed this bias in chapter II,
when I oftered examples 7 and 8 but not example
6, which
involved the scalar adjective "old", as cases in which
a
"sense" ot a word is requested.
It may strike the reader as odd that there is
a mismatch
between the empty-index membership conditions tor the compar
ative which my stipulation determines and those tor the posi
tive.
I
don’t like it either, but don’t know how else to
proceed.
Recall that I earlier suggested thinking of the
membership conditions for "reckless" at an empty index as an
infinite disjunction of conjunctions.
Intuitively, if there
is some conjunction in this disjunction such that John is
more reckless than Bob in the sense of each conjunct, then
John is more reckless than Bob" should be true at an empty
index.
However, the reader may verify that S1E can’t
guarantee this on any stipulation of an empty-index SM-set
even an infinite one, since there is no provision for the
disjunction.
Evidently what is required is to have S18
apply only to non-empty indices and supplement it with an
empty— index rule, one which allows for disjunctive membei
ship conditions; however,
don’t know how to specify such a
rule.
Thus, I prefer my 1 ess- 1 han-na tur a 1 stipulation.

31.

I

I
accept the charge that this argument, inasmuch as it
rests partly on a less-then-natural stipulation, is less
than overwhelming.
Note, though, that it is premised only
on the existence of empty-index indeterminacy, not necessarily extreme i ndeter i nac y
Note also that on any reasonable stipulation of an empty-index SM-set, i.e. any stipulation by which such a set consists of the delineations

38.

.

.

10 *+

consistent with any member ot some
fairly large set of
er
meamn9S ^
be 5h ° Wn that indeterminacy can
ex!st
:
aoa
C
° hn 5 h**" 9 m ° re reCkless
than Bob in
one sinse and Bob
K
9 m ° re reckless than John in another
sense but let ?h
5en ses be speaker’s meanings in the
relevant sei
r,9 course it might
be replied that any
st n t !
stipulation
is unnatural (cf. note 31).
But
am not
distressed about this, because
will soon argue that SIB is
misconceived to begin with.
Thus I think that these arguments tor nonlinearity, based as they
are on SIB, are
ultimately without foundation regardless
ot how the empP
ty-index problem is settled.
’

%

1

I

Klein proposes viewing gap— closing as the
end result ot
sequence of applying a predicate to a gap,
but for linear
adjectives only.
See Klein, pp
16-8.
33.

a

.

It is not just that
can’t imagine an element
context which closes gaps; I can’t imagine anything of
which
does so.
36.
I
mention this because on Lewis’s view delineations aren’t supposed to be contextual (at least
not
exclusively); see Lewis, op. cit.
In the terminology of his
later work, they are elements of an •'index" (what
Kaplan
calls a "circumstance"
see Lewis (1979).
3*+

.

I

35.

)

Kamp (1975), p.
Ibid., pp
37.

.

;

191.

192-3.

Fine (1975), p. 275.

More precisely, we proceed as in note 19, except that
the total valuations induced by an l ndeterm i nate index
correspond, not to indices at which the delineation coordi—
has no nul 1 elements, but to ways of somehow assigning
ail objects (or n-tuples of objects) in a gap to the positive or negative extension of the relevant predicate,
arbitrary though the assignment may be.
38.

39.

See Thomason (1972).

While classical logic can be preserved in the current
framework, it isn’t clear that it should be. Kamp has
argued that the logic of "observational" predicates is
non-classical, where an observat i ona 1 predicate 0 is a
predicate such that if any objects x and y are observational ly indistinguishable with respect to the criteria
associated with
then x and y are either both in the
positive extension of
both in the negative extension, or
both in the gap; predicates like "tall", "bald", and "red"
are arguably observat l ona 1
See Kamp (1978) tor discussion.
hO

,

,

.

.

CHAPTER

5

MEANING AND SPEAKER’S MEANING

I

Ht

I

•

ntroduc 1 1 on

the end of Chapter 3,

I

summarized the implications

which the study of speaker’s meaning
had for the meaning or
a vague sentence, essentially as
follows.
(11/
he meaning of a vague sentence is deficient
in
some way.
fhis makes it apt to prompt, on an occasion
of utterance, a WDYM-quest i on
one whose parameters are
set in a certain way.
l

,

(IE)
he content of the belief cor respond l
ng to the
acceptance of a vague sentence is in some way
more
deficient, or less precise, than that of a conceptual
e-reason for the belief.
1

(13) A competent speaker who knows the meaning
of a
vague sentence knows constraints on possible speaker s
meanings.
This is in virtue of knowing constraints
on answers to a relevant WDYM-quest l on
1

to

then noted,

though,

that a theory of meaning was required

complete this account.

The framework of

the previous

chapter might be thought to provide the required theory; my
goal

in this chapter

is so.

I

to

consider the extent to which this

begin with Ti and T2.

I I

I

is

.

Deficiency and Intension

he intension of an expression is a function from an

index to a denotation.

On the simplifying assumption that

185

i8t>

an index consists just of

meaning, this is

meaning to
a

t

unc

ment,

t

1

speaker's

a

world and speaker's

We may equivalently regard this as

including

a

null ele-

function from worlds to denotations.

a

former function

of

a

on from speaker’s meanings,

to

tent".

possible world and

function from

a

denotation.

a

a

•'character",

a

(Jail

the latter function

a

the

"con-

We may now say that each possible speaker's
meaning

an expression, as well

as the null element representing

the lack of

a

is equal

the character of the expression evaluated at the

speaker

to
s

speaker's meaning, determines

content.

a

lhis

meaning, or the null element.

fhe terms are borrowed from David Kaplan's theory of

indexicals, but

am not really invoking that theory.

1

Kaplan distinguishes two categories of truth -deter mining
features:

context" consists of features of an occasion of

a

utterance, while

a

"circumstance" consists of features

manipulated by whatever intensional operators are
language.
c

1

(Jn

r c urns t a nc es

Kaplan
to

s

usage,

"content"

is a

function from

denotations, while "character" is

tion from contexts to contents.

in the

a

func-

Aside from the fact that

1

am omitting a good many truth-determining features, my usage
is

distinct because

1

am not distinguishing between context

and circumstance, but merely separating two features of a

single set of truth-determining features,

i.e.

an index.

Doing this allows me to mimic Kaplan's approach while

avoiding the complications of actually adopting

it

(which

1

W ° Uid
ot

world coord 1 nates and,

"in a sense",

my analysis

two speaker's meaning coordinates).

lhB technicai

notion of "content", i.e.

possible worlds to truth-values,
provide an account
1

gwen

ot

a

07

1

function trom

thought by some to

is

the intuitive "content" of

hough the question is far from settled,

that this point of view is correct.^

1

a

belief.

will be assuming

Nonetheless,

a

dis-

tinction should be drawn between the intuitive
notion and
the technical notion meant to account for it

(as well

the intuitive content of an assertion), so
henceforth

refer to content in the sense of

truth— values as "content
is now tempting

It

a

as tor

will

1

function trom worlds to

w

think that identifying meaning

to

with character (intension) allows an account ot

11

whereby

deficiency in the meaning is explained in terms

of

the

content^ determined when no speaker's meaning exists, what
will call

content

the "default" content

evaluated at
v*v

an empty index which
is,
a

it

pp

.

(Note that the default

world is equal to the denotation at

includes the world in question.)

that

might be thought that deficiency in the "meaning"

ot

vague sentence exists in virtue of some property ot the

default content^.
a

a

w

This property might then help to explain

sentence's aptness to prompt
.

lOB-'f).

3

a

certain WDV M-quest 1 on (see

Also this property might account for the

intuitive deficiency of the content of the belief corre-

sponding to acceptance of

a

vague sentence, e.g. the belief

1

lea

that John is reckless.

Henceforth

„m

I

call such

belief

a

"vague" belief.

a

l

Similarly,

it

tempting to think that

15

may be

TE

accounted tor in terms of the content^
relative to
er

s

meaning.

a

speak-

The hope here is to identify the latter
with

the content of a conceptual e-reason,
e.g.

the belief that

John spends money without ever checking his
account.

Then

T2 might be explained after finding some way
in which this

content^ compares with the content

which has been identi-

tied with the content of the vague belief tor which
there is
a

conceptual e— reason.
There are two serious problems, however, with this

approach to

11

and T2.

properties of content

w

The first is that the hoped-for
are not discernible.

(he second

is

that the content of a vague belief can't really be identi-

fied with any function from worlds to truth-values, so that
it
1

is

misguided to look for these properties to begin with.

discuss these problems in turn.
Suppose that we identify meaning with character, and

set out to explain intuitive deficiency in the meaning by

appeal to some property of the default content
this property be?

1

w

.

What could

mentioned in the previous chapter that

vagueness cannot be associated with

a

high degree of

indeterminacy at an empty index (see pp
cannot be the property that we seek.

.

175-6).

However,

it

Ihus this
is

difficult tor me to see what other candidates there might

1B9

be

.

No™ suppose that ™e identify the
content of a vague
belief with the default content^ and
the content of a
conceptual e-reason for the vague belief
with the content
determined by the relevant speaker's meaning,

lA)

and set out to

explain the intuitively greater precision
of

a

conceptual

e-reason in terms of some way in which the two
contents
w
compare.
What might this way be? Recall the conclusion
the previous chapter

(p.

173)

that the extension gap of

of
a

vague predicate at an empty index need not be
larger than
that of an index which

is

identical except at the speaker's

meaning coordinate <i.e., under present assumptions,
identical at the world coordinate but not at the speaker's
meaning

coordinate).

Thus at any given world the extension gap

determined by the default content^ need not be larger than
that determined by a non-default content
the former content
lAl

latter content^.

w

.

In this sense

need not be more indeterminate than the

Hence we cannot account for comparative

deficiency in terms of the greater indeterminacy, in this
sense, of the default content

.

And it is difficult to see

lAj

what other sense of comparative indeterminacy might do
instead.

Moreover

,

it

is

difficult to see what other

relation might do other than some sense of comparative
indeterminacy.
in sum,

it

is not

at

ail obvious how either positive or

comparative deficiency can be explained in terms

of

proper-

i

ties OT contents^.

This does not mean, ot course,

properties do not exist.
grounds, as

that such

But this can be shown on other

will now explain.

1

considering what properties of content

in

VO

miqht

account tor positive and comparative deficiency,
one presupposes that the content of a vague belief can
be identified with the sentence's default content
Un reflection,
.

however,
that

a

is clear

it

that this identification fails.

vague belief serves as the topic of

requesting

a

e-reason.

That

speaker s meaning,

question

a

in the sense ot

the topic obtains and that

Recall

a

conceptual

speakers

a

meaning exists are both presuppositions of the question.
I

hus the topic cannot entail that

a

speaker's meaning does

not exist; else the topic would not be consistent with

a

direct answer.

the

(See pp

80-1).

.

But

if the content of

topic belief were identified with the default content

this entai lment would hold, tor the default content

w

w

,

then

is that

content^ determined when the speaker’s meaning does not
exist.

So the proposed

identification is incorrect.

The point can alternatively be seen in terms ot prag-

matic rather than semantic presuppositions.

An asker of

WDYM-quest i on presupposes both that the topic

of

question obtains and that

speaker's

meaning

-

exists.

In

topic of his question,

a

direct answer

-

a

attributing the belief that
a

a

one’s

is

the

rational questioner thus is assum-

ing that a speaker’s meaning exists,

not that it doesn’t.

.

But then the content of this
attributed belief cannot be the

default content

w

Nor, of course, could the content of
a

non-default content

speaker's meaning.

,

i.e.

a

content

80 - 1

Alternatively put,

).

vague belief be

determined by some

For the topic is assumed before it is

known what the speaker’s meaning is,
pp.

a

it

is

there is one (see

if

possible for

cor-

a

rective answer to deny that there is any speaker’s
meaning
(conceptual e-reason) without denying the topic.

content of
tent

a

vague belief can be neither the default con-

nor a non-default content^,

w

But if the

then on the current theory

content, the content of the belief is not given by any

of

content

at

all.

So no properties of content

will account
lAj

tor
at

i

intuitive deficiency of content, positive or comparve

.

The above argument may be summed up by saying that

follows from the "neutrality" of

a

vague belief,

entailing neither the non-existence of

a

i.e.

it

its

speaker’s meaning

nor the existence of any speaker’s meaning in particular,

that a vague belief can’t be assigned content

w

.

For the

latter requires commitment to either no speaker’s meaning or

some speaker’s meaning in particular.

<4

There are three possible reactions to this dilemma, as
foil o ws

Some beliefs have content but not content
Ihat
their content can’t be analyzed as a function from
worlds to truth-values.
This is true, in particular,
(

1

)

is,

.

.

i9d
°T a vague belief, e.g.
reckl ess
<2>

the belief that John is

The

(oversimplified) theory of content according
to
5 analyzed by a function from
worlds to
truth- °?
termined by some speaker 's meaning is
C

incorrect^

V

(3) There is no such thing as
a vague belief, i.e. a
belief corresponding to acceptance of
a vague sentence,
and which entails neither the
non-existence of a
speaker’s meaning nor the existence of any
particular
speaker s meaning.

That is, one can accept the apparent consequence
that some
beliefs do not have content^ or try to avoid this
consequence, by denying either the assumed theory of
content or
the assumption that the problematic belief
exists.

Barbara Partee has suggested to me
latter course might be taken, by

a

way that the

a

reanalysis of the topic

of a WDYM— question requesting a conceptual

example 8 of Chapter

Consider that

2.

a

e-reason.

Take

sense of an expres-

sion may be described indirectly, e.g. as "Lewis’s sense",
an important sense", or

"a more

relevant sense".

Partee’s

suggestion is to take the topic of the question to be given
by a be 1 i ef -a 1 1 r l but i on in which a sense of a vague expres-

sion is described as "the sense which the utterer (of the

vague sentence which prompts the question) now has in mind".
1

he topic would be
A1 believes that John is reckless in the sense
that A1 currently has in mind.

P’

:

[he relevance relation would

answer would provide

a

then be such that a direct

redescription of the topic, by

.
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pro v i d i ng an -identifying" description
of the sense in
question.
For example, a direct answer might
be expressed
by

believes that John is reckless in the sense
of
spending money without ever checking his
A1

account".

Such an

answer "identifies" the sense that A1
currently has in mind
as the sense of spending money without
ever checking one’s
account.
Note that the proposed topic is distinct
from the

proposition that A1 believes that John
sense.

is

reckless in some

The proposal rather is to describe the presupposed

sense more specifically as the sense which A1 currently
has
in mi nd

The dilemma to which my original analysis gives rise
is
that the neutrality of a vague belief makes an assignment
of

content^ to

it

impossible.

Partee’s proposal seems to

resolve this dilemma,

in

topic, P’

entailing neither the non-existence ot

a

is neutral,

the following way.

Like the old

sense nor the existence of any sense in particular.

unlike the old topic, P
sense.

But

does entail the existence of some

This is consistent with its not entailing the

existence of any sense in particular, since in the specification of P

’

the sense is described but not identified.

And

now it would appear that an account of the content of the
topic belief can be had.

For the intension of "John is

reckless in the sense which A1 currently has in mind"
equal

to

that of "John is reckless".

is not

The content of the

belief corr espond 1 ng to the former sentence is the content

.
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which is determined by the
sense which A1 currently has in
m 1 nd
i f
there is such a sense.
Thus, Partee’s proposal
prom 1 ses to resolve the present
dilemma via option (3)
above
,

evaluate this proposal, and at the same
time to
understand it more fully, let's consider
more carefully how
it compares with my original
analysis.
A WDYM-quest ion, to
repeat, presupposes that the topic obtains
and that there’s
lo

at

least one true answer standing in the
relevance relation

to

the topic

(as well

class do not obtain
the latter
e

is the

-

as that the members of the contrast-

see p.

14).

G n my original

presupposition that there

is a

reas °ci tor the belief that serves as topic,

analysis,

conceptual
Al’s

i.e.

belief that John is reckless, where the notion of

a

concept-

ual e-reason is intended to analyze the intuitive
notion of

using an expression in

a

particular sense.

The topic,

the

presupposition, does not entail this presupposition.
In contrast,

on the new proposal

the topic, P’, does entail

that on this occasion a sense, or usage, exists.

above,

As noted

this allows an assignment of content to the topic

belief, which the original analysis did not.

analyses the guestion presupposes that

a

Thus on both

sense exists;

however, on the new analysis but not the old this follows

from the presupposition of the topic alone.
A difficulty with

mentioned previously,

the new analysis is now apparent.
it

was possible on the original

As
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analysis tor

corrective answer to deny the pr
esuppost on
sense exists on this occasion without
denying
a

1

that

a

the

presupposition that the topic obtains.
possible for

a

corrective answer

That is,

it

was

that A1

is

using

to deny

reckless" in any particular sense without
denying that A1
believes that John is reckless. Such an
answer is true when
the content of Al’s belief is the default
content
w

the new analysis,
to deny

it

is not

the existence of

denying the topic.

How,

a

possible for

a

corrective answer

a

particular sense without also

then, can the new analysis account

for what the answers do not deny?

positing

Only,

it

would appear, by

pragmatic presupposition, equal to what consti-

tuted the topic on the original analysis.
in

But on

.

question can be said to deny

P’

fhen the answers

without denying this

pragmatic presupposition.
But now it

nowhere.

is clear

that the new analysis has gotten us

Its original purpose was to eradicate the belief

which served as the topic on the original analysis, so as to
avoid the problem of assigning
though,

it

content

w

.

It

turns out,

that this belief has not been eradicated;

that it no longer serves as topic.

it's just

But so long as it still

exists, so does the problem of assigning it content
put matters another way:

Partee’s proposal is not

w
a

To

.

way of

pursuing option (3).
Another route to the same conclusion is as follows.
Recall that on my original analysis what justifies the
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listener’s assumption of the topic
is
tional principle,

simple disquota-

a

licensing the passage from direct
dis-

course to

a

proposal,

this belief attribution is not
really the topic.

But even
of

it

belief attribution (pp. 39-90).

this is so,

it

On Partee's

doesn’t follow that the principle

attribution isn’t valid.

For this we would need some

account of why the principle fails, and no
such account has
been offered.
Lacking such an account, we must acknowledge
the existence of the problematic belief.
So

example

the new analysis of WDYM-quest i ons such as
that of

does not resolve the dilemma

8

resolve.

Moreover,

original analysis.

complete

it

-

in

I

cannot see that

lo begin with,

particular

,

it
it

was supposed to
is

preferable to my

am not sure how to

1

how to characterize the con-

trast-class and relevance relation accompanying the new
topic P

was

a

Furthermore,

.

it

seems to me ad hoc to render what

semantic presupposition on the original analysis as

(merely) pragmatic presupposition.

(See p.

a

79 for some of

the original motivation for the presupposition in question.)

Finally,

it

seems to me that the new analysis ignores

crucial task, that of explaining what
a

inference.

is to use a word

it

particular sense, where this involves

a

a

kind of necessary

The notion of a conceptual e-reason was deve-

loped with this task in mind, but on the new analysis no

analogous attempt is made; rather, the topic and relevance

relation (insofar as the latter

is

in

discernible) simply

.
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appeal to the intuitive notion of

a

sense.

1

he approach

thus tails prey to the vagueness of
this notion (see p. 96).

conclude,

1

pursue option
course,
know,

in any event,

(3)

is a

false start.

that option (3)

it

is.

is not

For the moment

of

assigning content^ to

it

seems to me to be

it

a

that Partee's attempt to

a

It

doesn’t follow, of

the correct one; for all

1

am not sure how the problem

I

vague belief can be resolved,

very difficult problem, and

I

leave

as a subject for future research.
To sum up,

the attempt to account for T1 and T2

m

terms ot the current theory of mean i ng / content is not yet

successful,

say the least.

to

how the content of

a

For it

vague belief is analyzable by content

and even if it were clear that it is,
c

^

ear w hat properties of content

III.

given

a

I

he truth — cond

1

1

i

l

t

ions

of

a

sentence is "truth-

ons of

a

sentence determine,

w

A related

notion, one which turns out to be relevant to T3,

henceforth,

a

sentence is true

i_n

is that of
a

sense

-

"tis-conditions"

(he notion

is clear

;

would do the account ino

world, whether the sentence is true.

the conditions under which

w

still wouldn’t be

it

Constraints and Tis-Cond

Another term for the content

conditions".

isn’t clear whether or

enough intuitively.

The tis-con-

ditions of "John is reckless", for example, consist

of

.

198

-orlds in Whl ch John runs red lights,
worlds
which John
spends money without checking his
account, and so forth.
Whereas a sentence’s truth-conditions
on an occasion are

m

equal

to

its content

that occasion,
er s meaning,

i.e.

its

t

^

relative to the speaker’s meaning on

its character evaluated at that
speak1

s-cond 1 t 1 ons are occasion-independent,

and can be specified by quantifying over
speaker’s meanings.
1

he

t

15-condi

t

ions of a sentence S are given by that func-

tion from worlds to truth-values which, when
given a world

yieids true just when, for some speaker’s meaning

-’

intension of S evaluated at
A

sentence’s

conditions of

1

s-cond 1

t

1

1

the

and w yields true.

s-cond 1 t i ons are equivalent to the truth-

construction resulting from the application

the sentential

of
t

a

t

s

s,

"in a sense" operator

.

f-or

example, the

ons of "John is reckless" are identical to the

content^, relative to any speaker’s meaning, of "In
John is reckless".

sense

a

The following is derivable from the

semantic rule S 9 of the previous chapter:
"(I <R(j))" is true at s and w iff "Rj" is true at s’
s
and w for some s
where s and s’ are speaker’s
mean l ngs
,

suppress reference to the model and assignment.)

<1

Thus

the truth-conditions of "In a sense John is reckless",

relative to any speaker's meaning, are defined by

a

function

from worlds to truth-values wh ich yields true just for those

worlds at which "John is reckless" is true for some speaker s meaning.
’

But this same function defines the tis-condi-

199

tions of

"John is reckless".

Corresponding to the notion of the tis-conditions
of a
sentence is the notion of the "s-membersh
ip conditions" of a
predicate P, i.e. a function from worlds to
sets of indivi-

duals which are P in

sense.

a

(For simplicity

assume here

1

that functions from individuals to truth-values
are total,

that they may be identified with sets of

so

individuals.)

Ihis is a function which, when given a world w,
yields the

set
fx: x belongs to
of P at s and w,

And

just as the

sion of

a

I

g

the result of evaluating the intension
for some speaker's meaning s>.

operator serves to transform the inten-

sentence into its tis-conditions, the

serves to transform the intension of
s

a

I

p

operator

predicate into its

membership conditions, as may be verified by inspection

the rule S10 of the previous chapter.

Thus the s-membership

conditions of P are given by the content
speaker's meaning) of

I

p

of

w

(relative to anv
7

(P).

Knowing the tis-conditions of

a

vague sentence is

equivalent to knowing the constraints on possible speaker's
meanings.

If one

meaning for
is also
is

a

is able

to recognize a given speaker's

sentence S as falling within constraints, one

able to recognize certain worlds as ones in which S

true in

a

particular sense

-

namely,

in that sense

corresponding to the given speaker's meaning; and conversely.

We might put it this way:

for all s,

if s

(a

propo-

.

dUO

sition)

is a

is able

to

constrained speaker's meaning tor

recognize that

meaning tor S

s

is a

b,

then one

constrained speaker's

and only if on e is able to recognize
that

if

the set ot worlds in which s is true is
a subset ot S’s
t

1

s-cond 1

t

1

ons

Having the former ability tor all

.

equivalent to knowing the characteristic tunction

set

b^_
A

described on p.

ability for all
l

ot

is

the set

constrained (propositional) speaker’s meanings (e.g.
the

ot

t

s

s

is

113), while having the latter

equivalent to knowing the tis-condi-

ons

Similarly, knowing the s-membership conditions of

a

vague predicate P is intuitively equivalent to knowing the

constraints on possible speaker’s meanings.

recognize

to

given speaker’s meaning tor

a

If
a

one is able

predicate as

falling within constraints, one is also able to identify

certain individuals in
cular sense

-

namely,

a

in

given world as being P in

tor all p,

if p

(a

property)

er s meaning for a predicate P,
'

nize that
if

is a

We can put

it

this

constrained speak-

then one is able to recog-

constrained speaker’s meaning

is a

p

parti-

that sense cor respond i ng to the

given speaker’s meaning; and conversely.
way:

a

it

and only

one is able to recognize that the set of individuals

which have

p

in a world

is a subset of P’s s-membership

conditions evaluated at that world.
ability for all

p

is

Having the former

equivalent to knowing the character-

istic function of the set of

(

pred i cat i ve

)

speaker’s mean-

.

£01

mgs

(e.g.

the set

described on

113

p.

),

while having

the latter ability for all
p is equivalent to knowing the

s-membership conditions.
Note that

if

0

i

such that

5

valent to 0/Ip, where 0/I

s

<

0

)

i5

logically equi-

that construction formed by

is

p

I

attaching predicate modifiers to each predicate

P

of
l

which is sensitive to

a

the tis-condi tions of

0

in part by the

a

may be regarded as being determined

intension of each

the previous chapter,

there is

speaker’s meaning coordinate, then

1^(0

I

p

(P

is not

)

).

But as we saw in

equivalent to 0/1

So the intension of

)

it

comparative operator in the language which makes

two— place predicates out of one— place predicates.
168.

,

contribution to the

t

i

I

s-cond

p
l

(P
t

l

)

is not

(See p.

necessarily

a

ons of a sentence in which P
l

occurs
We have that knowledge of constraints on possible

speaker’s meanings for
ledge of

0

’

s

a

sentence 0 is equivalent to know-

tis-conditions, which is equivalent to know-

ledge of the truth-conditions of 1^(0

>•

The question of

whether the identification of intension with meaning ac-

counts for T3» i.e.

licenses the inference from knowing the

meaning to knowing constraints on speaker’s meanings, may
thus be reduced to the question of whether knowing the

intension of 0

entails knowing the intension of 1^(0

).

now turn to the consideration of this question.
What is

it

to

"know the intension" of an expression?

I

1

bob

Well,

the relevant sense is the one in
which

competent speaker knows intensions,
since
an observation about the abilities
of
But what sense is this?

have to address

a

semantically
intended as

is

competent speaker.

a

To fully answer

number of fundamental

Mont ago v i an semantic theory which

T3

a

this, one would

issues raised by the

have adopted, e.g. the

I

issue of how entities like functions and
possible worlds can

characterize cognitive abilities.
the concerned reader

is hereby referred

We may note, however,
v

i

cannot do this here;

I

that

a

sources. 5

to other

crucial tenet of the Montago-

an account of semantic competence is the rigorous
version

compos 1

of

1

1

ona

1

ty whereby the

intension of

a

complex

expression is computed "bottom— up" from the intensions
structural parts.

On this account,

knowing the intension of
1

f"

1

1

^r ^ 1 ° r'=> of basic
1

a

competent speaker

a

s

sentence entails knowing the

constituents and knowing the composi-

tional procedures for combining these intensions.
a

of

competent speaker could know the intension of

a

That is,

complex

only by knowing how to "compute" it.
Let us conclude,

then,

knowing the intension of

intensions of

a

competent speaker's

sentence 0 entails knowing the

0’s basic parts and the semantic rules tor

0’s constructions.
not entail

a

that

Still, knowing the intension of

knowing the intension of

I

<_,

(

0

)»

since the "in

sense" operator is not, or anyway need not be,
of

0

.

0 does

a

a

basic part

Evidently, for the entailment to hold we must assume

.
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competent speaker to know, not only the
intensions
parts and the rules for
'5 constructions,
a

0

ot

rfl's

but also the

intension ot "Ig" and the rule tor it.

7

that this can be reasonably assumed only

It

would appear

if

we take "compe-

tent speaker", as the term appears in T3, to
mean or to

entail competent, not just with respect to

respect to the language as

arises whether
speaker
1

aside,

it

is

a

whole.

but with

The question then

reasonable to so take "competent

"

believe that

it

First of all,

is.

it

is arguable,

that it is not cognitively possible for

a

T3

competent

speaker to know the meaning of one sentence in isolation
from the meanings of many other sentences.

That 15

,

is

it

arguable that in some cognitive sense competence with
respect to

moreover

,

a

sentence entails "overall" competence.

But

T3 would simply not seem as plausible to me were

"competent" to be taken narrowly.

The ability it notes ot

competent speakers involves broad cognitive abilities, in

particular the capacity for commonsense reasoning, and

it

is

not plausible to suppose that one who knows the meaning

merely of some particular sentence

-

possible - must have these abilities.
somewhat impressionistic,

I

assuming this to be
This consideration is

admit, but seems to me suffi-

cient to establish that the pretheoret 1 ca 1 notion of competence in T3 is one of overall competence.
1

conclude that equating meaning with intension does

v

.

£ 0*4

provide

a

tenable account of T3.

For

it

reasonable to

is

take ''semantically competent" to entail
or mean overall

competence.

In that case a

knowing the intension of
the intensions of
or

all)

semantically competent speaker's
vague sentence $ entails knowing

a

(most or all) basic expressions and (most

semantic rules for complex expressions, which

entails knowing the intension of I^(^$

IV.

Conclusion

Identifying the meaning of
Mont ago
T1

1

).

a

vague sentence with its

an intension provides an account of

or T£.

However,

f3,

but not of

is not at ail clear that the semantic

it

theory is really to blame for the failures, as I’ve noted.
And even

if

this were clear

,

been shown to do any better.

no alternative theory has yet
I

conclude that

it

would be

premature to give up on the theory (which is successful
other domains) as

a

way of explaining what

I

in

have identified

as the phenomena of vagueness
I

emphasize that

I

am considering here the meaning of a

vague sentence, not just any sentence.

While some have

quite generally rendered intension as meaning,
seem correct to do so.

For example,

it

the meaning of

natural kind term is certainly not its intension,
is what

is known by a

doesn’t

competent speaker.

y

if

a

meaning

We needn’t then

give up on intension as an analysis of meaning; we simply

£05

need to proceed on

a

case-by-case basis.

That is what

doing in considering whether the meaning of

a

I

am

vague sentence

could be its intension.
(hough

meaning ot

I

a

have not succeeded in accounting for the

vague sentence,

hope to have shown that an

I

adequate theory of meaning can and must incorporate speaker’s meanings as truth-determiners.

And

I

hope to have

satisfactorily explained the notion of speaker’s meaning and
how

it

relates to vagueness.

I

leave as a project for the

future the task of making my story more nearly complete.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1.

See Kaplan (1977).

£.

See Stalnaker

(1985),

for a recent defense.

Actually, what would be needed would be an appeal, not
just to a sentence's intension, but to its "structured
m ^<3ning"
i .e.
a tree structure isomorphic to the sentence's
syntactic analysis tree and which has at each node the
intension of the constituent which is at the cor r espond i ng
node of the syntactic tree; see Lewis (1972), and Cresswell
(1985).
This is because the vagueness of a sentence is
always with respect to a particular constituent, but the
intensions of the sentence's constituents are not
recoverable from the intension of the sentence.
3.

>

I
repeat that a vague belief is one which corresponds to
the acceptance of a vague sentence, and that I do not mean
by this the belief whose object is determined by the
character of the sentence plus context, in the manner
suggested by John Perry.
(See p. 115, note 2.)
I
could not
mean this, since I am taking a vague belief to be
attributable before knowing what the speaker's meaning is or
whether there is one, i.e. before knowing the relevant
feature of context.
Rather, I mean the belief whose
specification is related by a "disquotational" principle to
the accepted sentence.

9.

See, e.g., Lewis (1972), Cresswell
1985

5.
(

)

(1985), and Stalnaker

.

See Partee (1989) for discussion.

6.

7. The intension of "in a sense" is not discernible from S9
of the previous chapter, the semantic rule for "in a sense”,
But S9 has a compositional
which is synac tegor emat i c
equivalent one which would compute the intension of
and 0
from the intensions of I
I
0
.

,

(

.

)

This is a departure from Putnam (1975), who concludes
that meaning "ain't in the head", and hence might well be an
But as Putnam himself
intension in the current sense.
notes, the twin-earth thought experiment shows only that
whatever is in the heads of competent speakers doesn't
determine extension; meaning may then be taken either as
I
have
what's in the head or as what determines extension.
chosen the former, inconsistently with Putnam's terminology
but not with his main argument.
8.
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appendix
FOCUS AND CONTRAST-CLASS

In Chapter 2,

argued that the contrast-class of

I

a

question depends on psychological factors under deter i
m ned by
the focus,

if

there is one, of the interrogative that one is

disposed to utter.

Since these psychological factors depend

on the case at hand,

unsystematic.

the determination of contrast-class is

The contrast-class of a WDYli-quest 1 on may,

however, be regarded as the result of the interaction of

psychological component together with
which is determined by focus.

a

a

systematic component

My goal here is to spell this

out.

Mats Rooth, presupposing

assigns

a

set of semantic rules which

a

semantic object s(E) to every expression

E of a

language, defines the notion of the "p— set" p(E) corresponding to E as follows:
E
(a)

p

(

)

is

the set of objects in the model matching s(E) in
type, if E is focussed
(b) the unit set fs(E)>, if E is a non-focussed basic

expression
(c) the set of objects which can be obtained by picking
one element from each of the p-sets corresponding to
the component phrases of E, and applying the semantic
rule for E to this sequence of elements, if E is a
non-focussed complex expression.

(See Rooth

(1985), p.

19;

I

have taken minor liberties with

his wording and terminology.)

corresponding to "Adam

a te

So,

for example,

the apple"

207

is,

the p-set

by the application

t

208
of

(c)

to

the whole sentence, of <b)

"ate", and of (c)

to

"the apple",

is

to

-Adam", of (a)

to

the set of propositions

which differ from the proposition that
Adam ate the apple
exactly with respect to the propositional
constituent

corresponding to "ate", i.e. sC'ate").
For WDYM-questions with a saying-that
or be 1 i ev i ng- 1 ha

topic, and which are expressed by

hybrid-quotes,

I

i

nter r ogat i ves with

propose the following link between focus

and contrast-class.
The p-set of a sentence expressing the topic of
the
question, where those constituents of the sentence
which correspond to the quoted constituents of the
i nterrogat i ve
are treated as focussed, is identical to
the default contr ast— c 1 ass of the question.

By the "default" contrast-class,

trast-class

if

I

mean the actual con-

there are no psychological factors at work

narrowing down the p-set; if there are such factors, then
the actual contr ast — c 1 ass is some proper subset of the

default contr ast— c 1 ass

.

for example,

So,

the

p — set

of

"A1

believes that John is reckless", where this is the focussed
counterpart of the topic of

a

WDYM— quest i on expressed by

"What do you mean, John is 'reckless’?",

is

identical to the

default contr ast-c 1 ass of the question, which is the actual

contrast-class of example

8 of Chapter

II.

(This supersedes

my previous simpler but more ad hoc account of that con-

trast-class, according to which

proposition that

A1

it

contains simply the

believes that John is not reckless.)

Note that this account could not apply to WDYM-ques-

.
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t

ions expressed by mention-quote

i

nter r ogat i ves

,

because

while mention-quotes do serve to focus an
expression, they
do not permit

doesn’

t

interpretation, so that the notion of

a

p-set

app 1 y

Inasmuch as the notion of
tic theory,

a

p-set presupposes

a

seman-

so does the notion of a default contrast-class.

The theory must be very rich,

focus in natural

since the concern is with

language, and must be intensional, since

the contr ast-c 1 ass is a set of propositions.

Beyond this,

the commitment to a semantic theory is not specific.

particular, there is no commitment to

a

(In

particular treatment

of belief reports.)
It

the semantic theory is such that intuitively synony-

mous propositions need not be identical, then the default
contr

as t — c 1 ass

,

which is typically very large, may easily

contain propositions synonymous with the topic.
ple,

in

example 8 of Chapter

2,

it

contains the proposition

that A1 believes that John is careless.
that this is

a

For exam-

It

might be thought

problem for my account of proper senses as

speaker’s meanings which do well on the favoring criterion
(as well

as meeting other constraints),

since

it

may seem

that intuitively proper senses, e.g. that corresponding to

Al’s meaning that John spends money without ever checking
his account, no longer do well on the favoring criterion.
But this isn’t so.

While it is true, for example, that Al’s

believing that John spends money without ever checking his

1

eiu

account doesn’t particularly favor Al’s
believing that John
is reckless over Al’s believing
that John is careless, it
does favor Al’s believing that John is
reckless over

great

a

many other members of the (default) contrast-class,
which

suffices for overall goodness on the favoring
criterion.
(See Chapter 2, p.

Still,

it

17.)

may plausibly be argued that the p-set

procedure yields contrast-classes which are too big.
contr ast-c 1 ass should not be generated from

a

1

A

the semantic

objects of the appropriate type, but only those in the same
"cognitive category" as the original topic constituent.
example,

it

For

might be urged that the contrast-class of the

question of example 8 should contain propositions such as
that A 1 believes that John is lazy and that A1 believes that

John is friendly

-

propositions generated by dispositional

properties such as that of being reckless

-

but not, for

example, the proposition that A1 believes that John

tractor

.

is a red

This point of view is supported by the fact that

contr ast-c lasses are supposed to have psychological signi-

ficance of some sort.
a

However

,

it

seems possible to regard

"cognitively real" contr ast-c 1 ass as the result of the

interaction of systematic semantic component, defined by the
p-set procedure, and, optionally, psychological factors

which narrow down the set of possibilities.
tioned,

As I’ve men-

this view is needed anyway in order to account for

particular contextual interests.

But perhaps "psychological

di

factors" may be taken to include, in addition
to contextual
factors, relatively context-independent
factors which

determine

a

cognitively coherent set of alternatives.

Uf course,

the nature of "cognitive categories" must

still be explicated.

undertaken here.

But that is not

a

task which can be

1

..

.

.

.
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